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Show U. 5. ST. MIHIEL LINE BORDERS BASIN VITAL TO AIMSOF GERMANY Further Retreat of Kaiser's Annies Upon Western Front Is Rendered Necessary by Waning Man-power. By WALTEB UTTXEFIELB, New York Times Blilitary Expert, (New York Times-Chicago Tribune Cabie, Copyright, 1318.) NEW YORK, Sept. 21. Th first American army, having established estab-lished a line northwest and southeast south-east across the St, M'ihiel salient through Ronvaux, Manheulles, Pintheville. St. KUaire, Doncourt, WoeL Hanmont, Jaulny, Vandieres and thence south to Chambley and Norroy, seems deterred from further advance for tbe moment Still a sufficient objective for the attack was attained on tho first day the opening of the railway which runs , from Verdun down to Ton! and Nancy. Guns on the American right wing have already engragred those of the fortress of MeU. The American line Is on the edg-e of the Basin-de-Bry, whose possession Is vitaJ to Germany's continuing the war. It is j less than fifteen miles from the great trunk line Metz-Mezieres; which, feeds the I enemy's front to the northwest as far as i Champagne. MOVE WOULD MENACE METZ. Possibly the American army is gathering gather-ing itBelf for a leap to attain these objectives. ob-jectives. It Is on the edge of the high ground which sheds many streams through a rocky wooded region to the Onie. To the northeast is a ridge protecting pro-tecting the approaches to the great iron region. The position of the Americans would be much relieved by an attack of the French down the Orne from their strategic positions northeast of Verdun, but the best move would be an advance of the right wing of the American army itself, tog-ether with the French second army from the Grande Couronne of Nancy Into Lorraine. That would menace Met from the east. Its twenty-eight forts are, already drawing- fire from the south and west. On September 16 the Fourth British army, under General Rawlinson, and the first French, under General Iebeney, made a. direct attack upon the defenses of St. Quentln. apparently with tho idea df enveloping the city, bwt In reality to reach the St. Qaentha cattaL which rtms north to Cambrai, where it Johns the j Canal De-Lescoat. the Scheldt canal. T he-attack he-attack was made from a twenty-two mile : base li ne extending" from Just north of GonEeaocourt, ten miles southwest of Cambrai, to Castren, four milea southweet of St. Quentln. Tbe famous defensive positions of the Hi n don burg lino were overrun at two points, at VGleret Aud from Holnon to Pontru. ENEMY WILL DEFEND CANAL. September 18 the Germans counter-attacked in forces with particular concentration concen-tration against Moewrres and TlavTin-court, TlavTin-court, occupying the farmer. On the following fol-lowing day the British retook Moeuvres in part and completely reoccupied it two days later. Although St Qnentin has lone since lost Its tactical value for the enemy, It is evident that he will defend the canal at great cost. Meanwhile, there is no doubt of the attempt of De-beney's De-beney's army to envelop tho city from the south, where on September lt it- captured Eseigny-le-Grand. An advance hero two in lies east would torn the flank of the canaL On March 21 Germany had TU active divisions and sixty (at th maximum) in reserve on the western front. Of these Lwdeodorff had available for hie work 110 active and twenty -three reserve, re-serve, or, in all, 1,729,000 men. With these men he attacked a front 135 miles in length, with an available average strength of 8SS6 men to the mile. His superb strategic positions before Lille, Cambrai and SL Quentln permitted him to break through the allies lines; Ms superb line of communication permitted him to press through an overwhelming ma of troops in the breaches thus made. In this way he expanded the battle line from 135 miles to 250, the maximum of the perimeter reached only July 1&. He had established three huge arcs, but theare arcs were quite incapable of stratoglo use, as the allies still held the sectors (Continued on Pag Flv.) ST. 1IEL UI 01 VITAL MSB (gotlnned from Pago One) which con routed thp,nx On that day bo hnd avaiLOJe L.794,000 troopa, or only 7180 man for every one of the 250 mii ironp; which Koch had bn Quietly ea-fcihllihiittT ea-fcihllihiittT positions at evwrv fitmtrrc point. No longer did T,tidndorCr ha sufficient men to concwrtrrvt om one ec tor without eiponin a.no-ther. To be sur ho had been heavTrr re-Infotrned. re-Infotrned. Two new armiwii, Von Even's ar.d Von Mu'lra'B, had TOrao to tb rea-nwi rea-nwi of tfie Imperial crovm prince In Q aW.-impl to xtricatr5 hhn Crora tbe Manire. Twelve divisions had beiia refitUL In nil, 2US5,W0 men h.nd bean ecnt Mm. But liis casiia.lt :es vorc elosto to a voii-Hm, voii-Hm, VJ nr fit na t3-tP3m 1,0,00 mn own from ? It do,;e not particularly matter. The. tact tli3.t aomo of ths divsakniB, aftor ro.fi nins. were Ftt back to the line wit-h only S000 mon ins -ad of th-it four divirV7i3 of Airtruins axid two of Bul-piiriatis Bul-piiriatis were oiJIod for, tells Its own story reveal why I.-aderdorff ha3 boon retntintr V-cforc Koch ever since., striving striv-ing to rrnch in tlio most eronomlc manner man-ner poseMrlo his orlglnaJ line of Oepasr-ture Oepasr-ture which hrd a pertcrwtw oo Murch IU of Hi5 miles. Morale Flays Part. At points he haji reactifcd iL At oOrer points he has bc.ea driven beyrnd It. He must go still further, for tbe simple rea-?on rea-?on that trot in Flanders or Artois, not on t he Aien e. In Champoarne or in tbo Arjijonne, Iorraine and Alsace, hae he sufficient men to hold a lin 500 miles Ion;,', even if ttwi mon he has were not obsessed wiLh the idea of defeat, with the vital fact of their loesses with tbe yearning for individual eelf-preservation at almost any prVce. Wliat has happened since TudrndorfT lost and Foch gained the InttiatJve has leen this: FirsL, the G-ernasui leador'3 shortening of the line ltaa efe.bled him to augment hJs reserves by between thirty and forty divisions. (We can i mtLge wiiat the condition ol theoe divisions di-visions must be.) On the other hanA, In order to refit other divisioos be has been oblifred to disband twenty. There ts no true criterion of hie casualties, but these can bardty be fewer than another million, and arided to that lost while his great offensive was la flo-wer, for between Juiy IS and Aujrnst 29 120,000 prisoners were recorded and eriiwe then nearly S,00O have boon reported taken. Bat the readiness readi-ness with which bodies of prlsonera nav thrown down the!r amis, while it speaks vol times of tbe wautng nxrale ol the enemy, ru pturea tbe usua4 ratio between t nombers of prisoners and the balance bal-ance of ca-suaJ ties. Ltsdendorf Ps Goal Now, admitting the fact that &nett-dVrrfT &nett-dVrrfT most inevitably shorten his Hne or sufler the loss o whole armies, poesfbfy a decisive defeat, t--e question is, how will he try to do it, and what will be his g-oal? It may parenthetlcany be remarked re-marked that henceforth his movements will not be uninfluenced by wbatt hi passing in political circles to Berlin and Vienna. IO Ty? before the Austrian peace mrte arrived the diplomats of the entente had been tipped off that it would contain a clause asking1 for an armistice. Few -vara have ever survived an armistice; still the note did not contain the request for one. It Is believed that tt was dropped at the last moment on the order of the German kaiser, because he believed that his peace offer to Belgium, simultaneously simultaneous-ly made, might prevail. With Beljrium out of tire war there would be no necessity neces-sity for shortening the line in France. But Belgium has rejected the tainted olive branch and will fifrnt on. Besides, the Autro-Hungarian govern- I mTTt haa not bon mitlrastartrto or Qia t aimbtc method of endlas tho war sloo . ItaJy lat Octobr toraed It down. R-e-fUTOd by Belfrrum, It la on tho cards thru Ocrmotiy hrseif win demand an arrata-! arrata-! oa thono hviTtia.no gronndii whic.h ehanLctcrhra most of the TfmtonJc pro-i pro-i noiincoments from hSh places.' Menj-. Menj-. wlitle. However, I.udondorff must do j eomeUilaK to wve the Oerman armies. |
