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Show SECOND YEAH OF IS) REVIEWED H! STATESMAN Marquis de Chambrun Declares De-clares Anxiety Has Shifted From Entente Powers to the Teutons. PREPARATIONS NOW COMPLETE Allies, With Plenty of Big Guns and Munitions of War, Look Forward to Victory Over Kaiser. PA"RIS, July 29. "The second year of the war euds with anxiety shifting from the group of the entente powers to that of our adversaries, who are now obliged to meet a general combined offensive on every front," said Marquis Mar-quis do Chambrun, a member of the foreign aiVaira committee of the chamber cham-ber of deputies, in summarizing the military situation for the A8sociated Press at the close of the war's second year. ''While French, British and Russian preparations become more complete, a crisis of exhaustion is fast arising for tho Austrians and Germans. Our iad-vcrsaries iad-vcrsaries thought it would be impossible impossi-ble for us to preparo, and certainly during dur-ing the Mist year of tho war there were diilicultien that had to be overcome. Wo are proud to say that this wus accomplished accom-plished oven while our valiant soldiers were resisting the German invasion. Thanks to tho patriotism of the country coun-try and the abnegation shown by all classes in franco and England; thanks also to tho campaign in both countries for more cannon and more ammunition, industrial action was everywhere multiplied multi-plied and General Joffre was able to say in fin order of the day to the army at Verdun,"" ' We have .munitions in abundance.' ' "The Austrians and Germans re sorted to submarine warfare which I will not attempt to qualify. It may continue to work- harm in a piratical 1 form, but it will not open ports nor further the commercial aims and needs ; of the central empires, now effectively blockaded, nor will it restore to German Ger-man v her lost colonies. "'fhe Russians are continuing their work successfully on tho eastern front. They have again invaded Bukowina and are pushing forward in the region of Lutsk and into the Carpathians, -while ' Grand Duke Nicholas is advancing vic- toriously in the Caucasus. I' . v j Ascendency of Allies. I "The Mosor one examines the situ- j, ation the more manifest becomes the anticipated ascendency of the allies, in- creasing as time goes on because of ; their unrestricted resources and un- shaken confidence in victory." ; From various critics and experts on i military affairs expressions have been obtained from which the military situation, situa-tion, according to the French view, may ' be summarized as follows: The extent of tho difficulties of the central empires does not even now appear ap-pear from the state of the war as viewed from a geographical standpoint, , hut has shown itself in the changed tactics tac-tics in evidence and is becoming ob-; ob-; vious in the altered map. The opep- j ations of the Franco-British armies, out- i f numbered in men and guns during the ' first six months, saved France by sheer heroism, but could not end the war; could onlv prolong it and gain time. The Russians pushed into East Pussia, ; conquered Bukowina, invaded Galicia, ! crossed the Carpathians and even ' threatened Silesia, but exhausted their armament in April 1915, and lacked ' even the essentials for defense. The Germans knew it would bo impossible for Great Britain and France to have caught up in nine months vith the Germans ' forty-five years' preparations and felt themselves free, dealing first with France, to turn upon the Russian armies. Nine divisions transported from the Franco-British front reinforced the Austrians. and the offensive against the Russians began in May. Bv the end of July Przemysl and Lembcrg had been retaken and the Russians were consider in j; the abandonment of Warsaw War-saw and he line of the Vistula. Short even of rifles, many of Emperor Nicholas Nicho-las "s troops defended themselves with I clubs during the long retreat in which was accomplished the second miracle of the war, the continuity of their line being be-ing everywhere maintained, as well as the integrity of the Russian armies. Superior Man for Man. The battle of Arras in June, 1915, was considered, to have proven the allies, al-lies, man for man, able to beat the Germans Ger-mans in the offensive, other things be-in be-in js. equal, but the munitions and artillery ar-tillery of the opposing forces were -not yet equal. The transformation of field tactics as the war progressed multiplied the need for heavy guns and powerful projectiles to break through concrete-armored concrete-armored lines. This transformation thus increased the superiority of belligerents bel-ligerents who had the initial advantage advan-tage in preparation, forcing their adversaries ad-versaries to a greater expenditure of munitions than their industries were as yet able to produce, while they themselves them-selves were able to shower the Russian lines with the biggest of shells. At tho same time the enigmatic situation sit-uation in the Orient became serious, Greece refusing the compensation offered for territorial concessions to Bulgaria which might have facilitated a union of the Balkan states. The situation in Persia and Asia Minor following the entry of Turkey into the war had developed de-veloped a menace to Great Britain in the far east. The favorable impression produced by the advance north of Arras had diminished in the absence of further operations, and there was a notable absence ab-sence of news favorable to tho allies. More Munitions. "More cannon, more ammunition," was the comment of the French people on the difficulties that beset them. Women and girls joined in the efforts of the trained mechanics brought back from the armies to the forge and the lathe, and the curve of munitions production pro-duction took a sharp upward turn. The industrial efforts of the allies were given the required time by the resistance resis-tance of the Russian armies. The Germans Ger-mans advanced, but they could neither destroy nor dislocate the Russian forces. Despite the formidable effort of the contra! powers, Dvinsk held out and winter win-ter .was upon Field Marshal von Hin-deuburii's Hin-deuburii's armies with the Russian cain- ,Paifin. unfinished. Even had it terminated then it was too late to turn against the allies in the west. Grand Duke Nicholas Nicho-las had won for the French and the British the entire fall and winter in which to continue their preparation. While intensifying to the utmost their production of arms and ammunition, the allies began early in the second year of hostilities, with the visit of Fiefd Marshal Mar-shal Earl Kitchener (to France, the series of conferences th'at was finally to co-ordinate their military effort. Their diplomatic action, however, did not as yet reflect the same unity of purpose. No parallel result was obtained ob-tained either at Athens or Sofia in negotiations regarding territory in Macedonia offered to Bulgaria, and there appeared to be a divergence of views among the allies as to further action. Negotiation's were still in progress prog-ress when Turkey ceded the Dedea-gatch-Mustapha Pass railroad, with part of Adrianople, to Bulgaria, foreshadow-, ing the latter 's action against the allies. al-lies. Meanwhile, the Germans and tAus-trians, tAus-trians, after crossing the Vistula' and occupying Russian Poland, transported part of the troops from the Russian front to the Save and the Danube for another an-other offensive against Serbia, which, after her victory over the Austrians, had only 250,000 effective men left to oppose them. The French, in the Champagne and in the Artois in September, gained considerable consid-erable territory and made important captures in prisoners and material, but as in the preceding offensive north of Arras, in June, this movement failed of decisive results because of the narrowness nar-rowness of the front of the attack and the impossibility to push artillery preparation prep-aration deeply enough into the 6erman lines. That the offensive was considered consid-ered to have confirmed the superiority of the French soldier in attack in nowise no-wise altered the general situation, just then further complicated by the mobilization mobili-zation of the Bulgarian army menacing the Serbians, which threatened the eventual extension of the war to the far east, by the junction of the armies of tho central empires, Bulgarians and Turks. The Greek army was mobilized immediately, but King Constantine refused re-fused to sanction the government's policy pol-icy of intervention in favor of Serbia, Greece's ally, and forced Premier Veni-zelos Veni-zelos to resign. The allies, heavily engaged in the Dardanelles, now had to face either the eventuality of the crushing of Serbia and anunbpposed junction of the armies of the Teutonic powers with those of the Bulgarian-Turkish coalition, or the additional burden of a campaign in the Balkans. The 'Dardanelles expedition had accomplished no appreciable result, and the need of saving Serbia was more urgent than the opening of the straits.' Mesopotamia Campaign. There still appeared to b a certain lack of unanimity among the allies as to the Gallipoli peninsula and Saloniki. The landing at Saloniki was decided j upon, however, and, consented to by the Greek government before the resignation of Premier Venizelos; it began in early October. But it was too late to save Serbia, attacked by the Bulgarians on October 7, when the Germans and Austrians, Aus-trians, under Field Marshal von Macken- ; sen, already had taken Belgrade. Thouah they fought heroically, the Serbians were overwhelmed by attacks from two sides and driven into Albania, while the armies of the central powers formed a j junction with the Bulgarians and opened the route to Constantinople. The end of the first year of the -war was the beginning of' the second crisis I for the allies. a munitions crisis aggra-! vated by a diplomatic crisis requiring new enterprises that drew on their main forces. The landing of the French and j Brizish at the Dardanelles in April had weakened the allies elsewhere, reducing I the number of reserves on the main I front, and if it did not modify thoir j general plan it obviously matte the ; elaboration of new plans difficult and hampered their movements. New difficulties continued to dovelop for the allies, however. In Mesopotamia Mesopo-tamia the Turks stopped the advance of General Townshend's forces within twenty miles of Bagdad and drove him back to Kut-el-Amara, besieging him there. In Persia the gendarmerie revolted re-volted against the government, creating fresh embarrassments for the Russians. In tho Balkans, after the complete conquest con-quest of Serbia and the occupation of a considerable portion of Albania, the Austrians invaded Montenegro, and before be-fore the end of January all the Balkan peninsula, with the exception of Greece, Rumania and a little corner of Albania, Al-bania, was in the hands of the group of central empires. That marked the limit of their successes. suc-cesses. The advantage that time had gained for the allies began to tell. General Gen-eral Ivanoff , commanding the Russian armies in Volhvnia and Bessarabia, continued con-tinued their offensive in January with the occupation of Czartorysk. Itself unimportant, the significance of this operation lay in the revelation it furnished fur-nished of a refreshed and reinforced Russian army provided with new cannon, can-non, abundant supplies of projectiles and sufficient power to plow up German Ger-man field defenses. Of far- greater significance was the advance in the Caucasus b' Grand Duke Nicholas, forcing the fall of Erzerum, accomplishing the occupation of Kermanshah Ker-manshah and, in the military view here, virtually eliminating Turkey as a factor in the European war beside reestablishing re-establishing the prestige or the allies in Persia. Instead of a reservoir of men upon which they might draw to fill the void caused by eight months of heavy wastage, the central powers found at Constantinople only an additional addi-tional drain upon their resources. The Russian, advance not only meant the recall of Turkish divisions that were expected to help the Germans, Austrians and Bulgarians against the allies at Saloniki, but German and Austrian troops were sent with them to aid the defeated Ottoman forces in Armenia. Yet Trebizond fell after Erzerum : Mush was occupied, and the conquest of Armenia was nearly complete. The diversion in the east had failed to break the cordon of steel, and in February the coalition of the central empires was facing a crisis of greater gravity than any that had threatened the entente allies. The Bulgarian army was almost barefoot, the Turks, excepting at Kut-el-Amara, were everywhere defeated, and the wastage of the long and unsuccessful un-successful effort to take Dvinek had weakened Von Hindenburg so that he was incapable of undertaking a general offensive on the Russian front. Tho Austrians, left to themselves, had never succeeded, and the maintenance of a large force before Saloniki was required to hold Serbia and prevent the invasion of Bulgaria. The interior situation of Germany was officially admitted to be grave. In this embarrassment, as the French observers view it, the central powers, ardently desiring peace and urgently needing success to raise the spirits of the German people, depressed as they were by prolonged privations, looked to the French front and decided upon the adventure of Verdun. Attack on Verdun. The German plan seems originally to have been to concentrate artillery, munitions mu-nitions and men in such force over a limited length of front that the onrush would be irresistible. They chose Verdun Ver-dun because the position of the ancient fortress was such that the defenders had their backs to the river Meuse on two sides, and because success there would give the greatest possible prestige pres-tige with neutral powers and the maximum maxi-mum comfort to their own people. It was also possible thoy knew what subsequent sub-sequent political events in France disclosed dis-closed that the defenses of Verdun were not, in view of the field tactics of this war, as strong as other parts of the front. It is the belief of military experts that the Germans hoped to break through the front there and destroy de-stroy the French armies. It was imperative im-perative that success be rapid, according accord-ing to this view, and when, after three days, the advance was checked in the region of Douaumont; the project had failed. General Petam, as an official citation later revealed, had time to "reestablish "re-establish a delicate situation." There was no longer hope of breaking through the French front. Every yard of ground gained by the Germaus before Verdun since February 24 has been at an extremely heavy, sanguinary cost. The continuing of so expensive and fruitless an operation has puzzled the critics.' It has been advanced ad-vanced that the Germans persisted with the object of exhausting the French forces and venting an offensive by the allies elsewhere. If that end was in view., the successes of the allies in the battle of the Somme show it was not attained. The battle of Verddun, if ordered with the intention of interfering with the offensive plan of the allies, in nowise no-wise diminished the chances of carrying them out, whatever the fate of the discarded fortress, it having now no more significance apart from the prestige pres-tige of the name than any other poiut along the front. Local success there has long been discounted, and, in military mili-tary opinion, can have no vital effect, while the attempting of a wastage process by the central powers at this stage of the war is held to be illusory and certainly enormously costly. The central empires have no longer reserves in such numbers that they can afford to launch them against the allies in the mere hope of inflicting more damage than they suffer. The heroic defense of Verdun, on the other hand, has been for the allies one of the notable developments of the war. It held German reserves there in such numbers as to put an end to the shifting shift-ing of trqops from front to front. It prevented the reinforcement of the Austrians, Aus-trians, suffering from the loss of prisoners, pris-oners, with perhaps as many in casualties, casual-ties, to the armies under General Brus-siloff. Brus-siloff. It obliged the Germans to prolong pro-long during five months a vasT daily expenditure of projectiles that was ex- Eected to continue only a few days, and as so drawn upon their reserves or munitions mu-nitions that in the battle of the Somme they were able to reply to the French and British guns in the proportion of only one shot for three. The successful defense of Verdun and the successful offensives of the allies in the north of France and on the western west-ern front show at the end of the second sec-ond year of the war that the finallv-I finallv-I prepaVed war map on which the Ger-j Ger-j man chancellor held that the fillies i ought to accept negotiations is undergoing under-going singular modifications, with the Russians occupying Bukowina and part i of Galicia; the Italians recovering territory ter-ritory lost in the recent Austrian offensive offen-sive and still in possession of the Tsonzo region, and with the French and British in possession of more than thirty villages vil-lages on the banks of the Somme that had been occupied bv the Germans fori twenty months, and each of them trans- ' formed in the meanume into miuia- j ture fortresses. i The allies have caught up with tho ! advantage of the central powers in prop- i aration, and any further modifications ' of the respective positions of the con- : tending forces, it is believed, must be a reconquest of invaded territory bv the allies. The destruction of adversary forces is another and a far more difficult matter. mat-ter. In this war the end mav bo nearer than many hope or may vet 'be far distant. dis-tant. There are no bases on which to calculate the progress of military operations opera-tions or the resistance of the belligerents, belliger-ents, even when apparently doomed to defeat. What is clear is 'that the anticipated an-ticipated ascendancy of the allies, arising aris-ing from their unrestricted resources, appears to have been realized. |
