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Show LLOYD GEORGE. i Tv'o impediment will be placed in the way of Premier Lloyd George so far an the prosecution of the war is concerned, even though ho is at the head of a cabinet composed for the most part of Unionists. JiriKsh citizens of all ehi.sses apparently . aio in favor of throwing all the avail- ! a bin men and resources of the empire I into tho scale and make every possible pacririeo to emerge victorious from I he present awful struggle. Lloyd George, by reason oir his tremendous energy and tho record he has made since the outbreak out-break of hostilities, is undoubtedly the td rongest man in public li fo in Great e lliitaiu at the present moment and probably prob-ably t ho only man ablo to hold tho new ministry together long enough to accomplish ac-complish a ny thing. His success, however, how-ever, will depend in a great measure j upon the attitude of the Liberals who I have been displaced. 1 Former Premier Asquith has long been j a power" in Bri tish politics, but he is ! hist as Patriotic as anv other man in I the empire, and Lloyd Georgo has noth- 1 i n g to fear from him u n I ess tho new i ministry fails to accomplish the purpose ; for which it has been called into being, , or stirs up tho domestic political situa- i tion instead of allowing all such mat- j tors to rest until after tho war. The fact that ir Edward Carson is a mcni- j iher of tho new cabinet will give rise to j apprehension that he will meddle with I Irish affairs to such an extent as to i bring on another crisis. Tho Natioual- ists arc not represented in the ministry of Lloyd George, doubtless because the leaders refused to take office. They steadfastly declined official position during dur-ing the term of Asquith as premier, although al-though they heartily supported the Liberal Lib-eral government. They also may force the Irish question to the front before tho new cabinet has time to take its boa rings. One' of the principal drawbacks from which the rtVwly constituted war council coun-cil will suffer will be due to the fact that the cry of ''On to Berlin'' is likely to be raised .before the council has had time to formulate plans. A similar cry was heard io this country during ' the civil war, when "On to Richmond" was J shouted from all the hilltops north of Mason and Dixon 's line. Four years passed before the capital of tho confederacy confed-eracy fell. The British people ought not to expect that Lloyd George will be able to accomplish miracles or that by raising rais-ing his finger he will be able to change t he situation on the battle fronts in-stanter. in-stanter. With all his pent-up energy and capacity for government and his ability to keep things moving the new premier and head of the war council must have time to arrange all the preliminaries before be-fore giving the signal. Undue haste would undoubtedly be fatal to the hopes and aspirations of the entente allies. If t he former officials were dilatory and failed to measure up to the expectation of the people, nothing could be gained by precipitate action just now. Under the new regime considerable power wilt be concentrated in the hands of the prime minister, and Lloyd George will be more or less ot a dictate r n ui c h more so than any of his immediate predecessors. One of the first acts of the new government govern-ment will be to put the whole resources of the spirit trade under state control. The distillation of whisky and gin. will be prohibited. Absolute prohibition of; the consumption of spirits, except medic- I inally, and restriction on the beer trade' are expected. Tt requires almost auto- j cratic power in Great Britain to make anv kind of headway against the liquor I and beer interests. The ministry just ousted could not successfully cope with j : hese interests, and if Lloyd George 1 succeeds he will have reason to con- j gratulate himself and the country. Control of the food supply will be 1 more easily executed. For some time past such action has been deemed inevitable, inevi-table, and there will be few protests in any quarter. War plans at the front are not disclosed for obvious reasons. It is to be expected, however, that as soon as the nc'v-iiiy preparations are made thi-f-iritir-h ujli launch an offensive movement move-ment which, if iu-'irt-ful, uill derble the war in favor of the enU-nte allies in the near future. If not, then another year or two of slaughter may be expected. |