| Show 1 from the mi N 1 93 9 1 the r tion tio ot or est en otiis from frolia the Assar assaults litts of isis his UR enemies Une mies CIllie the st louis Dr democrat j J extract front from an dito in h lial be been uril the war var t at for I 1 tit of tol t ol I 1 censor fl by all out tile the tt t airl ly y HUL i capacity in co censure relli Is veil bildt iff TI alila ped lilun bmw cil job Johni loii hah ellay Is the lead of the accusations et ed but it alth ith the li to luco be full again gl t it mignion Mir nion 1 mn it i juto t till am bounder miler have a contrata ts for in I 1 the cont t alwell d we t on alila l ill not tot tilt 1 the he tilt atall iii anny r Y atun klon to direct ng iw i w 1 lie h k end 11 1 1 GUI PI of liy the tha dt decil of 0 by nui no blavet jonnston Job hil has geduld tile his but by obstinate obIt luit of agn or deoly or of ilnia tin lio lie for to kiihl or nine months miles of salt sit malhin 1111 in camp up I ine d 1 li of the TI abt city anti nals or m 1 b iaus e ill 9 of tr wera e v was in ili a state stale or 0 the tha clinie country countr during vic wi hiiter iter ploomy M hill c choum AO id star but I 1 lit his p ienn stid vi up to llie ili 0 of art frt iii sli knes had been june and that his inch pro how g wies r the rears d 1 lie fora tiit i tile the irretrievable b i a error in the conduct of tilt mon ion u arm ss tile dimac MIRY of r col C 1 Joli j b imon it if he ell giai ded advanced de d on salt c I 1 e imbruglio em bruglio m h live been dis itan the he question u bohra ed if llie lie at n n had bad f gli t it would tie have but tile llie 1 anal I a and na con e 1 A a wilen tf he boull have nir ti tile bouters outers file f ami and it the P e comah 1 I ara tile wn y li ally of martial law I 1 would w uld have hea dl r I 1 d of tha tb apoti agoti a and binl ail 1 I 1 alio a fd f d alb lr cihil li hil it if tile ilia At antonion onion iun churco voaid d have been enriched with the blood ul of marleib marl the of tile the ua inlaid kittil states flatea would bt have b ban on a 11 brill adv b 1 and awn or Ii gienty enty ty vl bailhe I 1 l a ul d ila in d t t 0 1 it be ind I nd cht col Jilin jol uil i lias a gilby iii ly for of a arv 1 I luecil it that 1 ug ul ill i ly 1 hi 1 1 i c y e re 11 1 or abe I 1 it he ilg I 1 Il alpila Pila ill ild n of gin end iny hy king a di hi hilt t I 1 und n I 1 peor he ruce alec it ile be r kallod allol 11 biart liart tol tolila ilK 1 lice linan l but it Is a wd said 1 li 0 1 1111 1111 t ei l tile fu F u end be 1 llie ile nis his finans or it tation ciare beail betil limited but with tho entrup athin two or airee lails va no in them five or fie ua dilons ant I 1 h uldie f tile alie cumy wilid h iau fai fu ill laio thill hand bufil bi ore aby ihry il laii id 1 med the it own ato r tile he amors getho and that the tre troops wo 1 dos ave licen the valor vc lor hardly of doubt 1 ari n instance may lie be to in which the cited d abates troops have hare carided can kd tul daib u without ath t the aid of back final much I 1 agon IL 1 as de in one of lie ailin as in fand and eh ill toty ory of all campaigns contain instances in aich abener gr als have beebi founded fly tar more tha well dw round the elie utah army anny last win leri the war apart nuen t J lu clr ay coo d tot for de lining the troop p 1 n konsis airing tatt umer bill coi johneton Johnt ton hs for all claim to generillo hip by them at port during dining lle he aull tile tn adaui 1 anif to h freed ili biln audet Pu det a 14 elu 11 jv ili lev 11 1 1 treated th ahr nailon i to so dies illi sig 1 arl fright al 1 the c cost 01 1 t lity all ni MR EDITOR tile the above arti article cle lately appeared in tile missouri Dento democrat crat in chich m aich it vv seem tile the author not only arrogates to himself a high military knowledge but a mili military experience which he deems sufficient to justify him riot knot alone in criticizing criticising critic ising arni amil gitary operation but of cast casting censure upon its leader the chir character acter OT of t this his article is too censorious to impose upon the ignorant and tot toi those bose knowing the he facts and themy theirly it is an ostentatious display of stu stupidity edity scarce deservio de deserving consideration this is especially so ithen a review of every account of 0 the conduct elf the utah array army last winter submitted by persons on ion the spot is only a N vindication indication of its Gerl general ral if the article in question means anything I 1 t ill means a ris to condemn general ourse course sneers at his claims to be abrev breveted eted slid and points out olit by an ail incomplete and fictitious date ahat vi hat its author in I 1 n thep of ilia his self complacency styles the irretrievable error or of the conduct coni loit ol of the mormon war 11 it is not the intention to discuss the merits or demerits of 0 any but to prove that the author is not only ignorant of the error committed but that which he assumes as such was not only no error but in every respect inured inui ed to the interest odthe of the government and most justly to the reputation of general johnston it will be readily conceded that general johnston could in nowise be held responsible for the organization of an army with H ich whose organization lie he had nothing nothing to eo 0 o ahat fiat the organization was x as defective was wa abundantly proved by the unprotected state of the trains front the absence of cavalry on their entrance into the country whether this arose from the dilly dallying of gen harney barney at fort leavenworth the result of his repugnance at first to go go to utah at all or the little ll 11 byplay by play originated by himself and governor IN walker alker distracted his attention from the organization of an army niche be never neier expected or indeed intended to command it has not ot been thought proper to expose it is ig certain that there was no necessity for the utah army being crippled as it was wai by the detention of the very arm considered by his hia instructions most essential to 0 its efficiency effi clency it there was a necessity for any large numer ber of broo troops in kansas at all that necessity halas might hai e been een met without detaching the second dragoons from the utah forces the result esula v v as that the trains it ere burned the stampeded and the army harrasser harr assed by the few mounted men ali the mormons cormons had thrown beyond the mountains tins was the condition of the army which gen johnston was t to 0 command when uben he left fort leavenworth twelve hundred miles distant from it on in the lath september ten days das after this date on lams hams FO fork r k agreeable to orders there to aw await aft the arr arrival val of its commander cheth h sib r gen harney or some one else no one knew the season was advancing the weather cold its position totally unfit for winter quarters the forage nearly exhausted the grass rass scarce the animals distressed and it became apparent even at this time the of september tal that dela delay Y was fatal and that it was absolutely feces necessary sary to advance or seek winter quarters for the first time complaints were heard beard in in the camp and sus BUS entertained that we had bad been left in in the he il by solicitation the senior officer assumed the command of the army which then ben consisted of 0 two regiments ments of infantry try in tac batteries of artillery about 1400 arn men n ia A council of war was held to determine its a d destination c tion and on the of oc obber the order H m as given to advance tha ilia route ahr through Z u agh the kan ons was impracticable t of the snows winch chich at that time often occur there it was known by a force equal to they NN were ere well guardie three times our own if it it came to lighting fighting there was no doubt of our bur success in a pit pitch ch d battle buethe but the cormons mormons would riot not hazzard a pitched pitcha battle in ili a military point of bew ie then icv it would have been an ail absurdity it w have placed the few trains then with would ila have v e ended the army in in a position that in ili their abandonment or destruction and the many trains traina not jet concentrated leu left entirely 11 undefended in the rear etwas it was consequently I 1 y dete determined to attempt to reach salt lal lake e valley alley by soda springs a distance 1 e of miles mi les on the alth of october cnober the army commenced its march As a harbinger har benger of ill success 1 the daywan lowering ard the first snow storm mot of any conSe consequence que lice came Us IS the few trains in our immediate vicin vicinity I 1 had been ordered to concentrate and fols low in in our rear the animals of these train W were eire much distressed tile the snow distressed them much more and the die scanty grass m ill inch c it to a great distance ill tile the dire direction et on of 0 our ur march had been burner soon terminated terminate d th their ei r p powers ow ers of endurance r from born ten miles a day the distance traveled diminished to three the snow increased the grass diminished the toad road little traveled in some cases was undefined and at the end of seven da days s the condition of the animals plainly show ed that the further progress of ill tte army was arrested another council of war a at was hold held the question was w is now not where to go but low how to go anywhere any villere various propositions were vere submitted in and some of them spoke moie for he elie reckless rec kliss gallantry of their officers than the calm su suggestions or of prudence dence it w was as only consi considered deLM that thai to make mace a retreat of any kind ind was mortifying tl ti though it was felt that to advance even vere it possible could c oil id but end in in suffering and the most disaster ous losses if at any time the Imora morale lePI of our little army was shaken tt was now faction reigned murmurs spread through the camp and it was too felt aielt that w without the greatest grei test pru prudence dence and good judgment ud ament backed by strong strong sell self reliance and determination the expedition expedition w be brought to a most disgraceful end it was at this critical juncture that an express arrived armed bringing information of gen aress johstono Johs tons having hav ing reached the south pass a distance of one and si sixty aty miles from the army but few officers ceis ot of the army knew gen johnston Joh niton at that time still fewer had ever seen him yet his arrival was H as heralded by them as t the e termination if ion if not of their at least of the basci lation and indecision which had bid fair to prove destructive the position of the army was no sooner understood by him than its return was immediately ordered and the troops with all the hipply trains concentrated to take the road to fort bridger on the of october the army proceeded t to 0 retrace its steps the snow mow had fallen six ix or r eight inches the little grass that was wag fart left coveted up the animals more weakened by old cold and li hunger dragged ed their weary limbs alon along till death would ff relieve them of their their carca carcasses aes lined the road already traveled sad evidences of the ravages that had been committed the return march was slow glov er and more lal la orious than the for ward n ard one I 1 on the ad the army reached rached the point designated signa ted by general johnston and was joined by him on the ath of november 0 o ember it was anthis on una date that gen Job Johnston was waa first brought in in contact v N ith his army an army never organized as an invading army nui nor at the he time ot of its organization intended as such ile ie v was as accompanied by a small reinforcement reit dorce under col smith and nd the remainder of the supply trains on the ath of november the march was resumed towards tort fort brid er it if the difficulties the army had already encounter ed and the suffering it had endured were serious seri its arid and dish eirten ing 7 1 they nvere mere but a foretaste of what was to c oine come the weather suddenly became intensely cold the trains from ten to tv t elve miles in in length at any moment open to attack the animals liable during the night to be stampeded from the scarcity 0 or the grass required a i vigilance ig ilance that entailed the greatest suffering on oil the part of both officers and men and to their credit be it said their duties were ere performed with a a cheerfulness and a zeal that elicited the thanks of the general anti and deserves the admiration of the country all murmurs ceased all despondency pon dency tied fled a new spirit was waa infused a new confidence inspired and by an influence that imperceptibly pervaded the mass it was felt that th though ouli the ship chip was in a storm there was a as a pilot ni ha could guide her it is useless to recount the suffering eing m or the loss which chich attended the me march of the army to fort bridger for years to come its line will he marked as ono one vast G golgotha iatha with a greater scarcity pf af grass accumulated snows a much more inore intense cold but little wood and an increase of trains it must be apparent even to the obscured comprehension of our critic I 1 that it if the mobility of the army was impaired a month previous it was w as now completely on the the advance arrived at er havin having accomplished accomplished thirty five miles in fifteen days ays it is needless to refer to the suffering suffering of the troops tro for that gentleman evidently believes soldiers ers to ie be as insensible to that element of human frailty as he is in incapable of appreciating it it would be useless in his calculations to know that most of the army performed the most severe por tion of the march with ith shoes and stocking worn out and S clothing insufficient to t 0 me the severity seventy of winter that it was not until ua the of november that the supply trains arrived and not until the when they had been examined elamin d e a deficit deficiency n cy was discovered disco ered b both ill in in clothing and rations gen johnston was not insensible to the claims of his bis troops for comfort and rest a requirement which the dictates of humanity would have rendered imperative even in the face of orders to advance and yet in in the opinion of this roost most spartan critic this was the golden opportunity for the general to avoid the commission of his irretrievable to abandon aba n don his artillery animals and errors error supplies and with iv ith four or five days ay rations on the tha lacks backa of 1500 men malch maich miles jud and f make his et descent upon polygamous 1 and A by lit cause faiq ai an was wag not without subsist anc on the my of otsune june and a detachment of troops had gone on oil an indian scout in honda florida parrying carrying ten days rations sir if your propos iou had been submitted to the army were there would for your yo etibo have been sympathizers and ana anathemas anat henns themas on your impat dence where did you ou learn that arf an army could march 10 miles through git passable jD in ill five fi ve or their snows enow s carrying provisions si six days because a man goes naked at the equator is is it an argument against wearing ft earing a bearskin bear skin at tile pole if the army was subsisted on tile the oth ith of june does that piove giove it was not no in danger dari ex of starving on the slat or of november Iso vember when when did ani team earn that th the spoils of salt lake valley were sufficient to clothe and subsist an addition of 1500 souls 8 to its already half starved and impoverished population it it iv as so easy a task to enter the valley independent of an enemy why did the deserters who mho attempted to reach silt salt lake city return and give them sali selves cs up for punishment rather rathe r than ioner longer lace |
