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Show NEWS BEHIND THE NEWS I I Written for The Telegram By Ray Tucker i perste Hitler, seeking an alibi ' for defeat, may deliberately embroil em-broil L'ncie Sam. He might conceivably con-ceivably want F. D. R.. like Wilson, Wil-son, to sit around the peace table. Hitler's concentration on the heavy goods Industries rearmamenthas rearma-menthas seriously dislocated business and Industry and agriculture, agri-culture, according to these two unbiased reports. His determination determina-tion to restore Germany's military mili-tary might through totalitarian methods is given as the main factor for his plight. The war effort has strained men and machines to the physical phys-ical breaking point, and no further expansion of the productive produc-tive mechanism appears possible. WASHINGTON An Inside , snapshot of Hitler's economic household, based on semiofficial German reports, has been privately pri-vately circulated among administration admin-istration higher-ups. It has deeply affected official thinking and planning with respect to the outcome and the role of the United States. The analysis Is based en the semiannual (July. 19391 report of the Reichskredlt Gesellschaft bank and the latest bulletin of the official Institute of Business Research, an agency comparable to our department of commerce. Officials here wonder that der fuehrer would permit publication of these disclosures of grave defects in his economic and military mil-itary machine. The supposition is that the shortcomings are too obvious and acute for concealment conceal-ment even at home. Roughly, the report suggests that Hitler, like the kaiser, cannot can-not afford or survive a finish fight. He dors not possess sufficient suffi-cient resources to sit down behind be-hind his "western wall" and wait It out. He must win a crushing, lightning victory on the battlefield. battle-field. His srmy may not fail him but, as In 1918, his people may falter. These economic communiques (detailed below) my alter both the allies' strategy and reduce the United States role to that of a benevolent bystander. They appear to minimize the danger of actual American participation. With Germany subject to fierce internal strain and pressure. pres-sure. Great Britain and France may rely on economic encirclement encircle-ment rather than large-scale and direct military operations. On land and sea and in the air they must attack sufficiently to keep the enemy in a war stale of mind and motion, however. .They must force the German people to go to bed a bit hungrier each night, to feel privations more acutely day by day. Eventually, allied experts hope, a nation weakened by six years (twenty for the older generations) of recurring re-curring crises and lowered living liv-ing standards might crack up. It would be an intensification of the "war of nerves." Under such circumstances the need for sending an American army diminishes. Our contribution contribu-tion under neutrality revision would consist of the dispatch of war supplies. But In that policy alone lies some danger. A des- - Hitler's own administrators admit ad-mit publicly that they cannot obtain labor or materials, frequently fre-quently leveling nasty, Intra-famlly Intra-famlly charges against officials charged with these responsibilities. responsibili-ties. These conditions have been aggravated by the June-August mobilization of millions of men. Meanwhile, neglect of the consumers con-sumers goods industries has severely se-verely reduced standards of living liv-ing and weakened the Germans' moral and physical resistance. Hitler's people are now relying on "substitutes for substitutes." However, comments the American Ameri-can analyst of these documents, "the difficulties are not attributed attrib-uted to the economic policy of the government, and no criticism is directly expressed." Apparently Appar-ently it's a sad tune that doesn't need words. The crisis in the German coal Industry a key war need under an "ersatz" economy discloses that the men with the shovels cannot continue to meet the demands de-mands of the men with the guns. The difficulties are both technical techni-cal poorer grades of ore and deficient de-ficient mining machinery and human. Production, as officially reported, re-ported, was only 0.9 per cent higher In 1938 than in 1937. The output in 1939 s first quarter. Including added Austria, was 250,000 metric tons less than for the same period in 1938 without Austria. In an attempt to increase in-crease output. Hitler coddled the miners as he does his first-line troops. In April of 1938 he increased in-creased their hours by 12 per cent, but he gave them overtime over-time pay and larger quotas of fats. Nevertheless, sickness Increased In-creased and efficiency declined. Despite the 12 per cent increase In working hours, the production In July one month before war's outbreak was the same as It was last March. The Importance of this problem prob-lem may not Impress those unacquainted un-acquainted with Hitler's dependence depend-ence on this product. He needs it for steam power to operate his factories there is a deficiency of water power and for production of such substitutes as buna rubber, rub-ber, synthetic gasoline, textile fibers. The allies' intifnats knowledge of these difficulties explains their quick thrust st the coal-producing basin of the Saar. Copyright 1939 McClure Syndicate. |