| Show alm arwas clyd g 11 bount iese by th 1 north A I 1 I 1 A sa 0 y of tob 14 abie A E a IF 0 world arvd including T rights re r th adl production in whole by gen john I 1 pea shing service FOREWORD al my primary purpose in ill writing this story of tile llie american expeditionary forcht 0 cc in france is to render what I 1 c conceive to lie he an important service bervice to r ny my country in fit that adventure there here tire are many lessons useful to the amer american ca n people should they ever again lie be called to arms arins and ifill I 1 fell it a duty to record them as I 1 saw dwin the world war found us absorbed in the lie pursuits of peace and quite unconscious of poss i ble lile ahr at to our security we would listen to no aarni warnings of danger clanger we had made small preparation for defense and none for aggression so when war actually came upon us we had to hange change the very habits of our lives at and I 1 d minds to meet its ita realities the slow processes process ei by which we achieved these hese changes and applied our latent power to the problem t of combat in europe de 8 pill our w will i our numbers and our wealth I 1 have to describe therein lie tile the lessons of which bich I 1 write ri I 1 w wish I 1 I 1 to dedicate this modeo w work or k to if the men me ai of all ranks who ho arved with afi me in in fran france c e an and d especially ally to those alio ho gave their lives to tie the cause for which we fought to my comrades of tile tha allied armies I 1 wish to tay say that I 1 am not attempting to write a history of the world worl d war aar or of the epic part they took look in it I 1 write of our own army and for our own people and I 1 he have ve not conscious consciously sly magnified or minimized n the effort of any army or any ny people there is credit for till all 0 of fus us in the final triumph of our united arms the struggle of tile the allies was much longer their sacrifices very much greater than ours I 1 am grateful to president wilson and secretary baker for selecting me to command our armies and for the wholehearted whole hearted and unfailing support they accorded me in france no corn com rounder mander was ever privileged to lead a finer force no commander ever derived greater inspiration from the performance for mance of ills his troops JOHN J PERSHING CHAPTER I 1 on may 3 1017 four weeks after t the I 1 I 1 e united states had declared war on germany I 1 received the following tel telegram egra in from my father in law tile the 1 late te senator F E warren in washington wire me today whether and how much you speak read and write I 1 r rench french at tills this time I 1 was rationed dation stationed ed at fort sam ram houston fl chich adjoins san antonio texas and was in command of the southern department with mth the rank of major general naturally senator warrens telegram suggested that I 1 was wag to be assigned to some duty in ili france but as no intimation had been given out regarding the extent of our fictive active participation in the war the message was somewhat puzzling however Ilo wever I 1 telegraphed the following in reply spent several months in france nineteen eight studying language spoke quite fluently could read and write well at that time can easily reacquire satisfactory working knowledge quotes warrens letter my reply to be sure was rather optimistic ti yet it was comparatively accurate mid and perhaps was justified by the possibilities to be inferred troll from senator warrens telegram A few days later I 1 received troll him the following letter dear jack th this s Is what flat happened lost last night about ten the secretary of war rang me up and wanted to know 1 if I 1 would call in anil and see bee him this morning and I 1 responded that I 1 would if I 1 could reach him at nine this Is the first time lie lias his ever asked me to call for a consultation when I 1 reached him lie he said in the most distant and careless way bilby oh by the way before I 1 discuss the matter about which I 1 asked you to call do you happen to lin know 0 w whether pershing speaks irenen french this Is the first time your name was ever mentioned between the secretary of war and me direct 1 I said a id I 1 was not certain about that that I 1 knew lie was a linguist along the alie lines of spanish and to some extent japanese and adlof the philippine dialects a pardonable exaggeration by ones father in law that perhaps my wife might know as she speaks french a little and reads it readily ile he sald said well it Is of no special consequence only I 1 happened to think of it at this moment I 1 replied well ill ask my wife about it today and see whether he knows and will let you know ile he then sald said if you dont mind do so BO and then he proceeded to discuss quite fully some appropriation matters on which I 1 intended to go to work upon my arrival at the capitol 1 I hope hopa you will alre ire me promptly upon receipt of my telegram so that I 1 may tell lell the secretary what my wits wife said sa about it M affectionately IF III 13 shortly after tha receipt of tile the arl late fate wire and I 1 the h above letter Z A 4 A sv S v e q x X A C n Z U gen john J pershing from nii by joeph Commil ng chase chaa in parts 1019 1919 reached me a telegram dated may 2 came from maj gen hugh I 1 L scott chief of staff containing the opening words for your eye alone followed by a message tn in code under plans under consideration Is one which will require among other troops our infantry regiments and one artillery regiment from your department for service in france if plans are carried out you will be in command you will be in command of the entire force wire me at once designation of the regiments selected by you and their present stations I 1 construed this message to mean that these troops were to form a division which together with such other troops be sent loer dver at once would he under my command within a day or so after the receipt 0 of f scotts telegram it was intimated to col M 11 II barnum darnum my chief of staff that we might be called upon for a recommendation and after con S u with him I 1 selected the sixteenth eighteenth twenty sixth and twenty eighth regiments of infantry and the sixth field artillery these together with two other kotlier artillery ments and the necessary auxiliary units were later organized as our first division surprised by developments development ahad I 1 and scarcely glen given a thought to the possibility of my being selected to abeln be in supreme command of our forces force as afterward developed although my old friend maj gen J bell had written me that lie he thought my selection bel action almost certain after I 1 left the philippines in 1113 1913 where he was in command he and I 1 had kept up an intermittent correspondence in which we e freely exchanged confidences on oil army matters in one of his letters early in april 1917 general bell spoke of the pos of our sending an army to france and gine gave a list of the general olli cers who might ile he considered for the supreme command comma nl discussing tile the chances cli ances for and against each one he predicted ninth much to my surprise that all the others including himself would be passed over and that I 1 would be selected I 1 was the junior on the list of ma jor generals hence I 1 could not fully accept geneine hells bells view but bill lie he was so strongly stion sly convinced that lie wits was right that lie he requested an assignment under my command the major generals senior to me fit at the time were in order of rank lank leonard wood general liell bell thomas it II harry barry hugh L 1 scott and tasker 11 II bliss CHAPTER 11 II I 1 in Wash lii ton may 0 9 and the next morning called at the onice office of the th chief of staff maj gen hugh L scott ile II 11 spoke of my assignment which as had been my impression from his message of may 2 was to command comma tid a division and told me that it had been made upon ills his recommendation men dation general scott outlined the generel plans in so BO far as anything definite had been determined beginning with february 3 the war college division of the general staff presented a number ber of becom recommendations mend it ions for action in the event of war with the central powers one was tor for the enactment of a draft law and others referred to the size of the army to be organized and the necessity for the procurement zif of equipment and supplies chagrined by Unprepared march 15 acting under instructions of the chief of staff the war college division submitted a more detailed scheme for or raising an army of men but these were wera all eleventh hour suggestions and no definite action was taken on any of then them until may 18 when vi lien congress passed the law authorizing the increase Inci ease of military establishment through the application of the draft I 1 was really more chagrined than astonished to realize that so little had bad been done when ft lien there were so io many things that might have been done long before it had bad been apparent to everybody for months that we were likely to be forced into the war and a state of war had actually existed for several weeks yet scarcely a start had been made to prepare for IL it the war department seemed to be suffering from a kind of c h it was probably not altogether r responsible if hut but the truth ts Is that the tha general stair staff at washington lud find never been organized along modern lines its membership hall had been recently reduced by congress and but few of its officers had bad the experience necessary fully to understand its functions in this f fact s ct w we e no doubt find the basis of many of the difficulties that arose later in connection with the preparation of our army at home and its shipment and supply abroad praise for secretary baker sly my next nest call was us upon the secretary secie tary of war mr newton new ton D baker baiter it was a much younger and considerably smaller man who greeted roe me thun I 1 find expected ile he actually looked diminutive if nit minu tive as lie he set behind his desk doubled up in a rather large office chair but when nhen he spoke my impression changed flinn sed immediately we talked of my recent experience in mexico and of conditions on the border bolder which fortunately were quieter than they tin had been for several yeni eais s mr air baker referred to my appointment and sald that lie bad given elen tile the subject very careful thought and had made the choke choice solely upon roy my record I 1 expressed my mv deep appreciation of the honor mentioned the re of tile the position and said unit that I 1 holded lie he would have hae no reason to regret his adlon action I 1 left mr bakers office with a distinctly favo favorable rahle Imp impression relon of the man upon whom us jig head of the department would reft the burden of preparing tor for a grent war to which the wholly unready nation was now col committed omitted still hw proceeding under the assumption that I 1 was to command only a division in france fiance my iny feelings fiell may well lie ie imagined when a few days das later inter tile the secretary secie lary of war called me in to suy buy that it had been decided liy by the alie president to send mo ine abroad as com commander minder in chief and that hint I 1 should select my staff accordingly and prepare to sail as soon as possible the thought of the responsibilities that this high position carried depressed rue me for tile the moment here in tile the face of a great war I 1 had been placed in command of a theoretical army which had yet to be constituted equipped trained and sent abroad still there was no doubt in my mind then or at any other time of my ability to do the lob job provided the government would furnish men equipment and supplies bupp lles harbord chief of staff obviously it was advisable to choose my start staff as soon as practicable after studying the records of several officers of my acquaintance and of others who were recommended for the position I 1 chose maj james jaines G uniford Uni Ilar hord bord ills in every grade from the day of his enlistment as a private in n the armyn january 1830 18 30 was not only of record but was well vall known to those with whom he had served throughout the war Ilar bord never hesitated a moment to express his opinion with the utmost frankness no matter how radically it might differ from my own nor did lie he ever ever fall to carry cairy out instructions faithfully even when they were not in accord with his entirely un unselfish lie he labored incessantly tor for what he believed to be the best interests of our armies ills ability his resourcefulness hla his faculty for organization and above all ills hla loyalty were outstanding qualities and these together with a compelling personality made him invaluable to co the nation in ili this important position after consultation with the perma manent heads of bf staff and supply departments apartments part ments s and with no little insistence on my p part art in more than one It instance istance the corresponding representatives to accompany roe me were lie signaled designated and they in turn chose their assistants although the list did not include all I 1 would have hae selected as some were not available yet jet all rose to important places in the final except one or two who failed in health the total number in my iny party that sailed on nn the baltic was as follows regular army fincers 41 40 marine corps ofil officers cera 2 OTIC off leera in active service IT 17 enlisted men 67 field clerks 38 36 civilian IvIll sn berks 20 cv ma interpreters 5 civilians correspondents correspond en ta I 1 total on battle D draft rat t act P passed a be may 18 the method ot of raising our armies by conscription was based on studies made by the war college under instructions from general scott president wilson recommended the plan to congress april 7 1817 1017 but the tha draft act was not passed until may hay 18 forty two days alter after the declaration of war roosevelt offer rejected the appeal of col theodore roosevelt at this time tor for permission to raise a volunteer division aroused popular sentiment throughout the country in his favor but approval would have opened the door for many other applications and the policy would have hava interfered materially with the orderly tied and businesslike application of the draft law moreover the regular establishment would have suffered from the loss of 0 an undue proportion of the best om cers who inevitably would have been selected for important positions in these special units at a time whew p secretary of war newton D bake at his desk their services were urgently needed I 1 building more moie largely another important reason for disna proving colonel Roosevel ts application wits was that in such a war it was necessary that officers especially those in high command should be thoroughly trained and disciplined furthermore colonel roosevelt was not in the best of 11 health e 11 it I 1 and could not have withstood the hard work and exposure of training camps amps an and trenches TO BE CONTINUED |
