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Show GERMAN LINES I CAN BEPIERCED .' -i London. April 2, 9:40 p. m. The - '' official British observer with the 62951! French army in his latest report, jmaSSoj which was issued tonight compares y-.ji tho results achieved by the French jcSaiHi offensive In Champagne with the ob EjSSS Jects with which the operations were ESrJs undertaken. The objects, he says, BJWj were to keep a constant pressure on SERjjj the German first line defenses in or HS&E?t der to affect the use by the Germans ffis of the railway from Bazaji court to Sfcjfflja Challerange and to wear down their HBwf reserves of men and ammunition. I&9m "As regards the first object," says IHSb report, "the pressure continued wEb&A ror thirty-one days with the result that the enemy has lost the fortified KKBS area which he had been holding and continually strengthening for fiv months. His use of the Challerange and Bazancourt line has not been ma terially affected, for. although at c.er tain points it is within range of the French guns, he can without difficulty continue to run the trains required i for the maintenance of the corps on that part of the front, and the junc tlon at Challerange Is sure Reserves Used Up. "Using up his reserves has been accomplished In a very marked man ner At the beginning of the campaign cam-paign there were some eighty regi ments in that part of the line. t its conclusion thirty three have been identified Fifteen that had been called up to withstand the French offensive were drawn from man parts of the German line, which indicates in-dicates that the enemy has no central cen-tral reserves that he can call up in case of an emergency. "As regards ammunition The Herman artillery has practiced economy, econ-omy, which is unusual with them. On many days they made no effort to 1 eep down the fire of the French guns, although this meant heavier losses for their infantry In the trenches. This showed clearly that their supply sup-ply of ammunition was not all that rhey could have wished, and an ex Itra expenditure may well have made itself felt in the amount available on all parts of the German front. Lessons Learned "Two valuable lessons therefore, have been learned from these operations opera-tions The first is that the German front can be pierced There were moments both in Champagne and Neuve Chapelle when the way was open when nothing more formidable fhan the weak resistance of sorely tried troops faced the attackers, and it does not follow because the hole was closed before advantage could be taken of it that this will be the casr-;very casr-;very time. "The sceond lesson learned is that d serious attack on one point has an effect on the enemy's plans and fig;hting power at every other point. The British attack at Neuve Chapelle ruined the enemy's chances of a big success at St. Eloi. The French at ra. ks at Perthes helped the British ittaek at Neuve Chapelle, and both M.ese assisted Russians to withstand the German offensive in the eastern theatre " Joffre's Inspection. Speaking of the Inspection y General Gen-eral Joffre the French commander-in-chief, of several divisions which had been through the whole of the fighting, the observer says "We must not forget that these regiments reg-iments have had to be brought up to strength, sometimes almost reorganized reor-ganized after each of their attacks, "f which they carried out several dur ing the last thirty days. What we really arc looking at is the French system which keeps army corps not nlv up to their strength, but up to their full standard of fighting efficiency effi-ciency It Is one which plainly is inswering well. "There is an idea in many circles that France has a number of army c-orps or divisions somewhere in the background ready to be thrown into 'he fighting when the great day of victory is at hand This idea should be dismissed. Ml the army corps if France are fighting and her re serves will enable them to keep fighting, fight-ing, and fighting hard, so long as the war continues." |
