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Show OUR TROOPS GO IN. American units, not yet incorporated as a part of Pershing's army, will be brigaded with British and French troops for immediate use at the front. The advantage of the arrangement is that the men can be made available at once for operations. They will not depend de-pend for their supplies, ammunition and armament upon shipments from the 1'nited States. 'When they go to the front they will find all the resources of the British and French armies at their disposal and can make instant use of them. In this way the man power of the, allies will be Increased quickly by several hundred thousand men. If our men were held back until they had been organized as a part of an American army they could not get into the fighting for months. They would be compelled to await supplies of all kinds from this country and after they had received these supplies they would establish their own bases near the front, just as General Pershing has built up a small world of bases in the Lorraine district. Under the new plan, our. men, brigaded with British ' and French troops, will use the British and French bases. in a word, they will be a part of a "going concern," and will not spend a long period waiting until their military establishment es-tablishment has been constructed. The allies evidently have military supplies in excess of their man power, especially now that so many have been -killed or wounded. Thousands of French soldiers have been sent to hospitals hos-pitals throughout the country. At the front there is a plethora of military supplies and a dearth of men. There will be some heartburnings in this country because our troops cannot go into battle as an army and demonstrate demon-strate their abilities as Americans. The psychological effect of an American victory vic-tory would be an important asst for the allies, and in Germany it would cause profound depression. The allies must do those things which help most to win the war. The objective of all the allies is the defeat of Prussianism. If civilization can be saved, if the worid can be made free lor American ideals, by using our troops in one way rather than another, t he American people will sacriiice their pride. As one of tho London papers remarks, there are no people supporting sup-porting the allied, cause who are more awake than the Americans to the necessity neces-sity of crushing tho power of the Huns. Some of our men who have been Training in England are far more efficient ef-ficient than the British recently recruited. re-cruited. Jt would be foolish to send British tuv recruits into the battle while efficient American troops were available. The principal need of the allies is man power. The withdrawal of several million Germmi3 and Austrian from the Russian front has given the Teutons a preponderance of six to five, according accord-ing to some experts. The Italian army cannot be counted when rstimating man power becaune the Italians, for various reasons, cannot be thrown into the fighting on the French front at least not now. Au Austrian offensive in Italy is regarded as imminent and the Italians must make themselves ready for tho blow. lu France, the Jluus have achieved a triumph, which, if it can be extended, will give them such a decision ah will keep the allies on the defensive 1 ;h rough the year. The allies must take 'teps to counteract the eifectH of the Teutonic victory. Tho bert method is ;i counter offenHvc, hut the fillies cannot hope lor success if they strike with interior in-terior numbers. Jt i.H not absolutely necessary that a counterblow should send the Germans bac; to their oiiginal line, lmt it, is no'-cary that their c:mi-altie.i c:mi-altie.i should le so ini eased that, they x'.ill be unable to launch any other nf-lensive nf-lensive for months to come, Fvuu now they are K''H'"g ready to Continue their drive toward Aiiii'M. ''hey have ' hough in-n, but amniuititiou ami gnus niilst be brought up. The allied, it n .iil'i- to it . dilute, hfive the yiui and tl'C licll.i, but they miet, have tie' lni to ofl'-r Milch a j'ch i 1 1 Ji i j c e im will con 1 a nt 1 V v. car lo'. n t he enemy. J .' it bccoini m a quc.tioii of t;citin the greater part of the American army into Franco this yoar. the task probably prob-ably can be accomplished despite the U-boats. The problem is not so much the transportation of troops across the ocean as of supplying them after they are landed. But, should the allied losses be as heavy as is threatened by the magnitude of the German offensive, offen-sive, if hundreds of thousands of French and British are killed or wounded, it goes without saying that eur men can be used as replacement troops and can fight with British and French supplies. When the war broke out, we had 9500 officers and 202,000 men in the regular military establishment. On March 15. 1!)1S," there were 123, S01 officers of-ficers and 1,528,92-1 privates, a total of 1,052,725. This vast army can be employed em-ployed much more quickly if used to replace withdrawn British and French units. And by the replacement method the numerical superiority of the Germans Ger-mans can be largely overcome. |
