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Show LIMIT OF RIPARIAN RIGHTS. The Supremo Court of tho United States has reoontly rendered, a vory important im-portant decision upon tho distinction between the actual control of water and the riparian rights of the owner of the banks of the stream through which that, water flows, as respects tho water itself. Tho ense arose in connection con-nection with the condemnation by tho U. S. Government of the property of the Chandler-TJunbar "Water Power Company, adjacent to tho enlargement of the Sault Sto. Marie locks nt the outlet out-let of Lake Superior. Tho company claimed rights in thu water by renson of its ownership of the land through which the water flows. Tho Government Govern-ment contested this vight, holding to its powor through Congressional acts and through the public improvements which it might make, to control and dispose of such water power as may bo developed devel-oped in the improvement of navigation. naviga-tion. It is noteworthy that this opinion of tho U. S. Supreme Court cuts close to the Connecticut river case, in which tho Senate of the United States voted that the Government has no right in the water power which a privato company com-pany may develop in navigable Btreams. Jn the Sault ense tho proposition was reversed, it being" tho' Government that develops the wntcr power. And tho court exprcSBly held, not only tho right to develop this water power and uso it in the handling of locks, but that tho Government is at liberty to develop more water power than it uses and to sell tho surplus. Speaking specif ically as to riparian rights, the court hold that the company com-pany as riparian owners had no vested property right in I ho water powor inherent in-herent in tho falls and rapids of the river; that tho Government had dominion domin-ion over the rapids and the falls, and cannot be rcquirod to pay any hypothetical hypo-thetical additional value lo a riparian owner who had no right to appropriate tho current to its own use. Tho court held explicitly, Justice Lurton delivering deliver-ing the opinion, that "the title of the owner of fast land upon the shore of a navigable river is at. best a qualified one. It is a title which inheres in the ownership of the shore aud, unless reserved re-served or excluded by implication, passes with it as a shadow follows a substance, although capable of distinct ownership." It is precisely through this qualified right, a shadow which may follow the substance, that the United States claims .-jurisdiction ovcr tho wator powers in nil this mountain region. It is a claim which the U.' S. Supreme Court expressly denies in laying down the doctrine as to this water power which is located at. the outlet of Lake Superior. But if this is so shadowy a rierht pven on a navigable stream, what possible right, can it invest in the Government lo the control by virtue of Hint limiicd and shadowy riparian rifrlit, of (ho water which flows through the public domain ? Tt seems to us as though this Lake Superior case completely throws out of court evcrv- possible pica that tho Government Gov-ernment may sob up to the control of the water powor rights in, all this mountain moun-tain country merely by reason of its ownership of the land through which the si reams flow. |
