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Show I US TELLS OF "MILLS IILIS BIFRQNT j " Field Marshal Shows That Operations in November Aided in Stemming Drive on Italy. BRITISH ADVANCE SURPRISE TO HUNS Withdrawal or Prolonged Fighting Necessary to ' Maintain Positions; Former Chosen. lONT'ON", Mo:n'..iy, M.-rvh 4.--Tlio w;ir c:::. t ti't'.i.t m.ule vhiMk- a hni; dis-jvito dis-jvito i':v"i V'ielii Y..u ;'ui Sir Poulas ll.i:5 vcri!: t-Ul llHloM-dlscitr'St A Uu- t'nS c:i to l::iVr.il front last November. ; r .a s i -o v ).o o ; v r. 1 1 o n 3 w 0 r 0 ea r -T.ed O'.it. telU of I lie s Jewesses at f '.rst a.-h:eevl. and alludes vjulto as frankly to t'-.e subsequent reverses whleH compelled A t iih.lrAwaJ from lerri'.ory that had been eapluivd, no Maiuo beln? imputed ;o any one for t..s latter eocunonco. I:s:'.:s-,.:,..c the reasons for the decl-f:n decl-f:n to att.tek on t-e Cumbrul front, KieM Marshal lla'.j: says t'uit tT.o rerouted as-5.i.u'.t3 as-5.i.u'.t3 in KUr.ders had caused a weaken-irjr weaken-irjr of the enemy's line e'.sowhere and that ci t.e5e weakened sectors that of Cam ra: was r.een-.ed the most suitable for ::.? surprise opera: 10:1 conten-.plaioil. the ground heirs f.ivorable for the on. pi ovine ov-ine r.t of tanks, the pla n betnc to disperse dis-perse with previous an'.Hory preparation. i::ieh would h.ave prfen:ed seerecy, and do: er.i i:;stea 1 on the t.ir.ks to smash V-?:r way through 1) 0 enemy's wire. "7.e enemy.'' writes the field marshal, "was laying o.:t f : esh Iir.es of defense rerur.d those which he had already coin-r'.eted coin-r'.eted on the Carr.brai front, and It was V be expected his t ioo p s would b e r e -e..s".r:buteJ as soon as our pressure in y.ar.ders relaxed. He had already broucht Urce forces from Kas-ui in exchange for c.:s:o:.s exh.u?:c.i In the struule in the western theaters and it was practically practi-cally certain that heavy reinforcements would be brov.ght from "the east to the west during the winter. Troops Battle-weary. m - T the arsurr.ent in favor of im- .Tl,ite action I had to weith the fact 1 : . ;. : my own troops 1 : a d been engaged 1 ir.any months in heavy fighting. The co:-.-;.t:o::s of the struggle had greatly taL their strength.. unly a part of losses of my division had been re-7 re-7 - d a:; .1 many of the recently arrived c : :t were still far from be 1 n g fully trained ar.I Included in the ranks of the armies." eventual'- the British commander de-c.-..- in :aor of i::.::K iiate action. "The infantry, the tanks anj the artillery, artil-lery, working in combination," he continues, con-tinues, "were to en ieavor to break through alt t..e enen y s lines of defence on the first day. f this were successfully success-fully acccrtiphshe.1 an J th.e situation developed de-veloped favorably, cavalry were then to be passe I through to raid the enemy's communications, disorganize his system of command, dan. a ge bus railways and interfere as much as possible with the arrival of reinforcements. "It was explained to all the commanders com-manders that everything depended upon secrecy up to the mom-nt of starting and after that on toii, determined, rapid action. ac-tion. Lh.'ess the opposition could be beaten down quickly, no great results C'iuid be looked for." The attack, the field marshal notes, was started at -'l1. o'clock on the morn-Ire morn-Ire of November 20. The spertacular successes suc-cesses which first attend i it have been loli in the correspondent's reports writ-Ten writ-Ten at the time. It was on the last day oi November that the triumph began to give way to disaster. Enemy Follows Shells. "At the northern end of the Bonavis rid zo an,'i jn the (onnelieu sector," the 'xrrmander relates, "the swiftness with w'r.i; i the enemv followed bombard-ir.er.t bombard-ir.er.t ac pears to huve overwhelmed our tro"T3. both In the line and in the im-rrje-iirite support, almost before they Imd realized ths attack had begun. The nature na-ture of the bom bard men t, which seems to have been heavy enough to keep our iT.en under cover without at first seri-oj!y seri-oj!y alarming them, contributed to the successes of tne enemy's plans. I "No steadily advancing barrage pave ntmt ,.r ti p, mo i,. j, ,,r ,,, t:,M.nmn lvs-iii.i , di 1 inn-.. hIi.it s.nvl 11 s-,,. in bt v n -...it. d by lb, t.u.nx J.-i.p ioU nnd 1 11 bM'U.l ,.f llio , IimIU foii,MtI.Ml. ;VM vv f'bl. UI. .I t 1 oui ob-.r! ill Ion I 1 ..in tl"" l Uu. mil) nuMinn,; nils! 11 a onlv vvlun llu, Miii,-U uu- np.iu Humii ' 'at O'cil miuilM'iin 1 1 1 hnv-llvhu' t;.niuui 1 Mi.l.in,-i iiini.-d ma.lilno l-huMio ,.m our1 h,'n'" btlo (I,,, rM-nMw. UMO uf "MH'UO b,-:i.s Hlld boillbM lUlido tt ,-- H'Miu lv iluiuuili for our tivtipn to m( Mai w.us b.M'p.miiL; ..n oltur p.ils of nio battloru-id or to follow the inove- UUMllS Pl lU clUMMV. "In Mhort, Ib.-i,, u lim,. ,loubt that nl-'I.iun;I nl-'I.iun;I ;(i uttn. U whs exp.- l,-,! K.-nuat-lv - '( hi t luvso iiu-aH of 1 1 10 bat 1 1n, nt thrt immu-ut 01 h drllv.-iy, the unbuilt ell cc ted H Ui a I sm pi iso." Troops Moot Crisis. How tho iidv.mee was st.unnwd nnd thrt h'ioiMn dipiavd by tho bodl.-M of Written tioons, wlui s.i.-rtihn.i th(-iiUMdt'H In Mine lor tho 01 lUuil.'.atlou of tha .leb-nsa bahtnd llinu, biiM i.roii ntta-adv loM l-'idd Marsli;il Mal.g does u(iea to Iho -om:uio mid skill displayed lu thl crhUM. Me 'iitliuiril: "Tba streni.th the eiicmv bud nIihwu hlin-nelf able to develop In tllM ullaeU made It evident that ontv bv prolonged tipd severe Ib-hllm; eoul.l 1 hope to' reestablish re-establish my right 1 lank on Mmm vis ndgo. 1 niess this was done the sltuallon of inv troops In the Salient north of KleMHiieivs won! bo dmicult and la n -erou.s, even If our bold on 'iourlon hill v,.tv ,-lniil I had, tlieiei'ore. to deeldo either to embark em-bark on auot Iter off en-mo buitlo on u hit mi seale or to w It ad raw to a nuuo compaei line on Kb'si ui.Tes r!dm. Although this doeision lnoed tbo lE'.vlni; up of Important po.siiions mnt Kill-lainly Kill-lainly won, 1 had no doubt us to the .or-reet .or-reet fiuirs.' utnler the. .otiditiotiM" Iheld Marshal Mai mues that tho wit lidrawal was completed Mieeessfullv, witlutut ltitei'Ieienee from the. enenn , tui the morning o( I 'ecombi-r 7. Sumumn .v.;- the lestids 'of tho thro Weeks' nchUuLi. tho Held marshal .sav.s: ' 1'luro Is lutln doubt that our operations opera-tions were of eonsidrrublo Irulheet Jisjs-tanee Jisjs-tanee to tb.e allied fuees In liaiv. 1 .a t u'A demands were uudo i-pon the available lo-rman icsi eves at t tune when a Ki'eat coiu-eiu rat ion of lerman divisions w us still bem inalntained m Klaiiders. German Troops Diverted. "There Is t-videmo that Merman divisions divi-sions intended tor (lie Italian tlnater were diverted to tho M.unbral front, and it Is probable tlmt a farther totueii 1 1 a-Men a-Men of Merman forces against Italv was suspended for nt least two weeks at a most critical period when our allies were making their first tdand on tho i'iavo line." Mad Kie!d Maishal Mai? not met with a chock, v inch com; elied hiin to abandon aban-don pa:t of th.e captured territory, what he miL;tit hao accomplished ho thus discloses: dis-closes: ".My intentions ns regards subsequent ep!oitati.n wete t.i put-h westward and northeastward, taking the lindenbur line It: the reverse from Meuvres 10 ttie river S.arpe and capturing all the enemy defenses and probably most of his gar-risai gar-risai s lyinir West of a lino from (."am brat north-ward to the Seiisee and south of that river and tho Searpe. "Time wouid havo been required to enable en-able us to. develop and com; leto the operation, op-eration, bift the prospects of gaining the necessary ttmo were, in my opinion. poid enouK'h to Justify the attempt to execute tho plan. I am of the opinion that on t:io Oth and 21st of November we went very near to success stiff ieientlv complete com-plete to biliiL,- the realizatiui of our full prcramme within our power." |
