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Show 500,000 (. S. SOLDIERS IN FRANCE EARLY IN 1918, SAYS BAKER jSECRETARY REPLIES 1 DETAIL TO CHARGES Head of War Department Depart-ment Appears Before Senate Military Committee Com-mittee to Defend Machinery Ma-chinery of the Government Govern-ment in Matter of Making Mak-ing Preparations. DISCLOSES FACTS HITHERTO SECRET Acknowledges Mistakes, but Insists Emphatically Emphatic-ally That Deficiencies, Where Disclosed, Have Been Promptly Rectified Recti-fied by His Department. Depart-ment. WASHINGTON, Jan. 25. America will have an army of half a million in FVance early this year, with a million more, trained and equipped, ready to follow as quickly as ships can be provided to carry them and the outlook for ships is not unpromising. Secretary Baker gave this information to the world today in a statement before the tenate military committee bearing much that until now has been carefully guarded with the army's military secret--, in answering charges that the government has hroken down preparing for war. From early morning until late afternoon the secretary addressed the committee, and a crowd, including many members of both housee of congress, gathered in a big hearing room of the senate office building. He spoke extemporaneously, beginning with details of the mammoth task of building an army of a million and a half, answering such complaints of inefficiency as were cited by Senator Chamberlain in his recent speech and declaring that such instances were isolated and not general. Answers Questions. j Some questions were asked, and Mr. Baker from time to time had assistants go to the telephone for reports on epe-cific epe-cific questions. Then, toward tho clo.se of tho day, the secretary delivered a dramatic general statement of the American war plan, tell-I tell-I ing of the coming of the allied missions. ; of the day and night conferences with men from tine scene of battle In which the plans now being executed were adopted, and of success beyond the most sanguine expectations in building t lie army and its industrial supports at home, transporting men across the ocean, constructing railroads rail-roads in France and pre pa ring to striko the enemy with every resource at the country's command. Profound Impression. When Mr. Bilker rlosed it was apparent that he had create a profound impression. impres-sion. Chairman Cha in hoi da i n said t-o before be-fore ho left, t 'no sia nd. There was no attempt at eroy-examination. The chairman chair-man proposed that tho serretary he given a rest, and it virtually wav agreed to re-en re-en 1 1 him for further ova m inn tion Inter, alter the committe- ha completed Us he;uines of offi.-rrs of tin- medical corps, aviation section uiwi other bronchos of tho service. While many things di-o'-e I impressed the commit t ee, it. was fra nkly a mazed when told that tin nvn of thirty-two national na-tional guard and national army divisionM camps are ready to o toda y at need. When members wanted to know why such things had not been given publicity before. be-fore. Mr. Knker spoke of the rehictan" of military m-Mi to reveal their war plana and quoted Ormou remark,-- about America's Amer-ica's advertisement of her ptvpurations. Invites Criticism. Kniphnsizing that he was not there to defend himself or anybody else, the secretary secre-tary urged the committee acain and again lo lay bare any shortcoming or failure of the department, that it might be corrected. cor-rected. Frequently be paused to seek-stronger seek-stronger language to describe t he devotion devo-tion of his associates in the department, military and civilian. '"For one reason or another." he said, "the impression has gono out into the (Contlnned on Paeo Two.) CHARGES OF THE MM M II JOSSES Secretary of War Appears Before Military Committee and Replies to Criticisms of Chamberlain. (Continued from Page One.) country, to some extent at least, that the war department has fallen down. "It would be a tragical thing if this tremendous tre-mendous effort, this wholly unprecedented sacrifice made by men, were In fact to turn out to deserve the comment that it had fallen down." i Took Wood's Advice. j Mr. Baker took personal responsibility for getting men under training before their equipment was ready "to the last shoe button." Such officers as Major-General Major-General Leonard Wood, he said, had urged this policy. He described conferences that evolved the ordnance programme and its fulfillment, submitting documents to prove that France and Great Britain were supplvins; artillery and machine guns for the first" forces at their own urgent re-ciuest. re-ciuest. in order that ships might be used for other purposes. In all that was done prior to the departure de-parture of the first troops, General Persians; Per-sians; shared in the deliberations and approved ap-proved the decisions reached, Mr. Baker declared, and now, surrounded with a staff of trained regular officers. Pershin? is in France as the "eyes of the army. Every step taken since has been founded on his long, detailed reports of what is going on at the fighting fronts. Tables Cited. Tables were cited to show that overcrowding over-crowding in the camps and cantonments had not been general and that the sickness sick-ness had come mostly in the camps where medical opinion had agreed it was least to be expected. The history of the development de-velopment and building of the cantonments canton-ments was given in detail to show that every precaution possible had been taken. Analyzing the efforts of the ordnance bureau, the secretary said that General Crozier had urged for years a great artillery ar-tillery preparation; that he at least hart realized the time gunmaking required. But even France herself, "with the enemy en-emy at her throat," he added, had not been able to see what vast gun programmes pro-grammes the war would lead Into. Plan of War. During his general statement of the war plan and how it was developed. Mr. Baker was rareiv interrupted. He said: "Now, gentlemen, about the plan of the war. It will be remembered that this war broke out in August. 1IU4. We went into It in April, 1917, so that for two and one-half one-half years, the war had been going on. half- years, the war had been going on. It was not as though war had broken out between the United States and some couiilrv. each of them prior to that time haviim been at peace with one another ami with everybody else, so that an immediate im-mediate plan should be made in the United States for conducting war against its adversary, but we were coming into a' war whi'vh had boen going on for two and one-half years, in which the greatest ax-r,aitc all tVin inventive genius. all of the industrial capacity of those greatest countries in tho world had for two and one-half years been solving the problem of what kind of war it was to be and where It was to be engaged. Theater Far Distant. "It was not a thing for us to decide where our theater of war should be. The theater of war was France. It was not for us to decide our line of communication. communica-tion. Our line of communication was across three thousand miles of ocean, one end of it Infested with submarines. U was not for ns to decide whether we would have the maneuvering of large bodies of troops In the open. There lay the antagonists on opposite sides of No Man's Land, in the trenches, at a death-grapple death-grapple with one another. Our antagonist was on the other side of that line, and our problem was- and Is to get over there and get him. "It was not the problem Of doing it our wav and letting everybody else take care of himself. In the first place, we were going to fight in France, not on our own soil and not on our adversary's soil, and therefore, at the very beginning it lvas obvious that the thins we had to do was not to map out an ideal plan of campaign, not to have the war college, with Its speculative Rtudies of Napoleon and everybody else, map out the theoretically theoreti-cally host way to get Ht some other country, coun-try, but II was the problem of studying the then existing situation and bringing the financial, the Industrial and the military mili-tary strength of tho United States Into co-operation with that of Great Britain and France in the most immediate and effective way. Problem Vast. "That problem could not be decided here. I fancy in this audience there are men' who have been In the trenches. The altogether unprecedented character of that problem is the thing which every returning return-ing visitor tolls us cannot bo described in words, cannot be; put down In reports: It Is a thing so different from anything else that ever went on in the -world, -so vast in lis desolation, so extraordinary In its uniqueness, that It must be seen ttnrt studied on the ground in order to be comprehended. com-prehended. "II is Imagined that wo misht have perfected an army over here and carried it a'-ross the ocean and found it wholly unadar.ted to its task, nnd it might well have heen flint the army that we sent over was Just one thing that they did not need, and that some other thing which we inkrhl have supplied would have been the th'.iitf essential to their success. Question of Study. "So that, from tho very beginning, it was not a question of abstract speculation specula-tion here, but a question of study there to lituj out where our shoulder to the v. bee! i-uuld l ie put. "Tliiv realized that. And so Great Britain scut over to us Mr. Balfour and i.'eiii'iiil lihdiies anil a stuff of experts. Tlu-y came over here, and you saw' Mr. K;illour in the house of congress and at the While House and in public; meetings t oue place and another; but tho gruup of experts whom they brought over with tlu-in von did not see much of, and yet Ihcv distributed themselves through the: war department, and their ordnance experts ex-perts sat down with General Crozier, their supply experts with Genera! Kharpe and his assistants, their strategists sat down with the army war college, and all over this city there were these confident Inl groups 'exchanging information, telllclg how ihe thing was over there, what we could do, what they advised us to do, what experience they had had In ciovel- oping this, that and the other implement ! or supplv: how certain plans which one might naturally have evolved out of the : least experience of the world had been ; tried there and found not to work at all. Advice of French Mission. "They were exchanging Information, giving us all that they thought was helpful. help-ful. And then came Joffre, with his wonderful reputation and his great and charming personality, and he a great figure here and, we welcomed liim. It was a tremendous inspiration to see the hero of the Marne; but with him came this unobserved staff of fifteen or twenty or twenty-five young men, the most brilliant men in the French army-strategists, army-strategists, mechanical experts, experts in arms, experts In supplies, experts in Industry and manufacture, and they told as not' merelv the formal and military problems, but they brought over with them men who were in from the beginning begin-ning In their reorganizations of their n-dustrles n-dustrles In their mobilization of their industrial in-dustrial plants, and we sat down with .them jn little groups until finally we collated and collected and extracted all tho information which they could give us from their respective countries. And every country which has been brought Into' the war has brought us that sort, or sent us that soft of a staff of experts, and it has been necessary to compare notes, and with this ns a basis, to form such an idea as might be formed of what was the thing for us to do over there. Impossible to Draw Picture. "But that was not enough. They admitted ad-mitted that it was impossible to draw that picture. They could describe to ns Hiid bring the specifications and drawings draw-ings for a niece of artillery, hut they could not tell us why the British theory of the use of artillery was by the British Brit-ish preferred to that of the French. Thev could not picture to us a barrago of heavy howitzers as comparod to a barrage of 75-milllmeter guns. They could not picture to ns the association nf aircraft, balloons nnd mobile aircraft with artillery uses. They could toll us about it, but even while they told us the storv grew old. "The one thing they told us from the verv beginning to the end was that this war, of nil others, was not a static thing; that our adversary was a versatile versa-tile and agile adversary: that every day be revamped and changed his weapons of llaek and his methods of defense; that the stories they were telling us wore true when tbev left Kngland and France, hut an entirely different, thing was probably prob-ably Inking place there now. and they told us of largo supplieR of weapons of one kind and anoter which they had developed de-veloped in I-'rance and Kngland and which, even before they got them in sufficient riuantlly ma nnfactured to take llietii from the Industrial plants to t lie rronl. were superseded by new ideas and had to he thrown into the scrap heap. Not a Static Thing. "Thev said to us. this is a moving pic-tine: pic-tine: it is something that nobody can palni and give you an idea or. It is not a static thing. "Therefore. It became necessary for us to have eyes there in Instant and immediate im-mediate communication with us. tend we sent over to France General Pershing, and we sent, with him not merely a division di-vision of troops- to Unit T shall refer In a moment hut we sent with him perhaps 1 can say safely the major pert of the trained, expert personnel of the army. Vou know the size of Ihe official of-ficial orps of t In- regular army lit this country when the war broke out. It was a pitiful handful of trained men, and yet It was necessary to divide them nil and send over to Vicnic! officers of the highest quality, sec (hat they would he at the front nnd see In 1he workshops and in the factories and In t lire war offices of-fices and In tho armies, where eoneul-Litlona eoneul-Litlona would take place Immediately hack of the front so Meat they could ..i:e the things with their own eyes, and scud us back the details by cable every chev of the changing character of this a a r. "General Pershing's staff nf experts and ofricem over them runs Into the thousands, and they are busy every minute min-ute and every clay that the aun rises 1 gel cicblegncmn rrom Gr.ncrnl F'ernhlns fmin If n t si x) 't'U ntnl t wonty in;c.s Iuuk, fllloil wiih nionsiirrTiiont s nnd tor-niuluH tor-niuluH ii in i t'Ii;nif;iH of : millinir(T In slzn. kt-imU lcnit: ypofMfii'iittDiiM of iluuim's In details of t hhms. which wrtv iij:rM il upnti l:i si wci'k iuhI ch;nit,-cl t htn wccU, ;iih"I iic.fd to bt; chiiMKc'l niiln next wiM'k, so that wlint wi! nin loinn nl this onil if h t tempi Inn, hy nsinjr I lie eyes of I ho .'irtny there, to Kticp up tu wli.Yt. they w:mt uy to tin. "Alrritdy veui will iliul hi jour f urt her rMitniniiUnii Into muiu nl' t lie luiro.ui work of the ilepn rt men I , mih- nl' tin ili-vtnlOtiM, ili-vtnlOtiM, vlien 1 hey ennie ilown, von will fiinl thnl: sehnluleM which were' ;mrr-ttl upon, weiipdiiH which wein Helee,M mid which wo h;id mhtrled In ma mil net uro, huvo boon hu fur illnenrdod Unit lienple thi.a:.-. In lluur nlaee. in"1 """' Double Duty for OHiccrs in. I l-u v cuuttcly nrr.ine.niM I, I,., nvich'. ihi m hV';;;;;;',;'';;:' to Ve trot ,' ,'.""", """cllul o otfl, , , , ""bed of It u ,,, o ' ''n' f'"' either forward with manufactures, work out industry in-dustry and industrial relations; they h-: to see about supplies of raw materials ar: manufacture finished products, and mak? from day to day alterations and changes that had to be made, and they had ic'U ingenious with suggestions, to see whetis: they could devise on this side somethi:.-; which had not been thought of over there. "They had to be hospitable to suggestions sugges-tions which came from the ot.er si: they bad to confer with the foreign oncers on-cers who were here and were constir:!;'' being; changed, so that men fresh fcor. the front could be here to advise us, and, in addition to that, every cr.T of them had to be a university nrofftssrr goini? out into the life of the'eommun::: and selecting; men who had mechanic experience and knowledge and train::.;, but not military mechanical experier.; and klowledae and training1, and i&r" to Ms original equipment the sciepx:";: training; that finishing; touch which iru him available for use as a military Kiea-tisu Kiea-tisu Army Built Up. "As a consequence, this little gro- which stayed here have built the sneolal departments of the army. TV ordnance department, starting. I tr.Tt. with or officers, has now. as I rf-ca'l rf-ca'l the figures, ome,thln like cers. They have had to be trained; t'.r have had to be spt'iallzed, and t'-.at ; had to po contemporaneously with tremendous response to tlie changing conditions con-ditions on the other aide. "In the meantime, when we sutvn Into fliis war. T think It was coT.rc: thought throughout ihe country thut contribution at the outset mtjiht -financial and Industrial. The Indiistr.i? of tin's countn- were largely devo:v" t!i;u time to the appropriate lndr.s"- and many converted Industrie?, largely devoted to the manufacture ; war materials for our allies. "As suggested this morning &Jt went into that market we found it jrT occupied, oo that our problem r going to a ehoe factory and ki;:' (Continued on Fage Tout.) SECRETARY REPLIES TOIilE QH5 (Continued from Page Two.) Make shoes for us,' hut it was going to a factory which never made shoes, because be-cause all the shoe factories were busy making shoes for people from whom we could not take them, and savins, 'learn how to make shoes in order that you may make them for us.' Aim Not to Hurt Allies. ".Vow, of course, that is not true of shoes, but it is true of machine guns, it is true of other arms, it is true of ammunition, ammu-nition, It is true of forging capacity, which was the greatest defect in the country, and all of this time we had not merely to disturb the programme of allied al-lied manufacture in this country, but we had not to cut off the supplies of raw material to our allies, and we had not to disturb the industry of this country to such an extent that products upon which they depended for the success of their militarv operations -would be interfered with, both agricultural and commercial and industrial products. "At the outset the idea was that we would be a financial and Industrial assistance assist-ance to our allies during the year 1918. and I think I probably can read from the Metropolitan Magazine for August a suggestion sug-gestion which will show what the current expectation of this country was. The editor of the Metropolitan Magazine was protesting against what he believed to be the Intention of the government at that time." Quotes Magazine. Here Senator Weeks interrupted to ask If that was the magazine of which Theodore Theo-dore Roosevelt Is associate editor. Secretary Sec-retary Baker replied that Mr. Roosevelt was a contributing editor, and continued: This magazine ctme out in August, 1917, and this editorial says: " 'Since it is our war, we want to put everything into it so as to finish it in the shortest possible time, so that the world may be restored. To our mind, the wholo plan of the war department has been flavored with a desire to hold off until the allies finish the war for us'.' "You see, the editor was dealing with what he supposed to be the intention of the war department at that time, that we were holding off so far as actual military mili-tary operations were concerned, and letting let-ting the allies do the fighting. "What he says we should have done, and I ask your particular attention to it, Is this: " 'We should have strained everv energy en-ergy to have gotten from 50,000 to 100,000 men to France this year.' Programme Exceeded. "That is, the year 1917. I tell no secret. se-cret. . but it is perfectly well known to everybody in this group that we have far exceeded what in August, 1917, was regarded re-garded as a programme so ideal that the editor of this magazine refers to it as a thing which we ought to have strained every nerve in a vain, but hopeless, effort ef-fort to accomplish." In response to a question by Chairman Chamberlain. the secretary said the United States did not have more than the minimum number of men in France in August, 1917. He continued: "And then the editor goes on: v " 'And by- next year, 191S, we could have had 500 000 men to send over, or anv part of 500,000 men which we could ship.' "Xow, instead of having 50.000 or 100,000 men in France in 1917, we have many more men than that in France, and Instead of having a half million men whom we could ship to France If we could find any way to do it in 1918, we will have more than ope-half million in France early in 1918. and we have available, avail-able, if the transportation facilities are available to us. and the prospect is not an unpromising, one and one-half million who in 1915 can be shipped to France." Senator Weeks asked whether the secretary sec-retary knew who wrote the editorial, and Mr. Baker said he thought it was attributed attrib-uted to Mr. vviggin, the editor-in-chief. Chamberlain Asks Question. "Why,'' asked Chairman Chamberlain, "have you not felt it proper to let the public into your confidence with reference refer-ence to these things that you are telling now?" "Senator. T confess I have hesitated and I still hesitate," replied the secretary. "I have here a statement from Field Marshal Mar-shal von Hindenburg, in which he Is quoted as saying in a German newspaper in contemptuous fashion of us. that we have advertised our preparations for this war In an unworthy manner." "Do you think for a moment, Secretary Secre-tary Baker," saW the chairman, "that there has been any time within the last year that the German secret service has not been fully advised as to everything we have done?" "Tes. senator, I knew. If I mav relv upon confidential information which we get from confidential sources. I he German Ger-man government is still mystified as to the number of men we have In France, cr have had there at any time." The chairman said , he doubted this. After some discussion as to the policy of governments in announcing military secrets, se-crets, Mr. Baker said it was not the policy pol-icy of tho American or other governments to do so. and added; Example of England. "I am saying this now. because you have asked me why 1 have held back these facts until now. I am saving to vou that you could not get from Great Britain at this minute I don't know whether 1 could set the number of soldiers Great Britain lias In France or at home. I could get an approximation: I could get whatever information might be deemed heipiiil to the immediate military object to be accomplished, but I could 'not 'get from Great Britain or France, either one the actual number of troops they have at the front. "It may be that that precaution Is unnecessary, un-necessary, and yet that is the precaution which military men havo observed, and I have no further point to make in tho matter of the number of troops there than to show, as I was showing when I read that extract, that our original Intention was to make our military ecort In 1918-and 1918-and in August nf 1917 a zealous advocate of immediate military activity laid down as the maximum obtainable programme a thing which has since been multifold exceeded. Why Troops Were Sent. . "Why did we decide (o fend some troops to France in 1917? it is no secret When Marshal Joffre came lo this country coun-try from France, when the British mission mis-sion came from Frame, thev told us of a situation which we had not up to that time fully appreciated. There had been In 1-ranee recently conducted before that an unsuccessful rpalor offensive The French people had suffered, oh, suffered in a way that not only our language is not adapted to describe, hut our imagination imagi-nation cannot conceive. The war is In their country. This woir has not only been at their door, hut he has been gna win? for two years and a half at t r vitals, and when tills unsuccessful offensive of-fensive in Frince had gone on. there was a spirit not of surrender, but of fate about the French people, and this migh'v military engine, which they had seen prepared pre-pared to overcome them tor forty years was at thcni. and their attitude was thai no fatter whether every Frenchman died in his tracks, as they were willing to fj(, or not. that It was an irresistible thing! and so they paid to us, 'Frankly, it whi cheer us; it will cheer our people if you send over some of your troop."-.' J "We did send some troopa. Had No Choice. "At. that, plac? we had a choke. we could have fccnt over, as Great Britain, our ift'.ulfir army, and in a very short (jienaration have put it into action and sulXTid exactly what Great Britain sufficed suf-ficed with her Vi.ni r-mptible little army' as it. witt rail". I by their adversaries. Our arm" would have given as good an Hint of llM-if jk the. Rilllah annv did. hut it would have hia-ri dcstloc- like trie- I'.ritiHi army, and Hick- would have o'-cn no nn-l'ois mi which to build till:, nt ;v army tlmt was to come over a little ter, anrj It wns deomed wiser to RirM over a rem i In r division, but not to hi? nd over our wholo regular army at. that time "Thftn w'j;it biipiieriod was that that regular division went over and tin; people of France kinsed the Mains of their garments gar-ments us they infi rr-liert up the streets of Paris; the old veterans, wounded in this wa r, legk'Ms or ;i nnlesrf, stumping alonp on crutches, 'jmrlnpa, as thv went up the streets of I'aris vith thoir arms around the nock of American soldiers. Not a fiiriHle man in thn.t divipinn was unatjeorn paniud by t ve.l oran. A m erica had koiic tn France and the Freui'h people peo-ple roK'-. v.-It h a RPiise of Kt'a t Itude and hopefulness that, had never been in them before. "Of course t hev wrir-omed the fJrlt IhVi. but their nf ed was not so L;rc;i t when the Hi itisli went, ("if course t hey wel- ! corned the Rrilisdi, but there were ties between them and us which there bad not been between them and the Brit tsh and when mir troops went, thero was an intstHnt and spontaneous rUe in the morale ot the French, but fin equally instant in-stant one! spontaneouH Insintenco that j tlie.se sohiiera who came from America should continue to come in an unbroken stream "And po we made the election. Wo decided not to Mend the regular army aa a whole, hut to send rcyula r divisions and na l lona I puan divisions, selected according ac-cording to the state of their preparation and keep back here some pari of our trained force in order Unit it mi-ht Inoculate Inoc-ulate with its spirit and its trainine; these raw h'vips which we were training anil one after another the division? have Bone over mil il in France there is a fighting army, an armv trained m the essentials es-sentials and in the beeinnin.s of milPnry discipline a.nr.1 practice, and trained, seasoned sea-soned fighters in this kind of a wa r on t he actual battlefields whore it is In k-iriff k-iriff placA. What Allies Wanted. "Karly In tills war, when -loffrn was litre and whr-n Balfour wns liore they said to us, 'It may Uiko von r.ome time to got over to lis h liRhting Jii-my. but you uve a great, lurlurtilal (jountiy, our rnan pow;r la frilly p.ni.:afird In our In-rlofitrios In-rlofitrios and in nur military nttrprii",fr. eonl over Rrtirans. ppcolal ni;iiif?i r''iincnt:i and lroiia of n toclinli:al i.-lin r-qi'toi',' r-qi'toi',' and aUhoui;Ii If. w;ih nut conlvni-jilalil conlvni-jilalil at the nutuct, and onl. a vihrai-c In tlifl einorqi'.lify military ' li'ulsln t Ion hIiowh 1 1 in t tho thine waft llioncht of a.( a iKiHuiulllty. yf.t In a vr-ry .slinrl tinir-up tinir-up had organiZ'fil la'lni'i-rin ifi;lmi.Mlls railroail min and st'tit. th'ln oer then? and Vinni rfbiilldln 1-ndihnl I'm Mik'S I tlio Hrltlah and J'Tnm-li tlio lallrnaila whli-h' wcro bulriK curled loiwuiil witU tholi' advance; reoonstrnrtinir thcii' hrokr-n ensincs and cars, hniuilns new railroads, both liaili of tho Krenoh and Kriiish lino.s, and thoso ri'inionls wore of suoh quality that, at th Camlnal :is-nanlt. :is-nanlt. carried on liv llcneral Hynp;. uiicn the Germans made thoir counler-attacli. our engineer regiments threw down their ricks and spades and carried their rifles inlo the hatile am) distinguished them-tietvcB them-tietvcB by gallant action in the war itaclf. Nurses and Doctors. "Very early in this war Croat Britain, through luilfour and his assistants, and Fraive. through Joifre, suirf to us, 'Send us nurses and doctors.' Why. before we were scarcely In I he war American units oiKanir.ed in advance and antlc.ipat.lun by the Ked Cross. wlich was taken ever Into 1 1 10 service of the Kultcd states throueh Ihe surgeon general's office, were on thc batiloflclil. and t here are tens of thousands thou-sands of men in Kti.clnnd nnrt in France now- who bless the mission of mercy upon which the. first Americans appeared In France. "Our surseoiis have set up hospitals ini-medlaluly ini-medlaluly behlrid the lines. They Ivive been marie military in every sense of the word. They have not been espcrially for-tunate for-tunate In escaplim. at.t.:n t from n,e mr" and our early losses in this war wore losses of lied I'ross nurses and doctor and orderlies and aitrnd.mis in hospitals and ambulance drhers who were sent over to assist our allies In these mves mrv services, thus not onlv rcndcrlnc : sislance, hut nennlrliiK skill ,K knou'i". edgo of the cl r 'U i ns I a ncos mid sun onnl-Inna. onnl-Inna. so that when our own troops eaino In large numbers they could render 'hi e services to our own forces, nm 1 1 s t w'is I mil enough. It was suggested ,t r,,', ther groups of m.Mdianlcs mn'.ht be n,.,', " ed. Nhv. we began to that we .o.lng to be over ther.' In large V,,v, and tho iiuestlou that then had to' ho aj' in my In Viniico? Special studies l,d to be made of that problem. d i1,s is ' t they showed. Thev showed that tie railroads and facilities of Vraree hid durlnn this war., been k n 1, Mlent condition; far li.ttj, ' ban" other supposed possible under wa" eo, I diilons. A,ul yet, that those nil, ,, Jl were lltort to the maxhnun to u I ' V, of the needs of the Frond, ,,,,d tl e r . si, themselves. nd lhal when o r a ' v became a great army, it would be a s sary for us to build hack of our , w , n", i'l'lTendcnt lln, of eommu.llcatu'n !"" Whi(e Sheet of Paper. "In oilier words. France was white sheet of paper so far s we were con-cerned, con-cerned, and on that we had not onlv m 'Oonch had natur.,11 ' r, serve l7,U',,l,', I'oi't In France (or il ei, ? l m hrM 'I he channel ports , , . "M'Pl . "f the isrltisl,. W';.n w, " r"""o.t as neccesarv for s lo l ,'''",,, " f -"liv In M ul ""-M'.-.iI.nt not be confusion and a , " ' " n'ul" jnpidies goine. thro i,".'1 'v""''' of , yoV per,;.ps 'ztizr;: art a "", 1 ll;l I'orls, ports w, ,, , I rance "nd I dl basins at blr. '"-. " 'Hclcut water for 1 , , ' tn- "Ircn Ihe tide Is o,,t "" ''ocks v-Ks :1:,,'s::'i;,,!::1.i.i M very much ,0 n";: I . ,. yl ;ou hae u deep sea luiibor ana a-j a-j need to do is to erect rt pile w f'.srf. J have had to build ,ioeK, we h. ' to fabricate in this country and dock-handlins lrachinerv. wt h.iv ; send from this coun:t ' e en '!,e P' build the docks. W e' have t gauntry cranes mant'.t'acic.rci m .-. countr- and sent o ev to be erf '1. ilbivso docks; wo h,ie h.-id to er.v' ' . there warehouses at the ports ot ' I addition Pi order that '.'u se '5 ' r'umulattojts of storv's and suppUW w go e er can be propel lv PeiiM'd al 1 , lor until they can 1-e distri'cutiNi tl1" ' interior. K:iilro:id HeluiiK. "We have hjd to take over. nJ 'i process of i eholahpc Hi'd mMtS- railroad nco miles long m o:1er te our prod, lets from our ports ot binkation to our gsueml Pmm l2J.'. (Continued on I'oUouitif r.'. SECRETARY REPLIES TO SEillTE CHARGES (Continued from Preceding Page ) fion. Ar.1 all of that. pnM"inen. has to n done, rot only s:al;ed oA. as a nt-cs.irv t hin? to dc-, tut hn so srcdiel oi:t and r-ported Ii're the manu-fa manu-fa tures for thoe tiuni:is haA to be car-ned car-ned out In this country, and the things shipped over there, nails, crosn-t:es, s;mk es, f irh p!a tt-s, engines. -rm, build -tnB. We have had to build ordnance depots ;ind rpiir shops and Krc.iL ma.ca-zines ma.ca-zines of supply In the interior. All of tha t problem l.ac been carrying for v. a rd step bv step. The p'-'1 ns for a pinele ordnance repair phop, which I saw some time aro. i rveri aT"s and acres of nroiind, !esisTied o. cr here, the iron work fabricated over here, disnscmblcd, put in ships and carried abroad, to be reassembled re-assembled o".er there. "We have had to build bflrrarks over there for our soldiers, and In the meantime mean-time to billet rhem around in the French v ilia ires. Build inp harrarks over there and builJinK them here is a very' different thins, gentlemen. What Had to Be Done. "When w. summoned the lumber Industry In-dustry of r'nis country to produce the lumber lo build our own cantonments. It came In a neat and ptoady stream from all over the country, hut when wr talk about buildintr barracks in nnce it means this: 'It mesne tn organize, as we have organized, regiments of foresters for-esters and sending them ever Into the forests of France which they have assigned as-signed to us fnr our use. cuttinp down ttie trees, setting tip sawmills, making the lumber of various sizes, transporting It to the places where It Is to he used and then finallv usin it.' "We have had to po back to the plant-incr plant-incr of the corn in France In order that we mlEht Otne time make a harvest. Our operations began In the forests of France, nnt In the lumber varde, as they did In this country. I "Thit great staff under General Pershing's direction, containing so raanv men from the American artnv. enriched by captains of Industry and masters of technical performance In this country, all of these laree industrial operations under un-der general direction, such as the railroad rail-road and dock bulldim-s under a former vice president and now a vice president perhaps, of the Pennsylvania railroad' Atterbury. and men of that qualitc and experience, Hummoned In to aid "Mm those are the men who are enrry-ms enrry-ms forward these operations, which are quite as expensive as thoe which are carried on over hero and of fsr greater difficulty, because 11 means ccttlnq material bv cable as to sizes and specifications, having it fabricated here and sent across those infested 3iao miles of ocean and then set up on that sjfle." j Hospitals Built. "In addition to that, on Hie other side it has been necessary for us to hui'd hospitals, and that is where the major need for hospitals may he. It ha been necessary for the surceon general's stalf to be divided in this fashion and to select supplies and procure materials and to send over staffs of trained persons per-sons to supervise the construction of these hospitals and to man them and equip them. All of that has gone on contemporaneously with the work which has been done in this country, and then in order that another element mav hi added to this kaleidoscopic sector which this war necessarily has. I call your attention at-tention to a thing which vou already know This war had a more or less set character until the Russian situation changed, and It has changed In the last few months. When we had gotten more or less used to the situation created by the uncertainty as to Russia, there came the great Italian defeat, which called for even greater changes In our plana, In many ways. "So that what mi-ht have been a perfectly per-fectly acceptable plan as to major operations op-erations prior to the. change In the Russian Rus-sian situation or prior to the change in the Italian situation, had to be re-studied re-studied Instantly, and for that reason, among others, there is now organized, as you know, in France, pursuant to 'the suggestion of Mr. TJoyd George, the Rapello conference, or the supreme war council, and the United States is represented repre-sented on that hy the chief of staff of the American army and the major international inter-national arrangements In regard to the military arc worked out there, w hile General Gen-eral Pershing and his staff of experts are working out those other questions. "That is a picture of. what has been I KoiiiK on over there, pep t In nun. On this t- idn ill U eh of I !ui I hn.-l had to be doiK1, liiini in j)fld:ti"ii in it till tho thitiK ': i lwi e dour, and I ymi to ri-ni'tnber iin ion i h iu hi i t-iiifiil a on this wide b I the builtlliiK of HiU itriny, i.ot of ;',, u(t or inn.Oni) tn- :,uu,iMi(t but of MUbritatitlally a million and onc-lia!i' men. "And let me be frank with on, ninl b't your Jnlk'nirni be iranlt with inn about t hi. H :i m a nv army in hl- ; tory, ever, huh tb- he.: inning of time, been .so I'.'ti.it-d and c:ir-d for ad thin army ban '.' n n t lie t lire be diinli -r;il ( d ? We ui ra ln-d thin :iriny, t ak -tK the regular anny und the n; linn a 1 p mi i d, ra in im it to w ;i i mnpt h und MipnUmoiit 1 1 it by l In- ope rat ion of a draft, ;i nd 1 Iwrn n re ii na tors in (his room who said to in with RrW-f when we proposed tha t that for in of minim? the. pnldiei'H Mlmuld be had, tlwv i-hook th-ir h'-ads and Ha Id, 'Mr. Secr.-t :u-y, it j r-rin't dune. It hi too Filddwi lo ad- dn-H.s to tlie A'tKrii an oph- th.-t nioilc of s.-lcrttn-; Miblb-rs.' And yet. has any r.-nt enti'i'prlMf w 1( hln the k nnw if (lc nf nny man in this mjoiii evi r bt:-n r:ir-ri-d out with moio unf.. tit Just I -v. with ninii: liittliikji-i.t t-xpliiii.itlnn and roi n ine i la lion to tin- food tense of patriot pa-triot l?ni of tin- A ni'-rii a n people, and has a ny k'ral and n-vultif iona ry i ho n;;; i in our mod.- of praeta e ever bee i ) ae- , ct pted so p I 1 1 -1 1 1 1 y as the operation of ! the .selective service system? I Men Well Cared For. 1 "WV hrivn Kot thoe. ji-iirir men In j e;tmp iini they ar'1 Mirrounded from th? I day t h'-v left homo until t he da v tlvy eome bar k to it, if, in .od's prO idenee ! i hey e.iu conn- lark, with mor. aceneien I for rht'tr prot-etmn nnd comfort and ; health nit'l hitppitit-'.-s. phrit n, i!rilual iand iiM-n t.n I. t ti i n uny army tha t t-V:! ! w t-r,t out on ii field. i "They are cI.ii-slI led y a py-it-' m of cl.irj.Mfieatloii so that men who hnve .iiifohanii.il in.KinetF and traininir will be. 1 plvi.-;i me.-han I cn 1 npport u nit ies in the army. The "round' mart is not Fought 'o ' be put Into the. 's'Htnrc' pUre. The Y. M. . O. A. the America n people have fuI-1 fuI-1 seribed liberally for the purpos..- t li Knight s ti C'-jltur hu?, t hn S'ou nj V'omen'.s ('briMinn avoeiarlnn, the tratn-! tratn-! ini; camp activities com m 1 1 1 ', the training train-ing cau:) athb tic con.nnt t'.e ar.d iho.ll-d ("ross. h.w e all bei-n broijpht in to live w-th the soldi. ts, and by n t'Jf: of ar-I ar-I tlvifes : tarted In the war ib part m'Mit the commit nt it u a whit h surrounti these , camp" have he:i instanllv K'i't'-n aw.iy ; fi'.un the iiiuiiin v.hieli us.-d to prevail of ' h. cert ain a liena Hon l- -t w t n a eivlha n i.ir.d soldir-r croup, and iVst rnldier bon in these 1-a.mpp have 1 . 4 n adopted into t ho homes and hea its of the people ainoni? whom they live. No Kijeh relation rela-tion lias for exi'i d U-ir-rn an urmv I and a ci'ili:ui pojiuliition us exi.sia w iih I recard to t J. in. ! Vice Stamped Out. j "And then, with onr aid. the :m mv ha be. -n abi to practically : tair.p out im-m-, peraneo and vice amoral the soldiers, by ' the establishment of zonr-F, by tlu- cp-tab-I h.hnirnt of patrol s-.-t n.. of one kind 'it nd another, by the trainhiR of these 1 our.R 01 f Liji.:r in tiiese tr.it nine rampf?. ! y nun if men of experience and fine fe- -j imr and all that, ue have Rotten into thia I preii army thA idea that it ran h a t st rone and rf festive milita ry army and ; still he fre from thiny? wh icb lia vo ! It it her to v. en ke ned and happed the vi-i vi-i tality and virility of armies. I "I have cone from camp to camp arr.onir thecp ( antonmer ts, and mv lirst nuetion 1 almost invanabiy Is to ti.e camp omnia om-nia nder. "What about your disciplinary 1 problems?' I "Old men in the amir, men whor-e live? I havp been .-pent in I from their boyhoob I and who have been all or the continental I'nitod States and rhrmch (t.s insular possessions, wherever our armie have been, who know the life of the sold ier and the camp and the post, all say -with one ar'-ord. and no rvcept ton, that they have never seen an'thin like this, that the disciplinary problems of the armv are reduced to a nelipible quantity, and, instead in-stead of the melancholy and pathetic parade pa-rade through the secretary of war s 01-ite 01-ite of court mart ial after court martial, of men who have fallen down and yielded to tempt at Ion under t heso unusual circumstances, cir-cumstances, which used to obtain, T have a n in frequent case now of rourt martial j by reason of such v. eaknesses." j Statement Put in Record. Here, at the request of the chairman, Mr. Baker put into the record a statement state-ment fchowinp the number of hospitals, army and Red Cross, established in I-Yance, with the number of the personnel of each. The secretary then resumed his testimony. testi-mony. "When Lord NorfhcUrTe returned to England be was invited, as I recall it, by Lloyd Georce to accept a position in his cabinet. He wrote, a letter which was printed In the papers, and in that, ho made this casual reference to the. United States. He spoke of his visit here and spoke of our war preparations in this fashion : " 'War preparations are proceeding in the virile atmosphere of the United Statt-.s i and Canada with a fervor and enthusiasm little understood on this side of the At- i .antic "He was then In Fncland. T happen to have a copy of a confidential instruction : j issued bv the German povernment In i I June, 1917, to the c erman press as tn wha t course they should take in dea ling with American matters, and they say: German View. j " 'While the news about American war preparations, such as the orpanizin. and1 I outlining of an army of one million men i strong", to reinforce t he French-if.nrlish ! front, is looked upon in that form as bluff. ; the spreading of which may unfa orablv ' affect the opinion of the German people, ; yet the fact must not be ov erlookod, on 1 the other hand, that the United Sta'es, j with the support of its capacity for ma-j ma-j terial and industrial management, is arm-I arm-I iner itself for war with great energy and I tenacity.' I "Your committee will have full oppor-1 oppor-1 tunity and will doubtless so Into these things. If you will deal with the hospital .situation, the medical corps, the signal corps, you will hen r the wonderful work done by the enjineerintf department of the army. "When it is all told, Mr. Chairman, it 1 will be. a story which, T am sure, your committee will he glad to report to the senate of the United States as heln? a tremendous response to a tremendous responsibility, re-sponsibility, and when you have made this investigation T know that the American Amer-ican people will feel, ns T think they have a right to feel, that we are In this war ro i win it; that we are in it to hit and to hit ! bard; that we are, in it to co-ordinate our ! ptrenerth with that of our associates: that j the problem is not one of individual star ! playing, but of team play, with these veterans vet-erans and experienced persons under actual ac-tual battle conditions: that more has been done, perhaps, t han the country expected, expect-ed, more than the wisest in the country . thought was possible to do. j Knows What Is Ahead of Us. ! "Tn so far as I nrn personally concerned. I know what is ahead of ns. I know what the American t'cehn- about this war is. Kvcrybody is impatient to do as much as i 5V cati Tlier will be no division oX . 1 coum-el; tV.ere will be all the eritici?m there ou4'"it to be upon fhorti omin and 1 failuifs; there will be, so far as the war ; flepajtint-nt Is concerned, a cnntmuirig ef- fo; t at si if -improvencnt, and a ho.-pltal-. ity tnwaid every s ui: u on for improve- nn-ni that c,-m oon.e from the outside, hut tin- net I'-sult is poinT to b.j thu a united , and confident American people, 1 elievint; ( in then. selves a nd in thir In 5 tltut Ions, are s;nin ti demand. fl;id that at no late jday. 011 K:ropr-an lo f tletl.i.s. in th.e fyce of vett-raris, inoir-ii tnev do not -'v us In ar hu-veinent : and when the victory is 1 won ovr-r tiiere. Mr. C .i.-drrnatt, the credit jhhah will come 10 Anieii-an enterprise and to A m-ri'-an determlnat ion a nd to Anicican i oiira-c will le an honor to us, an t he tr-na- i:y of purpose and snlendid I itchl'emei;;s of xhe liritisb and French I already sh'-, ure.'t bistre on the names o; these great peoples." |