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Show OUR WAR POLICY. Whatever may be thought of President Presi-dent Wilson's refusal to send Colonel Roosevelt abroad with a volunteer ! army the president's general policy, as announced by himself, cannot be condemned. con-demned. He states that he will conduct con-duct the war according to the advice of military experts on this and the : other side of the ocean. Theoretically I such a policy should brin this country 's maximum power into the struggle in the minimum of time. F It has been the plan of the president aDd of the army and navy commanders command-ers to avoid the mistakes of the allies, by beginning our work from the point at which they have arrived. Take, for example, the decision to adopt the English Eng-lish rifle the Enfield for our army-Owing army-Owing to the fact that we have been making these rifles for the English army in a number of our private munitions mu-nitions factories we are in a position to supply all the rifles which will be needed as our various contingents depart de-part for France. The government arsenals ar-senals will continue to make the Springfield rifles and the ammunition will be interchangeable with that provided pro-vided for tfce Enfield because th American Enfields will be constructed on a slightly different pattern from the English Enfields so as to utilize our small-arms ammunition now in stock. Our gun factories have been highly developed during the war. We hav provided hundreds of field and heavier guns for the belligerents. It is the plan of the government to adopt some of the foreign types of guns, adjusting them to our own ammunition. Pershing's force and all the forces which follow will not lack for adequate ade-quate aud up-to-the-minute equipment. Our army should be one of the most perfectly equipped on the European battlefields. It has been said that the general staff of the army opposed the sending of any troops to France until autumn at the earliest. The report is open to doubt. The general staff, it is more probable, simply contended that whatever what-ever forces were sent to France should be the best and that they should not lack for any of the modern weapons of warfare. WHile forty thousand men ; cannot conduct a grand " offensive by j themselves they can act with more or j less independence as part of a -general I offensive. In a mouth or two they can j be followed by another forty thousand ! as well equipped in every particular, j Before the winter arrives we should I have at least 100,000 men in France j as efficient as any 100,000 in any of ! the belligerent armies. Only one thing is in the way the submarine and that appears to be held well in check, c om pa ra t i vely s pea king. What our military forces will be able to accomplish after their arrival in France is another question. The solution solu-tion depends upon the English, French and Italians. It must be admitted that the war is still far from a conclusion, if we are to judge by the salient facts of the offensives on the French and Italian fronts. The Teutonic power? of resist a nee have not been materially weakened. Hindenhurg has a bigger army today than ever before. It lacks somewhat, in quality and the number of reserves is melting as surely and as stead ily as the 111011 ntain snows under the summer sun. But, so far as we can tell by the surface indications, the j breaking point is still yfr off. The war will not end this year tin-., less Kussia can deliver a 11 offensive equal to that of Brussilolf Inst yeur. l"p to date there is little to encourage the belief that the Musco'. ites can strike the blow. But whether the war ends this year or next no fault can be found with the government's military jmljry in it-broad it-broad ouline- It is designed to exert the greate.-.t pnssiMe r'np'e at. the ear-, jlir-t poilde moment. We see the pol-! iy: illu-trated in the work nf the naw. ! j We have sent to Europe only (he. most' effective ships to meet, and combat, the ..iil)ni,yine. We might have rushed seven! sev-en! '.Kindred warships a cms? the water. but we would have invited disaster. By n sending our destroyers we gave the best j e aid we could at the time. And wfjh may feel confident that the next squaa- j p ron that goes will be as good as th-s 1 1 first for the 'articular purpose for a which it is intended. t The policy may be described at ''making haste slowly." By that i means we shall attain our goal much f1 more rapidly than if we charged intt n battle unprepared. a |