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Show RAILROADS AND ADVERTISING. Judge C. C. Kohlsaal of the United Slates Circuit Court for tho Seventh Circuit, at Chicago, has just mado a decision of considerable importanco in the matter of railroad transportation in consideration for advertising in certain publications, which would no doubt bo held as a general rule. Tho Judge holds that an exchange of advertising for railroad transportation is a violation of tho law. His reasons for so holding, however, aro by no means clear. A good deal of what he says, as reported by the wire, reads very much liko quibbling. In passing upon tho question ques-tion of compensation, tho Judge dwells very much on the value of thG advertising, adver-tising, holding that it is impossible to fix any standard rate upon which such valuation can bo mado, which is quite true; but wo do not seo that that is the question before tho court. The court was not called upon to decide upon up-on a general valuation of advertising, or as to what would be a propor charge, even in tho caso under review. The only question to bo considered, as it seems to us, is whether the railroad iu parting with its transportation got what is considerod to bo an equivalent in value. Thoro aro a great many things upon which no fixed valuation can bo placed. But whore tho parties to the transaction, in case thero is a transaction! trans-action! aro content with tho exchange of products or values, wo do not seo why tho transaction is not entirely legal. It can hardly bo denied in court, or anywhere else, that if tho railroad paid tho publication a certain amount of money for advertising, and then tho' company paid tho railroad a certain amount of money for transportation, that tho transaction would bo legal. But that is meroly a roundabout and complicated means of getting at tho real transaction involved. In that caso, precisely as it would bo if tho transportation trans-portation were traded direct for tho advertising, tho transportation and tho advertising would in fact be a set-off ono against the othor. Thero would in tho caso of money passing, be two money transactions; the railroad paying pay-ing the money to the newspaper and the newspaper paying the monoy back to the railroad. Tho effect, however, would bo the samo in both cases. It v il. ii.: tn j v wuuiu uu luu baine tiling n tno railroad rail-road would retain its monoy and would part with its transportation, and tho publication would get transportation direct di-rect for its advertising, in place of first collecting tho money from the railroad and then naying it back. It is impossible to boo what difference in fact, in law, or in ethics, thore is between be-tween the two transactions. In tho one caso thero is a doublo transfer of moudy; first from the railroad to the publishor and then back from tho publisher pub-lisher to tho railroad, and in tho othor there is a moro exchange of one commodity com-modity for tho other. Wherein is tho actual or legal differonce? If two persons haviug nroperty to trade, trado direct, tho effect is in no way different from what It would bo if A, for instance, should go down in his pocket and pay over, say $100, to B for an arliclo that B might have that A wishes to got, and then B in return hands back tho $100 to A and gets the article that A has to trade him for what ho has already sold to A. The passage of the money betwoon tho two meroly complicates tho transaction and docs not in tho least chango its nature or character. The fact is, the two mado a trade; that is all thero is to it. Thero is no reason why an' money should pass at all. In tho caso between, the railroad and tho publication, how-over, how-over, Judge Ivohlsaat insists that tho trade direct is unlawful. It would bo impossible for him to insist, however, If tho railroad paid the publisher in money a certain amount for advertising advertis-ing and tho publisher paid tho railroad a certain amount in money for transportation, trans-portation, that tho transaction would be illegal. And yet in effect, in law, in business, or in any relation whatever, what-ever, what would be tho difference in tho two casesi To prevent this sort of thing and to say that the passage of tho money was a more subterfuge to ovado tho law, would bo practically saying to tho railroads that they have ho legal right to advertise their business busi-ness at all, and to publishers that it Is illegal to accopt railroad advertising. Reduced to this, form tho whole busi ness of denying the legality of tho transaction looks very much liko an absurdity, and wo cannot bolicvo that tho United States Supremo Court will sustain any such position as thai. dudge Kohlsuat says: "If it bo lawful law-ful to mnko tho exchange of railroad transportation for advertising, then it would be lawful to do the samo in ovory transaction, and tho railroad business might lawfully become ono of barter and salo, limited only by the demand." "Well, what of it? Suppose the railroad company wishes to trade transportation with anybody or with any other company or with any other business whatever, for something valuable valu-able that that busineps or that corporation corpor-ation has and that tho railroad wants, why should it not trado transportation for it if it wants to, and it is agreeable agree-able lo both parlies'? Why should one have to pay aulual monoy to tho othor and receive actual money back, in order to mako the deal legal? It seoms to us that this whole business of construing constru-ing tho law in Bitch a way as this is merely a hampering of tho ordinary businesB of tho country, to no purpose whatever. It will drivo all concerned to various subterfuges to evade tho law, and as fast as tho court gets at thoso subterfuges and doclarcs them illegal, it will moro and moro become apparent that that kind of legal construction is simply an unwarrantable nuisance and a restriction on tho ordinary traffic of flio unmitrw Mi of-. inttrfa 1i;ivo. in fni'.f. no right to impose. To say that tho railroads may not trade transportation for advertising, or for anything it wants, is to deny tho common law right of barter and trade. To say, further, as Judge Kohlsaat will probably bo obliged lo say in. order or-der to maintain his - position, that an oxchango of monoy between tho two as suggested would be meroly a subterfuge to evado tho law; but this would be, as stated above, to deny tho railroad tho right to advertiso at all and tho publishers pub-lishers lo accept advertising from railroads. rail-roads. And whilo this position would unquestionably bo wrong legally, morally, mor-ally, and from a business sense, that Is the position that Judgo Kohlsaat would ultimately be driven in the maintenance main-tenance of his very curious decision, sustained by the yet moro curious and restrictive reasons given for it. We do not seo how a decision of that kind can possibly stand in tho jurisprudence of a free Republic. |
