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Show IGarn from ( 0 VJashington . . . Vw v By Senator Jake Gam As a Congressional Advisor to the Strategic Arms Limitation Limita-tion Talks (SALT H) which are taking place between the U.S. and the Soviet Union in Geneva, Switzerland, I believe be-lieve that the proposals in the talks as they stand now would guarantee the Soviet Union military superiorty, probably for the rest of this century. It has become distressingly clear, as the Geneva negotiations negotia-tions progress, that American negotiators are operating under instructions to de-emphasize de-emphasize the need for an appropriate U.S. deterrent. We are playing down this crucial part of our defense: our ability to discourage a Soviet offensive by maintaining maintain-ing the ability to retaliate if attacked. The Carter Administration Admin-istration seems willing to give away a lot and to receive few concessions in return. Some of the current proposals propo-sals in SALT II would do the following: 1) Limit each side to 2,400 strategic weapons (nuclear bomb-carrying missiles mis-siles and aircraft.) 2) Set a ceiling of 1,320 on the total of missiles with multiple warheads, war-heads, and 3) ban the development develop-ment of new weapon systems, although allowing each side to improve its existing arms. initially, the current agreement agree-ment may sound equitable enough, since both nations would be permitted an equal number of such strategic-delivery strategic-delivery systems as bombers and missiles, launched from either silos or submarines, as well as an equal number of multiple-warhead missiles. However, a nation's total strategic power cannot be measured by the number of delivery systems alone. The maximum weight, including in-cluding warheads and other components that a missile can lift, is also crucial as is explosive power. Russia already al-ready has missiles with far greater throw-weight capable of carrying heavy, high-yield nuclear devices so the limit of 2,400 on strategic weapons clearly works in our disfavor. Another concern is the ban on weapons development. Our most modern missile, the Minuteman, is a product of 1960's technology, while the newest Soviet intercontinental interconti-nental ballistic misile (ICBM), which is rolling off assembly lines, is based on more advanced ad-vanced research. Thus, the SALT U proposals would freeze American technology a decade behind that of the Soviet Union. Furthermore,' U.S. negotiators negotia-tors have apparently agreed to let the Russians keep some 300 heavy land based missile systems, while the ban on new weapons would prevent us from building a similar system. sys-tem. Taken together, the concessions con-cessions being discussed in SALT H would allow the Soviet Union the ability to deliver two to three times more destructive force with ICBM's than could the United States. This imbalance is terrifying, since it all but assures the Soviet Union the ability to deliver a sudden first strike that could ruin our entire force of Minuteman missiles. Such unilateral conceSs-are conceSs-are particularly trouhfo when we consider that ! Carter Administration haj firm commitment to deve future deterrent weapon I terns. Any or all 0( projects could meet the sj? ' ill-fate of the B-l bomber fc? . multitude of political or fij ' ' reasons. Thus the United Stat, ' appears about to walk tightrope with its hands J behind its back, unproteJ by an insurance policy, has carter tentatively apj , to such one-sided proposal, Perhaps he is bettingft?;? U.S. concessions will enhaaa '' detente and lead to futm, C Soviet reciprocity. ' ? strategy is risky at best f the terms that Americans wj ''f 1 have to live with, or die fw myself, prefer not to gi ! with national security; that', VJ one game we cannot afford t' ' |
