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Show THE CZAR'S SUCCESS. It was to have been expected that the Russian armies would display great er strength when the czar took command. It goo3 without saying that he would not assume direction of the military forces of his empire untj.1 he was fairly certain ihat supplies and ammunition were sufficient for immediate im-mediate needs. The very fact that he jllaced himself at the bead of his troops should have been, and probably was a warning to Me Austro-German com-mauders com-mauders that the Muscovite armies were in better condition than for several sev-eral months. Probably strategic reasons dictated the inspired statement from Petrograd that the czar was taking command at i he very darkest hour because he wished, following the custom of his forefathers, to share with his troops in their greatest adversities. It was a legitimate ruse de guerre, hut it is doubtful whether it deceived the Ten-tonic Ten-tonic commanders in the slightest. In one respect, however, the Teutonic commanders probably were misled. The most menacing movement of the advancing ad-vancing Germans was toward Riga and Petrograd, and it was rather to have been looked for that the czar would seek some show of vietory in this region. Instead he struck his first blow at the other extreme of the line, in GaliciK. Allowing for the Russian desire to make every victory seem of vital importance im-portance in order to bolster up the morale of the Russian people, it is possible, nevertheless, to see that in Galicia the czar's troops have achieved a notable success, which should serve to relieve the pressure on other parts of the line at least temporarily. |