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Show GERMANS FACING A SURE DEFEAT 1 Terrible Scarcity of Rubber and Copper and Other War Materials aa Well as Food. RESULTS OF THE WAR French and British Strengthening Strengthen-ing Armies and Preparing to Win With Absolute Certainty. (Correspondence of the Associated Press 1 London. March 27 The Ninth and Tenth installments of the French review re-view of the war, which In previous chapters has dealt with the German effort, the using up of Gorman troops and officers and the material and moral wastage of the German army, deal respectively with military supplies sup-plies and the conclusions of the war up to date as found by the writer Under the caption ' The Scarcity of Primary Material for Projectiles" the review points out that the, chief explanation ex-planation of the imperfections noted In the German projectiles is to be found In the bad quality of the primary pri-mary material It declares there Is a "terrible scarcity of rubber'' and that still more serious Is "the scarcity of copper, which Is Indispensable for the manufacture of shells and munitions." The same condition, it is asserted, holds true of salt petre and of the nitrates necessary for its manufnc ture. Scarcity of Food. The review then deals at great length and presents tables and quo tatlons from German writers to prove the scarcity of food supplies, within the empire. It says "It has been observed on several occasions that the 1 e-victuallng of the German army has not been as regular as that of the French. In the case of the battle of the Marne and in the weeks which followed, the German prisoners were famished and declared de-clared they had eaten nothing for soeral days." Results of War. In the tenth and last installment the writer proceeds to draw his conclusions con-clusions which he places under four heads, as follows: "The Bearing of the German defeat," de-feat," ' The Bearing of the French Success.'' "The Three French Superiorities." Su-periorities." and "The Offenshe Faith of the French Army." Under the first he says "Of the events of which an abridged recital has now been completed it remains to appraise the results ofj these six months of war and to define de-fine the possibilities which those results re-sults have In store for us in the fur ther operations It ma first of all be affirmed that the fundamental plan of the German general staff has coin-, pletely failed This plan has been superabundantly set forth by German I military writers as also, in the relch-stag relch-stag by the ministers of war. It j aimed at crushing France by an over-i whelming attack and at reducing her I to a condition of helplessness in leas' than a month. Gerinanv Has Failed "Germany has not succeeded in this Our army is. as we have seen, not only intact, but strengthened, full of ( trust in its leaders and profoundlv permeated with the certainty of final success. Germany has not attained then, the essential object which it publicly set before It. But the de-feat de-feat which she has sustained does not apply only to her fundamental plans It extends also to the various operations opera-tions in which she has essayed to secure se-cure partial advantages over us in do fault of the decisive advantage In 1 w hlch she had failed. Seven Significant Defeats. "To sum up. the German general statf has placed upon its record since the beginning of the campaign, apart from the failure of its general plan which aimed at the crushing of France in a few weeks seven defeats of high significance, namely defeat of the sudden attack on Nancy, defeat de-feat of the rapid march on Paris, defeat de-feat of the envelopment of our left in August, defeat of the same envelopment envel-opment in November defeat of the attempt to break through our center at Mons defeat of the coast attack on Dunkirk and Calais and the defeat of the attack on Ypres "The German army, powerful and courageous as it may be, has succeeded suc-ceeded in gaining the advantage upon no single point, and Its forced halt after six months of war condemns it to a retreat the pace of which may be accelerated by the Russian successes, suc-cesses, but the necessity of which is now a forgone conclusion independent! independ-ent! of thoso successes. The Bearing of the French Success. "Against the extent of the German defeat has to be placed that of the French success. All that our enemies en-emies have failed to gain we have gained, and, first and foremost, confidence con-fidence in ourselves. It is certain, and it could not be otherwise, that at the outset our troops and the country itself still remained under the Impression Impres-sion of the defeats of 1870 The vie tory of the Marne, confirmed by the victory of Flanders; the impassable barrier set up against the most formidable for-midable effort which has ever been attempted In the military history of the world, have created a feeling of security which grows stronger everyday, every-day, ' Eery one Is aware that in order to gain the day against the coalition which encloses her. Germany needed a rapid success. This rapid success lacking, her defeat is certain. French to Be Well Prepared. If for the last three months the French command has not engaged In a general offensive it has had three decisive reasons for this The first is that having time on its side, it intends to make its efforts only after it has assembled all the means upon which it can rely, within a more or less near interval of time, with absolute abso-lute certainty. The second is that the example of the Germans at Ypres has shown us what may bo the price of an offensive, vigorous indeed, but Insufficiently prepared The third reason Is that the weather has been almost incessantly bad "We have seen that the French army is strengthening itself every day, In heary artillery, in explosive weapons for the trenches and in pro-' jcctiles. British Increasing Fereee. "It is known that the British army In France which at lirst consisted of. four divisions is today (beginning of February) composed of ten British divisions, two Indian divisions and two cavalry corps with 900 guns, of which 100 pieces are of heavs arrll lery. It is known nlso that the num be rof troops now with the colors and I being trained In England is very ( large. Belgian Army Reconstructing- "It Is known that the Belgian army, which Is reconstituting itself will shortly have six divisions of infantrv and two divisions of cavalry It ia known that the Serbian army, supplied sup-plied afresh with material and munitions, muni-tions, is once again prepared to show Its splendid qualities It is known finall) that -Russia continues to draw upon the immense reservoir of her recruits, having up to the present utilized util-ized only the twentieth part Theso are the reasons why the French command com-mand has not hurried and awaits the hour which it considered favorable. Thse reasons, based on precise motive mo-tive which are easy to tost, are entirely en-tirely Irrefutable French SuDerloritlea "If then we turn to the future we note that: "The wastage of the German army is in all respects greater than that of the French army The principal cause of this Is the superiority of our artillery and the fighting methods of the German Infantry, which attacks in closer formation than does ours It Is now certain that the lossee of our adversaries are double ours. "The possibilities of the German army ar-my from the point of view of effects effec-ts eness will go on decreasing more and more The German population capable of bearing arms is in comparison compari-son with the French population in the proportion of three to two. Now at the present time, landsturm included. I Germany is employing on the French front, a number of men representing two-thirds of her resources, against one-third on the Russian front On account of the Austrian defeats Germany Ger-many will be obliged to strengthen her force against Russia more and more. "The number of troops opposed to France will therefore continually decrease de-crease Our position will be improved by this circumstance, as alBO by the number of German losses, which will alwajs remain larger than ours and finally, by the large reinforcements which the British between now anJ July will send to the continent "The capacities of the German army In the matter of regimental organization, organiza-tion, already inferior to ours, are be-coming be-coming still more so. Granted that 1 our adversaries at the beginning of the war had more cadres than our selves, the text books show that their superiority In this respect was considerable consid-erable less than their superiority in men It was not as much as three to two Now It Is an established fact that the German losses in officers are greater than ours. We shall, there fore, certainly have the advantage from this point of view if indeed we have It not alrcadv Faith of the French Army. "Out of all these elements has been born the offensive faith of the French army and Its leaders. We had be fore us two systems The one. the German system demanded a rapid success at. the opening of campaign, a success in France before the Russians Rus-sians could come upon the field, before be-fore the British reserves Could intervene inter-vene before the economic trouble could make itself felt. Hence the creation in all haste of new corps, whether or not they could be kept up for a long time. By predetermination predetermina-tion the victory was to be Immedi ate. Now this necessary victory the Germans did not have. "The other system, the French system, sys-tem, consists, with the advantage of the freedom of the seas, in maintaining maintain-ing in good and complete form a number num-ber of sufficient formations and in creating new ones only in the measure meas-ure in which they can with certainty be kept up and suitably and durably equipped with regimental organization organiza-tion Expect Prolonged War. ' This system is established with a I view to a prolonged war. Of these (two systems which after six months of trial shall triumph? "The Germans can no longer oppose ue with forces superior to ours. They will therefore not be able to do In the future what they could not do in the past when they were, for one thing, more numerous than ourselves. Consequently our final victory- must follow by the imperious necessity of the concordant force of facts and fig-1 fig-1 tires. Our effort, too. is from now I onward directed toward that offensive I which we shall take at our own good time and the issue of which cannot be doubtful. Preparations Made. "Our reinforcements are being trained train-ed in the instruction camps with view to that offensive. It is in view of the offensive that from day to day our stores of munitions, food and transport are being Increased It is In view of the offensive that important import-ant reserves of telegraphic, telephonic, railway and shipping materia! have been constituted. It is in view of the offenshe that the reoccupation of the Belgian. Luxemburg and Alsace-Lorraine Alsace-Lorraine networks of railway has been prepared for and that a military mili-tary commission. English. French and Belgian, is preparing to work them. It is in view of ihe offensive that to our 10,000 heavy lorries we have added, add-ed, with the powerful and of our automobile au-tomobile industry, more than 4000 new transport wagons since the beginning of the war. Against All this, which on our side is sure and available, Germany Ger-many can offer nothing, either equivalent equiv-alent or analaeous "The large resources in men. officers offi-cers and material and munitions which ahe had at' her disposal six months ago have been largely ex-; pended in the hope of crushing ths opposed forces under the effort of mass and the effect of surprise, and they are toda scarcely sufficient after aft-er the defeat of that attempt to offer defensive resistance. The military wastage goes on progressively at the same time as the economic wastage and the moral wastage, which is the consequence of them. The creation of new units can hav no other oojeot than to re-eBtabllsh the equilibrium of the balance of numbers, which leans more and more to the side of the aJlles. KTery further development develop-ment given to the order of battle will result in a diminution of the general value of the German armies and accelerate ac-celerate the wear of tbem. It will also bring nearer the momsnt when Germany will be at the end of her military mil-itary resources and incapable ef ever regaining her numerical superiority. "At that moment France, taken by surprise in August bv a premeditated act of aggression, will begin the war in very truth with the entirety of her forces." nrt . |
