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Show "BUSSIA AND JAPAN OBJECT. ' The despatches tell us that' both Japan Ja-pan and '.Russia, with all tho politeness of Oriental 'diplomacy, utterly reject Secretary Knox's suggestion for the neutralization of the Manchurian railroads. rail-roads. It was inevitable thaUl.his should bo so, especially v since thoso nations have ascertained ' that Sccrcta- Knox had no previous consultation with other powers, aud no promise of support for his note in case it were issued. This was a fajtal mistake. The noto should havo been fortified boforo its issue, by inquiries in the various ruling courts of European nations,'' to ascertain whether it would receive any support from them. Tf it was found that it would not, it should not have been issued. Its issue under the circumstnneos places the United States in a ridiculous position, as boifig flouted by tho world. .Quite naturally, "both Russia 'and Japan decide to hold on to the advantage ad-vantage that thoy havo in thoso railroads. rail-roads. The railroads in Manchuria aro not, to them, tnero transportation agencies agen-cies or aids to commerce and tho handling hand-ling of business. In the ultimate analy-ais, analy-ais, the chief valno of' thoso roads, both to Japan and 'to Ruvsin, is military; and both nations would keep up thoso roade if there were mi civil commerce at all passing over them. They keep them up as part of their military establishments, and on ' occasion ueo them exclusively exclu-sively for military purposes. To expect, ex-pect, thorofore, that either nation would yield to tho proposition of neutralization neutraliza-tion of those roads, ih so wild aid impossible im-possible u dream that, it is a marvel that such a level-headed, practical man as Secretary Knox should havo for one moment entertained .it, especially as a one-nation proposition. |