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Show LAW IS C0MMI01L, BUT LIOUflB CAN BE HELD FOR PERSONAL USE IF PURCHASED BEFORE AUG. ! I Liquor seized by officers of Ogden city at the Union Stockyards on August Au-gust 17, was ordered returned to the owner yesterday afternoon by Judge A. E. Pratt in, fin opinion covering 29 pages prepared ns judgment in themo-tion themo-tion for dismissal of tho case brought by the defendant's attorney. The liquor li-quor said to be worth $250 and was purchased prior to August 1, when tho prohibitory law went into effect, and held for personal use. Attorney George Halvcrson, for the defendant, moved for a dismissal of the case on the grounds that the law docs not prohibit or does not Intend to prohibit the possession of liquor for personal consumption, that it does not apply lo liquor purchased before the law wont into effect and kept and intended in-tended for personal use thereafter and that, If the law must bo construed to prohibit the acquisition and possession of liquors for any purpose other than that mentioned in the act, tho legislature legisla-ture exceeded its power Insofar as it sought to prohibit tho acquisition and possession of liquors for personal consumption. con-sumption. These three points were considered chiefly by the judge in the handing down of his decision. District Attorney S. P. Dobbs moved for a stay of execution of the order to return tho liquor to its owner pending pend-ing his preparation of an appeal to the supreme court. The stay will cover 30 days and was granted by Judge Pratt. Judge Pratt's Decision. Judge Pratt said in part, as bearing directly on his final judgment: "Does tho act apply to the possession posses-sion of liquors purchased before the act went into effect9 "Undoubtedly, it does, so fnr as the right to traffic in liquors is concernod, but if kept and Intended for personal use another question is presented. "It is observed that up to and including in-cluding July 31st, 1917. the right to manufacture and sell liquors was recognized, rec-ognized, even to the last minute of that day. As there can be no salo without a purchaser, the right to purchase and keep liquors therefore existed. In other oth-er words, the right of property in liquors li-quors existed, and it was preserved as to dealers and druggists for at least ten days after ihe law went into effect, ef-fect, and thoy wero encouraged to dispose dis-pose of, by sale, up to the very last minute of July 31, 1917, as much of their liquors as it was possible for them to sell. Such being the case, especially in view of the fact that nowhere no-where In the act is the drinking of liquors prohibited, except in certain enumerated places, and there Is no requirement that persons other than dealers and druggists shall remove their liquors from the stale, or destroy them, nor may they sell or give them away and in view of the fact that the various provisions of the act referred to Imply that liquors in some circumstances circum-stances may he lawfully possessed, would It be reasonable lo so construo the act as to prohibit in the next sec ond of time any use whatever of the liquors li-quors purchased, which the state has said might lawfully be purchased up to and including tho last moment of July 31, 1917. Shall it be presumed that tho state has said to A, the dealer: deal-er: 'You may sell within the state to B, tho consumer, as much of your liquors as you can up to and including includ-ing July 31, 1917, and have ten days thereafter in which to dispose of the remainder outside the state, and the state will thereupon confiscate what you sell to B; he shall not have the benefit of what wo permit you to sell and him to purchase? Was the law intended in-tended to speak prospectlvply only, or ! retrospectively as well as prospective' ly? If the latter, would it not be an expost facto law as to liquors purchased pur-chased prior to August 1, 1917, for personal per-sonal use. and also contravene the constitutional con-stitutional provision that no person shall bo deprived of his property without with-out due process of lav;?" After reviewing the diclsions of other oth-er courts, in which the question was involved, Judge Pratt concluded: "Since the act in question, If construed con-strued to apply to liquors purchased before the act went into effect and retained re-tained for personal use, without intention in-tention to sell or otherwise unlawfully unlawful-ly dispose of the same, would make mere inaction, or failure to destroy them, a crime, and since the law en-i couraged and permitted the purchase of liquors up to the very moment that the law wont into effect and saved to dealers and druggists their property right for at least a period of ten days thereafter, and docs not expressly prohibit pro-hibit the use of liquors as a beverage, except in certain designated places, nor require that persons other than dealers and druggists shall remove their liquors from the state of Utah or destroy them, I am constrained to the opinion that the legislature did not intend to make the possession of liquors, li-quors, acquired before tho law went into in-to effect, and hold for personal use thereafter, a crime, and did not intend that such liquors should be subject to seizure and destruction." Judge Pratt decided that the act is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and not unconstitutional .and that intoxicating liquors may not now nor since August 1, bo purchased, or brought into the state, whether for personal use or otherwise, except as provided by the act. |