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Show Group O "The Draft: Needed! By LEO D. BROWN Looking beyond the immediate manpower needs of the war in Via ' nam, there is a much larger question of whether America requires I peace-time draft in the nuclear age. Conscription involves timeless qu& tions regarding the merits of one system of recruiting over another, h.; ; there is also some very timely arguments that can be injected into ; draft debate. Consider possible future wars that the United States mayhavet' fight. An all-out nuclear war would require two types of forces: "sna, j highly survivable forces designed to seize and hold key locations , the initial blow and forces designed to restore the fiber of the countn- ii that be possible. For either duty the current draft is ill suited. The fore could best be achieved by a small, highly trained volunteer force, ft the latter requires universal civil defense training. How Limited A limited nuclear war, assuming it can be kept limited, requL': highly mobile and highly specialized troops. The large number of trot: that a draft can bring in would be too vulnerable if ma,ssed and too m exhausted in a war of atomic attrition. A professional army, on theot hand, could have the training and specialization required for such at Large scale conventional war on the scale of World War II or Ik is also possible. With current and future technology, the primary wi of the draft, the ability to raise large numbers of troops, is gret(y j-. duced. The increased firepower and mobility of a modern, armor or af mobile division over older divisions allows a small screening force ri few divisions to cover an increasingly broad front, to hold back an sail blitz. Such a mobile screen also has an increased chance of survivalfi! war should escalate nuclearly. For offensive thrusts, the same is te In World War n, Korea, and the 6 day Mid-East War, the greatest on the ground were made by a few specialized, elite, or mobile fa notably armored spearheads, airborne troops, or amphibious bp Moreover, if a conventional response in Europe did require larg numbers num-bers of troops, and in the future this will be increasingly doubtful, M not these troops come from Europe whose population almost equals e whoe economic strength exceeds Russia's? And in any case, a mac conventional war with Russia andor China would soon escalate Mot nuclear realm, where again large numbers of American troops overs: would be of little value. A Different Role Guerrilla wars and other limited conflicts also require a mofc specialized force that is best achieved by a professional army, t the role of the combat infantryman will still be important here, fc conflicts will be won or lost primarily on the basis of local troops;: local popular support. The American role will probably be one of port, supply, and guidance, particularly in the realm of sophistic weapons. Finally, the draft with its large number of troops might be to-upon to-upon as a necessary mobilization base that could be called upon to I. in any sort of conflict, possibly a type not mentioned above. The-of The-of conscript armies as a mobilization base is questionable. As I Hart notes: "The conscript armies that were overrun in 1940 had j joyed nine months after mobilization before they were called on to la1! the simpler task of defensive action, and even then were under-tr-It is unlikely that those who may have to meet aggression in then-will then-will be allowed nine months' grace before the attack starts." In sum, the modern complexity of weapons and the nature of wars requires increased training, increased time in service ; creased time in service, and increased enthusiasm for the job. -specialized forces need not be large to fulfill their missions, ana unteer force fit these needs to a "T." |