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Show Military Methods Differ ef m m , u a m French Army Democratic U. S. System Attacked By Kenneth MacDoagall By Special News Service, NEW TORK. June , The very evident evi-dent need for American troope on the French front haa been Indicated by Field Marshal Joffre. Hla atatementa that lonvr training of American troops here before sending them to the front la unnecessary are evidently Inspired In-spired by his realisation of the defects de-fects of our present military establishment estab-lishment They are In direct contrast to 4he views held by our general staff, which opens up the question: Are American methods of military training obsolete? It beglna tn look very much as If they were. The crying need In this country st the preeent time Is offl-oers. offl-oers. Our millions of men made available avail-able by draft are useless unless they are officered to teach them at least ths rudiments of military drill. France, on the other hand, probably haa mors officers per thousand men than any other nation in the world. Marshal Joffre's Idea of sending American Amer-ican troops to France to be trained there, back of the fighting line, by French and British officers, is food for thought. Such training, according to hla fig-urea fig-urea would fit our militia and regular regu-lar army for active service within els weeks from ths time of their arrival. The day of ths pretty military for-rrtanhaspasedjrheHnTneaohool of the soldier In which Is taught squad formation, followed by the aquad'a relation re-lation to the company and backed by the knowledge of the rifle, la all that men In good physical training need for the present type of warfare, FRENCH DEMOCRATIC There ig no army in the world aa democratic as the French. Officers of the old school, who were gods of discipline, dis-cipline, are no longer popular. Officers and man have but one thought fraaos. They are fighting aa a bus!-" aesa and any good buaineaa la better off for the cooperation of employer and employe. Thus the present war haa In a measure mea-sure abolished the need for men trained years In ths difficult evolutions of the old military ayatem. The new system sys-tem does not call for anything but the rudimentary knowledge of eolldeiing. Then cornea the period In reserve back of the front. Men are keyed op and made to realise that war ia not the romantic ro-mantic display of the past. It la the long, hard watting game broken at tlmee by vicloua lunge and counter stuck. st-uck. v Here men find that it Is more or leas up to themselves to lessen the chances of death by exercising care, not to needlessly expose themselves to danger, dan-ger, and, above all, to obey orders-It orders-It haa already been pointed out that in case we do send sn army abroad in the near future we will have to use the British srmy rifle beause of manufacturing man-ufacturing conditions. We will have to strain every resource to properly equip our troops; yet. once, equipped, they can be trained In shorter time under sctttal war conditions In -PYance. What officers we have need war experience. ex-perience. Most of these even in the regular army, have never bean in ac- I tlnn. They do not realise what they are up against, that modern warfare la absolutely abso-lutely a contradiction to the teachings of the past. Our own general staff le not above par aa set by the preeent conflict. They are a till figuring aa of yore, and with few oxoeptiona are men of the. old school. Their chief objection against an early ear-ly expeditionary force Is the fact that each trained man sent abroad will deprive de-prive ua of from one to two hundred trained men Inside of two yeara. The establishment of officers' train - I lag camps shows they believe they can fit candidates tn three months' intea- jsive training tn command other men. If this Is possible, why Is It not also possible to train recruits up to a stage where they can be finished by vater-an vater-an French or British officers In a like period of time? , , HELP OFFERED. francs has offered as the valuable help of her officers. That knocks the pins from under the war department theory of not enoegb offloers to start training. It also opens np the way tor observation of real warfare while undergoing un-dergoing the finishing touch ee of training. It will harden men much quicker, because they tin have the added Interest developed by the realisation reali-sation that they, too, must aoon take their places beside their alUea at the front. It wftl also awaken the natloa to a full realisation of the tact that Amert-! Amert-! ea Is In the war. and In te win. If the j nation as a whole knew Just how sorely sore-ly put Franeo la at the preeent lima I I think all hesitancy would bo wiped away tn a flash. I The Oermana are- by ao mrsns I whipped. They have a tot of reserve j strength left, and If by any chance they suooeed In their efforts for vlo-itnry vlo-itnry the Dnlted Btatee will bare to i finish by fighting Oermany aloae, There have been meay Mvea lost la thla war. Will the Uvea ef ear alllea have been apent la vain f Or will the objects of a noamllitary natloa be overcome by the sound as rice of a na. tlon that haa for two yeara known modem warfare aa ao nation eutalde the oonfljot eouid ead . whloh now stands between Germany and the rest of the world T The greater the delay, the greater the aaislflce later an. Doea the fire department wait aatQ every piece of apparatus la oa the scene before they fight a ft re? Then why ahould we watt until we have a million men ready for action before we send our much needed aid to Prance? One hundred thousand mea on the Oghting line by the middle ef summer may hare the moral effect of five million, for It wtll hearten the aillee and show Germany that we are not In favor of a Tooklng eaalr" war. |