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Show JlS TELLS OF 1HE RETREAT j Field Marshal Explains Extension of Lines on Hun Attack. Longer Front, Held by Fewer Men, Is Cause of Withdrawals. IBy MAJOR GENERAL SIK FREDERICK FREDER-ICK B. MAURICE. (Xew York Times-Chicago Tribune Cable. Copyright.) 1 LONDON, Oct. 25. Sir Douglas Ilaig's j dispatch dealing with the story of the j dark ys of last spring is dated July 30, ' is now published, just three months 9 alcr. The date' of publication has been I skillfully chosen, for no one would desire at the present time to call the govern-ment govern-ment to account for past stlns of omission or commission. Halg says definitely that he was obliged to extend his front and that this was the prime cause of the disaster which lengthened length-ened the front, with fewer men to hold it. "The extent of our front made it im-' im-' possible with the forces under my command com-mand to have adequate reserves at all points threatened," he stated. It is inconceivable that Haig should now make that statement if he had not ' pointed out his weakness before the Ger-I Ger-I man blow fell upon him. Halg says: "Since the month of September, Sep-tember, 1917, pursuant to the decision taken by the British government toward ' the end of that month, negotiations had I been proceeding with the French au- I thoritles regarding an extension of the ' front held by the British armies." Bonar Law, on April 11, said: "The ar-I, ar-I, rangements in the matter of the exten-: exten-: slon of the British front were made entirely en-tirely by the British and French military II authorities." Haig says: "Under instructions from Bthe army council, the reorganization of divisions from the thirteen battalions to the ten battalions basis was completed during the month of February." Efficiency Lowered. That Is about one month before the j: German attack. "Apart from the reduction in the fighting fight-ing strength Involved by this reorganization, reorganiza-tion, the fighting efficiency of units was, to some extent, affected. An unfamiliar ! grouping of units was Introduced, thereby f i necessitating new methods of tactical j: handling of the troops and the discarding P ' of old methods to which the subordinate : commanders had become accustomed." In other words, at a time when it was known that a great attack was impending impend-ing and the British front had to be extended, ex-tended, Haig's establishment was reduced by some 130 battalions because he was nottiven sufficient men to keep these battWions up to strength, and on the eve ' ihe battle the lighting organization mtfivQl bis armies was radically changed. flU On April 9 the prime minister said: "What was the situation at the begin-tv begin-tv ning of the battle? Notwithstanding the Trheavy casualties In 1917, the army in Jfcance was considerably stronger on i nLary 1, 1918, than on January 1, On Slay 9 the prime minister. In a dra-Jmatic dra-Jmatic passage, implied that that state-1 state-1 ment was correct, because he was justified in including noncombatants in Ilaig's J fighting strength, lie said: "Who are combatants? Are those men who stopped the advance of the German 10 army to Amiens the other day coin-Wants? coin-Wants? (Honorable member Yes.) They are not if you begin to make a dis- j tlnctlon .between combatants and non-! non-! combatants. I am speaking of General if Carey's force. They would not be treated J as combatants." ff Haig gives the composition of Carey's W' force and shows that it was made up al-1 al-1 most entirely of men whowerc conibat-bru conibat-bru ants and arc always treated as com-hatants. com-hatants. Plans Known. On April 9 the prime minister said that ' : he had been informed by Sir Henry Wll-son, Wll-son, In the month of January or the be-r be-r J ginning of February, that the Germans '" would attack the British front at ap-' ap-' proximately the place and in the strength ;.: - and in the manner in which they did actually attack. On August 7 the prime minister informed the house of commons e: that the enemy attacked because he be-L-: 'J lieved that we had no reserves in men, pi:;i whereas in fact 365,000 men were sent eVcj across the channel in that month after 1 the German attack had taken place. Later the prime minister made a similar statement at Manchester. Why, then, was it necessary to reduce W Ilaig's force by 130 battalions before the i j battle? " In this connection there is one matter e ' to which Haig does not refer because it Jues not come within his province. We have been officially informed that after I the German attack at least two British . . divisions, together with a larger number fT British battalions, were transferred lJ I from Palestine to France. t . The question is, could nnv or all of s these troops have been in France before 1 J the German attack, and. If so. why were " A "Ky not there? Obviously, these matters ; ; cannot be left where they are. The ex-Planation ex-Planation tendered by the soldier and by ; , he statesman do not agree in any particular, par-ticular, and In the public interest an In-auiry In-auiry at the proper time is essential, f algs dispatch brings out verv clearly , tlic fact that If the effective unltv of : xc"nim5nd had been established before . je battle Instead of In the midst of the -j I 'ttest military crisis which we have ex-!il ex-!il jW.vjced in this war, the danger to which "I 6 we exposed would have been very !( if 8enslbly diminished. Committee Ineffective. A polyglot, versatile executive commit-i'c commit-i'c was not-and could not be the effective wgan of command, as ninety-nine sol-l sol-l oiers out of a hundred predicted when " , ns constituted. The words "too late" : it ,Y,en largely on nearly every page K,'"ls,,, dispatch. sir Douglas Haig's siory will. It is to be hoped, remove for-I for-I !,' , ' undeserved stigma which h;s I i , '!pon tne F'fth army. He makes I of vi.un , nt,y clcar "'at. feeling it to be I Dni-ii L Importance to defend the channel nntik' ne, had to. keep reserves in the I Inii aml lo leave General Gough with '"adequate support. 'mill dlvlslon of the Fifth afmv was ' Ei?h ti0!! an average G750 yards of front, holfli "'vl3'on of the Third armv was : Ircni s Dn an average -1700 vards or ' ui,r,,,'.i'st ' far rfhe heaviest blow fell Sca n , KIUh army, which was lighting .f'nst tremendous odds and equaled, if it ., "ot .surpass, the gallantry of the tore.. fnteinptil.les." Halg "sav.s his h:' wer' i !U. the disposal of the Fifth army ';! tacl "adequate to meet and hold an at-d.tiK at-d.tiK i ,a.uch strenBth as that actually llamr ' by th0 enemy on its front. No " il s "'trlhuted to General Gough, ' ah c ' ':efen'ed to in the dispatch as an onlv f n j experienced commander. The asoHMi 8 which can posstblv be taken I 'efer i f!" his acUon are those which I '"Idgehead aoandnme,it of the Peronne I iioTliyspa,l'h states explicitly that at Ij- cither nn ihc Sommo or. on 11"' sy(?r"',!' there Anything apnro.mhlng a '-TIjaKdown of command or of failure of 7 ?' a statement which gives the lie lail!,1 to many rumers which were circu-In circu-In London. The story makes it ' iT;r that if the Fifth armv was at first 1 fthfi , cack under the weight of over-i over-i f aiming numbers it was bei-ause of the withdrawal of the rigtlt of the Third army on March 21. owing to some misunderstanding, misunder-standing, which compromised the Fifth army south of the Somme. Sir Hubert Gough has been for six months on half pay without any Inquiry or investigation into his responsibility for what occurred. That is ntbt justice. In May the prown prince overwhelmed General Fra!nchet d'Espeftiy's command and drove it back to the Marne, just as General Gough's command mts driven back to Amiens. The French government transferred General Gen-eral d'Esperey to Salonlki, where he overthrew over-threw the Bulgars. " The contrast in the treatment of these distinguished soldiers is remarkable. |