| Show I 1 h ings X X X of f the he A E 11 W 0 IF 0 I 1 X X copyright 1931 in all countries countr lo by the tb north anaa amert by wl general X can n newspaper alliance world right reserved red fl including the scandinavian reproduction in what or in lupart part prohibited S to wostell johnj J pershing fi X CHAPTER 11 continued the secretary of war much to the disappoint t ment of colonel roosevelt wisely made an adverse decision in his case which was confirmed by the president it was evident that both mr wilson and secretary baker were looking for trained lenders leaders find and were determined to avoid the embarrass ment president lincoln experienced experience in the civil war when he was more or less driven to nil fill many high positions with political appointees who in the end had to be replaced by mefi trained in the military profession roosevelt Roosevel ts plea for sons the following letter from colonel roosevelt dated tiny may 17 1917 will show how his own one fine attitude my aly dear general pershing 1 I very heartily congratulate you and especially the people of the united states upon your selection to lend lead the expeditionary force to the front when I 1 was endeavoring to persuade the secretary 0 of f war to permit meto roe to raise a division or two of volunteers I 1 stated that it if you or some men like you were to command the expeditionary force I 1 could raise the divisions without trouble 1 I write you now to request that my two sons theodore roosevelt loosevelt Koo sevelt jr aged twenty seven and archibald B roosevelt aged twenty three both of harvard be allowed to as privates with you to go over with the first troops the former Is a major and the latter a captain in the officers reserve corps they are at plattsburg Platts burg for their third summer my aly own belief Is that competent men of their standing and rank can gain very little from a third summer at plattsburg Platts burg and that they should be utilized as officers even if only as second lieutenants but they are keenly to see service and if they serve under you at the front and are not killed they will be far better able to instruct the draft army next tall fall or next winter or whenever they are sent home than they will be after spending the summer bummer at plattsburg Platts burg the president has announced that only regular officers fire are to go with you and if this ilia Is to be the invariable rule then I 1 apply on behalf of my two sons that eliat they may serve herve under you as enlisted men to go to the front with the first troops sent bent over oer trusting to hear that tills this request has been granted I 1 am with great respect very illery sincerely yours THEODORE ROOSEVELT P S tf if I 1 were physically alt instead of old and heavy and I 1 should myself ask to go under you in any capacity down to and including a sergeant but at my age and condition I 1 suppose that I 1 could not do work nork you would consider worth while lille in the fighting line my only line in a lower grade than brigade commander N CHAPTER III our deplorable situation as to munitions was as fully discussed at a conference called by secretary of war baker may 10 it was brought out that we had for issue not in the hands of troops fewer than springfield rifles caliber 80 30 only a few more than light field guns throe three inch and heavy field guns As it was aa impossible because of manufacturing difficulties for our fac tories to turn out enough springfield fildes within a reasonable time the secretary decided to adopt the enfield rifle for our infantry it was then being manufactured for the lie british in large quantities tit at private factories in our country and a slight modification of the chamber only was vas necessary necess nry to make it alt our ammunition tile total production of tills rifle line exceeded during the war As to machine guns it was reported to the conference that we e flat a few less than 1500 and these were of four types congress in 1910 1016 lind bud alibro printed for machine guns but the war department ind had not de aided definitely to adopt any lor one for our army although an order tin hid been placed late in 1910 for a quantity of the heavy vickers maxima short on ammunition of 0 artillery ammunition except for the three in inch c h we ve did not have enough to provide more than nine hours hovirs sup gup ply even for the limited number of guns on hand bring at the rote rate ordinarily adl used in laying la ing down barrage for an infantry attack tile the situation at that time as to aviation was such that every american ought to feel deeply chagrined to hear it mentioned of ca 65 officers and about 1000 men in the air service section of the signal corps there cerii were 35 officers who could fly with the exception of five or six officers none of them could have met the requirements of modern battle con n A col theodore roosevelt editions and none had any technical experience with aircraft guns bombs or bombing devices deales we had some fifty five training planes in various conditions of usefulness ful ness all entirely without war equip ment of these planes it la Is amusing now to recall that the national nati obal AaI advisory committee for aeronautics which had been conducting nn an alleged allege scientific study of the hie problem of light flight advised that fifty one were obsolete and four others obsolescent we could not have hae put pill a single a squadron in the field although it was estimated that we should e eventually ven tally need tit at least squadrons each to be composed on the average of some 24 off leers cois men and 38 13 planes besides a large reserve of planes tor for replacements among other subjects considered with the secretary was the assembly for training of the national guard and the men to come in under the draft in lieu of any previous plans the secretary contemplated the construe tion of cantonments canton ments in different parts of the country and may 7 the corn mantling generals of the several departments part ments were directed to select sites the actual construction of canton ments was not begun until nearly neaily three months after we were in the war and so great wits was the task of erecting buildings building and putting in wa ter works and sewers that hint some ninety alnet days more elapsed by the tinie time these CL centers n of instruction were ready to receive troops thus thin it was with some exceptions practically sit alx lx months lie ile fore the training of our army was un der way elyen then several of these camps were not favorably located and training was seriously handicapped during the fall and winter months rivalry for our troops about tills this time the miles allies brought up the lie question of utilizing our men to build up their ar anniles niles As we see the subject arose froin time thue to lime in one form or it nother anti and we had to fight fl lit against it until the end of tbt war both the french and british rills nils under BI al itene ilene viviani and arthur 0 balfour ISal four respectively then in our country were very keen to have us consent to 1111 up tip the ranks of their armies with americans I 1 was decidedly against our bacorn ae A e V A troops of first division loving leaving mexican border for now new york ing a recruiting agency for either the french or british and at that time this was the attitude of the war department part ment also while fully realizing the difficulties it was definitely understood der stood between the secretary of war and me that we should proceed to 1 organize our own units from top to bottom and build a distinctive army of oui our own on as rapidly as possible the evident rivalry between the british and french tor for control and use of our forces even before we had an army in the field confirmed my impression that those two governments were not working entirely in harmony As to their armies it had been apparent for some time that there was a lack of co operation cooperation between them their efforts were often separate and distinct that Is first one and then the other would attack friends sought ts to go along although it was not generally known that I 1 was to go abroad there was a flood of f applications to accompany me one of them was a personal appeal for service sen ice in any capacity by my old friend robert bacon who had been ambassador ambuss idor to franco france lie ile had al ready given valuable fild ald to the allied cause and because of his intimate knowledge of the french people and his tact and discretion I 1 was glad to have him A few days before my departure while at lunch at the metropolitan club with charles B magoon ex gov einor of cuba charles 0 dawes dawe joined us the three of us had been friends in the tha days when we were together at lincoln neb magoon and dawes as young lawyers the latter with a decided talent for business and I 1 as military instructor at the state university dawes was an applicant for a commission in one of the engineer regiments then being organized under the direction of samuel felton from vol with experience in railroad tug ing and wanted me to help him get the appointment I 1 asked him whether he knew anything an thing about engineering and lie said that when a youth he had bad carried a chain a month or so BO for a surveyor in ohio in was not much impressed with his pretensions its as an eng as a prospective military ty but I 1 lid did have knowledge of hla his business ability and experience and knew that lie he would be valuable alu able in soini loiue tion requiring ills his so I 1 to the secretary of war viar in hl his behalf requests from national guard oali cers and from froin governors for the lie early acceptance of 0 their state units liter ally poured into the war department th alie e cla clamor became so general and so c insistent ills latent that the secretary secret nry of war happily conceived the idea of forming a com composite cosite division to include i troops from every state in the union I 1 thought the suggestion a good one and save gave it my hearty endorsement indorsement Indor tills was the origin of the forty second vv division which was later to distinguish itself in several enga engagements eg CHAPTER IV my first and my only meeting with president wilson until after the armistice occurred tiny may 24 1917 when I 1 called on him with secretary of war linker after some soine conversation will mr baker on shipping mr wilson turned to me general we are giving you some cult tasks these days said the president perhaps Perlin ps so I 1 replied but that Is what we are to expect aar president tile the president then mentioned my exper experience lence in mexico and inquired about my iny acquaintance alth france I 1 lind had expected him hill to in something about the part our army should play pilly in the hie hut but lie he sahl nothing promised full support upon leaving I 1 bryld mr president I 1 oppre appreciate clate the honor you have conferred upon we me by the assignment you have given me ine mid anti I 1 realize the responsibilities it ent fills hut but you can count comit upon the best that Is in me ine to this the president replied general nl you were chosen entirely upon your record an and I 1 have every confidence that you will succeed you shall have my full support the president then asked me ine to con vey to the king icing of gi great ent britain and to the president of france lilg ills greetings and best wishes ills ilia manner was with his poise and ills his ali air of determination ills assurance of conil confidence dence in me was but tn in the he difficult situations that eliat arose inter regarding the manner of aiding the allies he was inclined to yield to the persistent importunities port unities of the allied representatives in washington in the act actual un I 1 conduct of operations I 1 was given entire freedom and in tills this respect was to enjoy an experience unique in the lie history of ameri amer can wars letter making him chief blay 27 1917 1017 the day before I 1 wits to sail from new york secretary lan ker sent me a letter of instructions conr oncoming ning my command conini inid authorities and dut duties les in if E europe which Is quoted in full the president directs nib me to communicate to you the following d 1 the president dent you to command oil all the land forces of the united state operating pe in continental europe and in the united kingdom of 0 great britain and ireland including any part of the marine corps which may be detached tor for service there with the army from your command are excepted the military attaches and othe others r s of the army who may be 0 on n du duty ty directly with our several embassies 2 you will proceed with your staff to europe upon arrival in great britain franceour france Franc eor or any other of the countries at war with the imperial german government you will at once place yourself in communication muni cation with the american embassy and through its agency ogency with the authorities of any country to which the forces of the th united states may be sent 3 4 you are invested with the authority and duties devolved by the law regulations orders and customs of the united states upon the commander of on an army in the field in time of war and with the authority and duties in like manner devolved upon department commanders in peace and war including the special authorities and duties assigned to the commander of the philippine department in so far as the same are applicable to the particular circumstances of your command U 8 forces force separate 14 4 you will establish after consultation sul tation with the tha fren french h war office all necessary bases cinell lines of communication depots e etc te a and nd in make ake all the incidental arrangements in ants essential to active participation at the front 5 in military operations against the imperial german government you are dire directed e te d to cooperate with v ith forces of the 0 other I 1 ier countries employed against that enemy but in so doln doing g the underlying idea most be ba kept in view that the forces of the united states are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces the identity of which brust be preserved this fundamental rule Is an subject abject to such buch minor exceptions in filar cl circumstances as aa your judgment may approve the decision as to when your command or any of its parts Is ready for action to Is confided to you and you will exercise full discretion in determining me manner ot of operation cooperation co but until the forces of the united states are in your judgment sufficiently strong to warrant operations na as an independent command it Is understood der stood that you ou will co operate cooperate as aa a component of whatever army you may be assigned to by the french fench government 0 you will keep the department fully advised of all that concerns your command and will communicate mun muni cate tente your recommendations 9 charles G dawes in war time freely and directly to the department and in general you are ara vested with all necessary authority to carry airy on oil the war ar vigorously in with the spirit ol of these instructions and toward a victorious conclusion signed BAKER party sails in secrecy on the late of my sailing may 28 1917 my party assembled at gover gaer nors noi s island md new york all hod had been instructed to proceed with the lie utmost secrecy cj even eian civilian chilian clothes until they N ere aboard the steamship baltic although we ourselves stole silently out thron through the fog and down the hay bay the large number of quartermasters and other off leers stationed near new york ork dashing mound around in uniform rather ostentatiously that thai day really amounted to an announcement bonte something out of the ordana ordinary ry was happening hut but it must be said to 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