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Show i;.anl ho ran If , . mirul m,,U tl oV l, ' ' .'iu-my country, but 1 1, . 0 .W5rf: " ' vvhipp.M without f, ' " 7 n Nm.-I nuwhlno of war i Ku.ssu, m other youhs, thor a o j.vt.vo8 besides i,u'U,tinff cas,? ltus upon tho enemy. Tho AUi's SS fWARD 5 HARCH ,f500 By H. S. Sims, Jr. -rn,, i.of ,..,:! of tho xx r in K-v K-v iuviuat.-ly oiedieted . .;J9.V xxu knows how lonii J,:nvs xvill last. Sim aei- T,mi Army moved tow- htie . Nov. Stli. thovo luts - Tth. ''':",!.uiv intonsifu'iitiou of ;.jvn tho Nasi, '"erai ' , ,,nioose of tho Wo,," front ' T thc w,1' hIkiw tl ,', ,H1Kh there J''''tlvo, t u, , 1,n,m!C,1o ob-""'H ob-""'H "T' oC tho Ger-nttulmu Ger-nttulmu l" Rh,nc- m'ght be lltyZllnf! t0 nHte' at this u- S N n a lllPnlRn' that the two,-,, our " nio Position be- Sooo ml A ra the British h to Moreover,- on the o" thota? SeVCn al 0-th-d 0(li" On Southern & i on t . . cJThlrlTth range the Ameri" t e P ,Army' the Scventh and lor! n" ' Wh have made on-s on-s o able gams through their na- break-through. It has not been heard from since the big attack began but, after the Holland invasion, in-vasion, it is probably ready for another descent. This might be beyond the Rhine in an effort to disrupt Nazi hopes of making a stand along fixed fortifications when it is no longer possible to stand west of the river barrier. Strength of Enemy Reserves Unknown . . . Naturally, there is no way to tell how long the grinding process will last. There is the possibility that the Germans will fight longer long-er than we suspect if they have reserves greater than we think. If the- battle is prolonged, the enemy en-emy will face disaster as it at-temps at-temps to retire into new positions but, so far as the record of the present war is concerned, the Germans Ger-mans have shown an unusual abil- wiumraw iroops trom traps and to avoid catastrophe. The lull on the eastern front cannot be long continued. With the full-scale offensive on the western front the Red Army will undoubtedly move into action, taking advantage of the critical demands upon German manpower. If, and when the big battle begins in the -east the grinding process will be faster and it is difficult to believe that the Germans can stand the pressure very long. !'..SAUusloftVsivo i simply ' .'",veii. If this oan bo xo-Cn' xo-Cn' ; J .:ho:it ooossivo loss Mil -i'1 th0 !ltt:U'k WlU lH i"S" , is jainoJ-ia jainoJ-ia "C ivnr.sm plan 1' xlofoiiso. ."' nVi iS (o soil vory iloarly a wost of tho Khmo and ;.';--.s tho rivor xvhou it bo--i'-tvossary. onoush men to fortifioations that have 'v'.oJ for tho main defense Rfioh. i Sjtf Fortified I r.-.ts . -f Allioi high command has s-,r::v of numbers, and prob-'.'v prob-'.'v cwriority of mobile equip S ii weans. It may be when the Nazis get into " f:oJ fortifications, whether t -ive s-"X' advantage of posi- - This depends, of course, up- ' ilong tho line nnrt the Na,is so '"at there will not be available suuu.lent .nanpower to dofe river barrier. L AM, Seek To Hatch T)i' Rhine . . . Tho immediate goal is the approaches ap-proaches to the Rhino nnd they are so important that the Germans Ger-mans are resolutely fighting to hold them. This compels the enemy ene-my high command to commit its mam force and much of its reserve re-serve strength. Naturally, the sooner this is done the more des-I des-I perate tho situation becomes for the Germans, now faced by greatly great-ly superior armies. Tho length of tho battle for the Rhine approaches depends upon the extent of German reserves and the willingness of the Nazis to throw them into the fight. In tho first two weeks, despite sizable siz-able gains, there xvas little indi- -wu invasion route into Germa- n, frt Gap- e Mo 2 p fiVe WlS dcsiSned for the Metz ,-Bclfort, or Lorraine and Mozello areas, is not known but it is possible that the decision can occur anywhere along the front. By concentrating power on the Aachen front the Allies have compelled com-pelled the Germans to counter with appropriate strength. By attacking at-tacking forcefully in the south they have prevented the, Nazis from shifting soldiers, thus compelling com-pelling the enemy to throw in re-At re-At first glance the southern at-serves at-serves as the threats developed, tacks seemed designed to hold German forces but, here we have another uncertainty, where has Gen. Eisenhower placed his available avail-able reserves? There is available, in the event of a rapid advance, the Airborne Army, which is expected to be the instrument for the final |