Salt Lake Tribune | 1919-09-28 | Page 1 | Germans Confident of U-Boat Success in Spring of 1917

Germans Confident of U-Boat Success in Spring of 1917 American Admiral Explains Critical Situation Which Confronted Allied Nations Immediately Before United States Entered War. By ADMIRAL WILLIAM SOWDEN SIMS. Copyright 191'J by The WorM'n Work. Published by arrangement with The Mc-f'lure Mc-f'lure .W-wpa per Syndicate. I 01 X tteveial occasions I attempted to Impress IJoyd George with the Kravlty of the situation; he alwajs refused to nee It that way. "Oh, yes, things are bad," he vould Fay, with a srnl!c and a sweep of hi:i hnnil. "Put we shall pet the best of the nub ii .a rlnea never fear '." Hut the i. beer fulness of the prime n.ln- IsIt was exceptional; all his associates ; hardly oneealed their apprehension. On J the oih-r hand, a wave of enthusiasm j w;im sweeping over Germany. Americana , still have an Idea that the German government gov-ernment .''doptvd the submarine campaign an the last despairing gambler's chance, only haif believing in ll sua ess them-s them-s Ives. There Is an inipr'Sninn here that the Germans never would have staked their 'mpire on this desperate final throw had thry foremen that the United States would have mobilized h11 its men and resources re-sources ag:iinst them. This conviction in entirely wrong. The Germans did not t'.lnk that th-y were taking any ebane?s nt all ; the ultimate result seemed to them a certainty. They calculated the available shipping of the allies and the neutral nations; they knew just how muh their submarines could sink each month; and from these statistics they mfitiu-matieally deduced the time when the war would end. U-Boat Commanders Confident of Outcome. They did not like adding- the United S ates to their enemies, bui this was because be-cause they were thlnkir.fr of conditions after the war; for they would have liked to have had American friendship in the period of readjustment. But they did not fear that we could do them much Injury in the course of the war Itself. This again was not because they really despised our fighting power; they knew that we would prove a formidable enemy on the battlefield; but the obvious fact, to their eyes, was that our armies could never gt to the front in time. The submarine campaign, they said, would finish the thins in three or four months: certainly in that period the unprepared un-prepared United States could never summon sum-mon any military power that could affect af-fect the result. Thus from a purely mili tary standpoint the entrance of 100.000,-000 100.000,-000 Americans affected them about as much as would a declaration of war from tfie planet Mars. We confirmed this point of view from the commanders of the occasionally captured cap-tured submarines. Th-se men would be brought to London and questioned : they showed the utmost confidence In the re-I re-I su't. i "Yns, you've sot us," they would say, "but what difference does that make? The-re ate plenty more submarines com-Ing com-Ing out. You will pet a few, but we can build a dozen for every one that you can capture or sink. Anyway, the war will all be over in two or three months and we ehall be sent back home.'" Kaiser Certain of Submarine Success. All these captives laughed at the suggest sug-gest Ion of German defeat: their attitude was no: that of prisoners, but of conquerors. con-querors. Thy also regarded themselves as heroes and gloried in the achievements of their submarine service. For the most part they exaggerated the sinkings, and placed the end of the war at about the first of July or August. The Berlin government gov-ernment similarly exaggerated the extent of their success. This was not surprising, for one peculiarity pe-culiarity of the submarine is that only the commander, stationed at the periscope, peri-scope, knows what Is going on. If he reports re-ports sinking a pQOO-tcn ship no one can contradict his statement, for the crew and other officers do not see the surface of the water. Not unnaturally the commander does not depreciate his own achievements, and thus tho amount of sunken tonnage reported re-ported in Berlin considerably exceeded the actual loes. The speeches of German dignitaries resounded re-sounded with the same confidence. "In the impending decisive battle," said the kaiser, "the task falls upon my navy I of turning the English war method of starvation, with which our most hated and most obstinate enemy intends to over- throw the German people, against him 1 p.nd his allies by combating their sea traf- i fic with ail the means in our power. "In tins work the submarine will stand (Continued on Pago 11, Column 1.) S CONFIDENT OF U-BOAT ACCESS IN SPRING OF 1917 o ,.m Admiral HxpKiins Critical Situation Con lion Ui AHiod Nations lnmuiiatelv IVi'or? I'nitod States Hntered War. A I ' l" t vim, uu ligations , , , ,N,I""H I f.ui.iKi.rs ll,,. I, ,, 'I'u.T Men.,,, ,,.,. . , , M , , '"""""'!''''' r,.w l.i.ilrM.ii.s O, tine ii ii I eoinni, i.e. or the tree i, ,..,. IU"Ot of tin.. p.. Allies Face Defeat in Spring of 1917. It Is i.hu.mslv ahsunt ,v that a brill, bri-ll, e , "l"''1' '""'"K """.WW ami I .- i i;" tons of shl,,,, ,onlh. s , tin, ""l "'" "I..1..K of 1-.H7. w. ,,- "sPlllr.l nusness of tin. sriir,. II.,, I l,e 'in man submarine enmpalmi cnnimurd U. surrrr, I i ,! ,- t... ui. Tutted SI. .Irs , ,iii,l uol liv llaiisporlr I Its army lo ''""re. 1111,1 (, f,,, ,, mnu-rliila which we were ..iu1nK to Kin op,., and which ',r" 'ssriilliil In wIiuiIiik I he war. rould iifvor havn none aernas. Thai In lo s.iv. roniplela control of llie nuhsurlaee hv i.eriiuuiv would have Hun,.,! nKiiliint Ihia-latid Ihia-latid the hlorkade, the verv power with Wlilrh aim m, pluuiiicl lo reilucn the (or. man empire. In due roinsn I aliall nllempt to nhow lie Iminrdn,!,, Oo vllou that, exists between be-tween eomiol of tin. surraer end rolil.ol or the Milvsui ii,-o; t!is n.u ralh e w ill ,lls-'hsn, ,lls-'hsn, Indr.-d. thai the nilllon whhh pon-Srsses pon-Srsses the Ilrst also J'olent l.ill- posHesseil the seromt. p, ,,, wlrv ,.;,. , pn,; Ihi.s prill, Iple was not , lleellve. o rar as niorehaiil dhlppliiK win eon-eertied. eon-eertied. i;'rmany's purpose In adopting the rillnlrsa suhiiiariiie warfare warn o( rours,.. the ,,,u. whl. li I have Indlral.-I -to il.prl tl, ai,,.a ,,. n ,h8 n,.M and elvll populations of the suppll.-H fiom ovei sraa w hlrh w i re essrlill.il lo vlt torv. .Naliirr had been laiul to this ilermaii pi-oBi-am when she .-rented tho llrlllsh l.slrs. Indre,!. ', t,K,t ijttle kingdom, and Hie waters whlrh surround li. seemed in !i.'ve been almost ovpiesslv mad' In au-tlelpatlon au-tlelpatlon ,,f t, hli, marine rampaUn. for purposes of ronir.isl. Irt us roiisld.u our n uronrnphlral slliiallon. A nine g-nilee al I lie map ills, loses how difficult. If not Impossible, p would he to blorkade the I mt.d Stales with submarines. In t le rtrsl plare. tnn operation of svlbma-''"' svlbma-''"' more than two llious.ind miles from their l'ns,. would present almost In-KUpcrabla In-KUpcrabla illllleultiv.s. Impracticable for Huns to Attack America. Oermnny could send an occasional mih-martii mih-martii to our coasts she. ilemi'mitrnt.',1 this fact In the war but it wou.il be hardly possible to maintain anvlhliiK like a regular and perslslent campalmi. Kun though she couid kreo a force const. inrlv w-orklni; lu our waters, other natural d,f"-tlculties d,f"-tlculties would defeat their most di-u-r-nilne.i efTorts. The traile routes approach our Atlantic ''"""', I" the shape of u f.m, of which itlfTrr.-nt sticks point lo sucl, ports as Hcston. New York. Philadelphia. Norfolk and t. rr!!J ,,r th ,; ,.f o( Ml,xlro .j. destroy s.'uppn to American ports it would be necessary for the enemy to rover all these routes with submarines -a rro.'..,-t p.i vast as to he hardiv worth the trial. In addition, we have numerous fae:l,- ;.or;s t ),lc, ,. couM ,V,-rt - Fiv:h Tiii- Om.) . , 1 expect that IV ile.i'h'l.'d 1,1,!! wise I :" ,: a.im'r.i'.' e i.ir.N, in l ,'. our ct-'rr nui.il im'il- I 1 ' - --".',T!cd I'V the S Ml 't : , ii .N'lirs. of te ' ,,i t s le per .' - '" t! l'i. ml .' i p ' ' , .- ..-','!' ; i s war i 1 1 . ' ' i '"","' v.! :r..'. i-v ii M 1 Mr N'wvu Hv- ' ' e:v .h:vui fs! a r-.ir ' ' 1 ' ! : .r,J 1 : ' j "u-: tt' S'M .l-ippear ,' ';. .ii,. xH.ir w -i-.-h oi-r i:'- i' u .v rv.i :;. ;:v i ' " t t'vIlM.l.'! i -i, We 1 " "' ';-M :i of !' I"-"-'. ! E. we 1 ' m " i.!M't irin ,V..-!:s If.l.l .'!l,0t l,lit ' y: Vsx e:e m in ! v 't:.i.t .r. :- , .-,:i,t ,t .'i --iif , the-v v "V V v.. iff. roo:o- ... I 't' ti.w) m.iIe -v for Germans L-5 Positive. - ' .'. '.' b-t've whir t.u - s : a '-v ' " 1 ..i t'wry reo:i for tv-' tv-' "--? .i.?r a" t aro- . - -.v i. .,'. WAT WO'.l'i ?. A u'st 1; - 1 Klicl! , - - vi 1 oa:-.- !'i oo-.t.it-: j . r; 1 a:. - x!tV.it t1-' 5 :S-j- ri.;s. !'w iu!.t , - "t'.,nf a:-rrvi'-. t':; . ; cr.S.vro.AvA , J, i C :1 :-H .-ir-.i ii f t'- ,-ts ':r-. ':r-. W :t.U r- :" f w.r,i:. t -i t , :. : t o it t . vf". o:- A'.:c":; . j r"' ?T.r.:ty.: t..-ev n!l I : --- --- - of v-s. 1-th tion . i-v i-i -ir :: . it rr. -: : : j-i'.ec.c.i i- r Go. ' V :- v..iri cvr- V - r j. id krrjt:T:i on J if r f '-:i-. 'iji a1. i -: 1- dr'.-r o:ie , -r.V. o " f . . s ( . - : ' it x r.: t'n rn - ) c-i ..t? r::e:i wl h i s.-., .t n-i-o- , e,,,;'l"!,,."" w,"''i"l''llona of Us en-' en-' ' '"'le the nation domla, ' ;, '' U ,'; "l"" H"1 resources of the n , . ,,:"'M: lo ' '-"1 lor Us civilian I ! .i.all.in. raw nuileilals for Its nianu. . . ues munitions for It, a,-,i,.,- ,, I the same time, to maintain that coi: inaV .I.V1,,c',",W"U'" W''T "-"'"l- I"" It enable, mi.-i, tt pVr lUso to trans. i; ""v ". '"-m of cti '.J ,y '":,v ""'"ed. At the very lie t est seaiMwer is he.ipliK i ,,,, "7,;"K" u.l'" " dominant nation It a lvinwf" ""0" 1,1 '" th,., sa,,,.. a h aulas, , to Its ene-in. For the bivkde" raour'' srarower ,a tho Britain's Control of Seas Exaggerated. ,, ,U.,'''u ' "St'l.'.lltui-allv and In- .l.is.iia.1 ilepemlent upon the muside .' ...Is. seapower can tiansfmni It Into 'lr.n-.i,-red lortress and sooner or atri c, i. p,. it, unconditional surrender -s opnatien, are not -ectacuhi, . but w"rl; "'1 ' 1'iev, table lemoisc-.. lemoisc-.. s:,es.s of death tlst:r This fact Is so ta,il.,P tlls, , M!)ii.t en it here omy lor tin, ,uuposr ,.( m-ltm m-ltm attention to another fact which Is not so apparent. Perhaps the urealost .I'.nmoiip.ace of the war. from the newspaper news-paper standpoint, was u,t ,h Hrlllsh l iel eontro.led the seaa. This mere clr-.-mslance. as I have already said, was l.e reason why all atiidenu of history ijfpt Insistlns thai sho could never he dcteated. It was not until the sprlnir of 1117 that we really awoka to the real situation- It was net until I had spejit evrral cl.iv In ..ns.an.1 at 1 made the all-Important discovery, which waa this that Hrllaln d.d no; control the sens. she .till centre cen-tre '-d tha seas In the old Nelsonian ser.se that Is. her priuiU fleet successfully contained" the ilermnn hattlo s.pia. Irons and kept them, for the preater part of the war, penned up In tfce ilerman harbors In the old days such display ot s.apower would have eashy won the war for the al is. Hut that Is not control of th oas In th mMem irnsf; It Is merely control ot th s-irface of the stas Under modern methods of naval warfare sea control means far more than controlling the top of th water. V'or there Is another type of slip, which anils stealthily under the w.wes. revealing l;a pre-s-'nee only at certain cer-tain Intervale, and capable of ahoolin a te-rib'.e weapon which can sink the proudest proud-est surface ship In a few minutes. The exl-tenco of this new type of warship makes control of the seaa today a verv .'..irerc.nt thing from what was in Nelson's t.nre. As lor.c as such a warship can operate urr-'.er the water almost at wep and this was the case In a considerable area, of the ocean In the early part of 1117 tt Is r'..!.cu!o-.i9 to say that any navy controls the s.vas. For this s-.ib-surtaee vessel, when used as successfully as It was hv the German In 1517. deprive the surface :-vy of that advantare which has proved most decisive In other wars. That is. the surface r.avy can no longer completely f"i mvl i hr ji .rx of h I r'.anln . It was y wav of the. niij.h l.i.tt the INboat-s rc.i.'h.'.l t:;c nj. n ye.i. (tTico in t:,.- 1 : 1 1 k 1 -H 'i;mn.'l, lh" suh-ni:irin.'s suh-ni:irin.'s Jui-1 th.-ir . h-.j. (ao r.-utt-s to t::e )r.intliiK kpiuiiIs off the v, st i:n l cuuth of I r -1 : i f i I . A h.r'1 iiumi f-r m.tri.-th- app m-niiy mint, .-.--.tr.lv l.-nc d.'tour acro.-b tho Nnrth und atmind -o '. I;i , KoWK Tm:th tj-.M K.tir t l.t ii 1 j t.-.iK.-. boiwon the Orkney uiul the ShtliiiiI Is.atuN, nlnnc iht- H.h:!(iis, vh-re thry orr.tt:riic.- inadt- h a frill, aii'l nrniinl the w.-st roa : of Irt-laml. This lf'ks hko a Ions; a tul . : f flr.i; t trip. y-t i:i t:?n was mt orit rt'lv vaf:r- I, f ir ..v. 1 : "a t h. a.t the map of ;!r;jtln;; 5);nws. nhiia;1 K'th-rre) K'th-rre) in yrveral on th- way. Hut the I'-ho.an had :i ni'i,-h s;-.'.rtt.-r a!tr-r:ia-tivf rn-jtc to iht h'int:ii)C ft--lls. Aru! Ii'r" I muM i-orr'-t .'tTiOt.'.er widely jrc ail in mifiiippn-htTi'-lon. N u ."paper r-.'i'Ws h'ar-! much, whl'f thfft ar was coir.g on. nf t )k- Ivirrnco TO.t ih? Ktit-lish ri H-m-!, frmn I -vr to aPii, ar,'i t! ry t"'i!- f v. ,ii frcr.ornl th.it this ohviri''! inn k-:t the 1" -boats from p;i-in thro'ili. This was not an. T!: n-fai't rrcs.:nij fr troops and sup. p!i-s thd nrk p- rf tly fro:Ti tho hln P ' Put t :n inrs, n''t s and nt i-r-r oh-t oh-t met lor. that wf-re irUi-nd-d to pr-ont tho paiai:o nf snhmnrh'K-s did not do ?o. An a rratt'T r.f fa-t. tlio Jintjsii navy know littio about nnr-s in it hd always rath or tospir d them as tlio "weapons of tho wt-uker powor." and Its mine oar ray at, tlie ihaniit-l nrossiiifc wan not successful. A hir; part of it was rarriod away by th strong i'.d and srnrms, and tho mines wore si defective that nysTors u;id otr.er prowtb.s. at- tarhinc ti'emselvos to their prons, made many t them harmless. In 1 r 1 . under Admiral Sir Ttocer Kpys. this barrage was reconst r;c t ed with a new type nf mine and became. In fart, an effortive harrier; hut In the snrinc: of TjIT ti;c jerma:i U-boats had httle difficulty dif-ficulty i:i slipping throuph, particularlv in tho njlit time. And from tills point tho distance to the trade routes south and west of Ireland was relatively a short one. Vet terribly destructive as these U-boats were, the nnmb'r operating simultaneously simultaneous-ly In thl and other fields was never very lare. The extent to which the waters were Infos ted with German submarine was another particularly ludicrous and pa rtirularly prevalent misapprehension. Merchant vessels constantly reported having; hav-ing; been assailed by "submarines in shoals," and most civilians s'Jll believe that they sailed top-ether In flotillas, like schools of fish. There is hardly an American Amer-ican doughloy who did not see at least a dozen submarines on his way across the Atlantic; every streak of suds caused by a "tide rip." and every swimming porpoise por-poise was Immediatoly mistaken for the wake of a torpedo; every hit of driftwood, In the fervid imapinn tion of transatlantic voyagers, assumed the shape of a periscope. peri-scope. The fact Is, thnt. with few exceptions, excep-tions, we knew every time a German submarine sub-marine slunk from it? hase into the ocean. The allied secret service was immeasurably immeasur-ably superior to that of the Germans I pay narticular tribute to the British naval intelligence department in saying this. We always knew how many submarines the Germans had and where they were; we always knew how many they were building, where they were building them, their essential characteristics and the stage of progress which they had reached at a particular time. .Ti.ti li... in case our cnemv attempted to h.o. -Kade 4is on the A'.lantic mast our splrnilai hvptem of tranhcoiitinent.il ra'l-roada ra'l-roada would make Internal distribution not a partu-uh.rlv dir:b uli matter Above all such eor.5idoral m. of course M the Uci t),:il tno t nlt.-d State j n industrial and agricultural ontitv s.df-supporirne- and self-rdlnir. anl." 'thtvo-fore. 'thtvo-fore. It could not be M,trved Into mirrcn-nor mirrcn-nor even though tho enemv t-hnuld Mir-mount Mir-mount these practhallv Insuperable obstacles ob-stacles tn a jiubmarlno bio, kudo. Hut the situation of Great Uritaln In entir-Iv i different. It obtahiB from oversoM the larger part of Its food and a runs w!"-ab part of Its raw mat'Tial-.; In April uf accordmc to st at -merits maiie a-l that time. KnKland had enough food on hand for only six woekn or two months. The trad ioutes over which the. supplies sup-plies come made the submarine blockade a comparatively simple matter. Instead , of the sticks of a fan, the comparison w-hi.-h I have suggested with our own 1 coast, we now have to doai with th neck I a bottle. Tlio ttado rout s to our Atlantic At-lantic coast spread out us tn- 'approach our ports; on the other hand, the trado rou'.es to G.-c-it Uiitain converge almo.se to a point. The far-flung steamship lanes whlrh bring Britain her f.md arxl raw materials from half a doian c..:'.t!i-.rnt.s focu" In tho Ir.sh sea and tho Kngiish channo!. To cut the communications of Great Hritain. therefore, lh submarln-'S do not have to patrol two or throe thousand mi hi of seacoast, as would be necessary in tho cade of the Unitod State,; thoy merely ntd to hover around the extremely re-etr'cted re-etr'cted waters wet and south of Ireland. This was precisely tho area which the Gorman had selected for their mam fioid of operations. It was here that thoir so-called so-called U-boats were operating with the most deadly effect; these waters constituted consti-tuted their happy hunting grounds, for here crrte the groat cargo ships, with food flf.d supplier from America, hound for I-dverpool and the great channel ports. The submarines that did destruction In this region were the type that have gained universal fame as the U-boats. No Submarine Bases on Foreign Coasts, There w re other types, which I shall describe. 1it the U-boats were the main reliance of the German navy; they were fairly large- vessels, of about fcr6 tons, carrying from eight to t welve torpedo s and enough fuel and supplies to keep the sea for three or four weeks. And here let me correct one universal misapprehension. misappre-hension. These l -boats did not have bases off the Irish and .Spanish coasts, as most people believe. Such bases would have served no useful purpose. The cruising period of a submarine did not depend, as most people think, upon Its supplv of fuel oil and food, for almost any underwater boat could carry enough of these essential materials for a practically prac-tically indefinite period, and the average U-toat could easily make the voyage across the Atlantic and back. The cruising cruis-ing period depended upon its supply of torpedoes. A submarine returned to Its base only after it had exhausted its supply sup-ply of these destructive missiles; if it a'-iould shoot them all In twenty-four hours, then a single day would end that partlculnr cruise; If the torpedoes lasted a month, then the submarine stayed out for that length of time. Bases on the Irish coast would have been useful only in case they could replenish the torpedoes, and this was obviously an impossibility. Xo, there was not the slightest mystery mys-tery concerning the bases of the U-hoats. "When the Germans captured the city of Bruges in Belgium they transformed it Into a submarine base; here many of the U-boats were built, and here facilities were provided for docking, repairing and suDptving them. Bruges was thus one of the main headquarters for the destructive campaign waged against British commerce com-merce Bruges itself is an inland town, but from it two canals extend, one to Ostend and the other to Zeehrugge, and In this way the interior submarine base peace treaty is disposed of, but in his" Pueblo speech he went far toward repudiating: re-pudiating: the idea that his tour had ' anything to do with tlio next pro?iW-" tial campaign. f anything: has scitied definitely in advance of an actual statement by tho president his desire not to continue in public office when once his term expires it is tho- condition condi-tion of his health since returning from abroad. The -fact is if "Woodrow Wilson, is to finish his term at all lie must have much care, quiet and rest for a considerable consid-erable length of time, which are the ; words of his own physician. sons for postponing the president's trip fif ross the continent in behalf of the ; league of nations, which had been planned to beein immediately after his return from Kurope, but even if he could have finished sooner those con-fereuees con-fereuees with individual senators his physicians would probably have held him in Washington, as lie was beginning begin-ning then to show signs of a collapse. But tlio president's recuperative powers pow-ers have on more than one occasion been a pleasant surprise to those who have worried about his health and when he insisted on making his tour for the league of nations consent was given on the condition that he would not make . an extensive trip and that he would rest on -week-ends. It was suggested that he rest in Yellowstone Yel-lowstone park or Rainier park or in the Yosemite, but to all suggestions the president grimly objected, saying he was not bent on a pleasure jaunt but a business trip. Even his Sundays were not fcpt free. Local committees insisted in-sisted on seeing him. Everywhere along the journey requests for labor conferences confer-ences have been made and the result was that Mr. Wilson got very litt'o rest. On Sundays, too, all day long and all night, crowds would gather at the passing stations and cheer. Jf the train stopped to take water or change locomotives it was pretty certain that the president's rest would be disturbed at night, while during the day he would go out on the back platform to shake hands. People Are Insistent. The people insisted on seeing him. His physician would not permit him to make any but scheduled speeches. Between stations, the president worked awav on his typewriter on official business. bus-iness. Much of his time was spent in studying cables from Frank Polk, head of the American peace mission negotiating nego-tiating treaties with Austria and Bulgaria. Bul-garia. Lately thi situation at Fiumo has given him much concern. But the greatest burden of all has been the extemporaneous speeches. Instead of stretching his trip out to eight w.?cks and covering ten thousand miles as other presidents have done, Mr. Wilson sought to accomplish his purpose in four weeks. He spoke extemporaneously everywhere, forty times in twenty-oiw days. Ho would prepare notes on tho train. On Thursday night he had mapped out the speeches he planned to deliver in Wichita, Little Rock, Oklahoma City, Memphis and Louisville, but ever since his appearance in San Francisco he has been ill and has coughed heavily and spent sleepless nights. Mrs. Wilson, who is a trained nurse, has constantly attended him and the effect of her vigils of the last ten days have seemed to tell on her, too. Br. Grayson was summoned twice after mid-! mid-! night Thursday. On the second occasion, occa-sion, about 4 o'clock Friday morning, ! he sent a messenger to arouse Seeio-; Seeio-; tary Tumulty, who was asleep in the next car. He told the secretary the trip would have to be canceled, that the president had gone too far and would have to' be detached completely from his work. Tho president insisted that h- would Ve well enough in a day or so and pleaded for the opportunity to fulfill his engagement, but Mrs. Wilson and Br. Grayson and Secretary Tumulty overruled him and the trip was summarily sum-marily cancelled. Consultation aboard the train on Friday Fri-day led to a. decision not to step off en route but to get the president to the White House as soon as possible and decide then whether he should go to some quiet spot on the seashore or mountain. It mav be that in Washington Washing-ton other physicians will be called bv Br. Grayson as a measure of precauj tion, and the extent of the president's exhaustion fully determined, but that the president mnst give all work up for the present is tho command of his physician. phy-sician. The president's trouble is described teeuuically as nervous exhaustion, but there are several things that contribute to it. First, there is a couli which is the after effect of influenza, and this has affected somewhnt the president pres-ident 's respiration. His digestive organs or-gans have been hurt bv the constant strain of his work. Altogether it has slowly taken awav a large part of Tie president 's vitality. And when the doctor observed him twitching and halting halt-ing in the last few speeches it was apparent thnt Mr. Wilson was physically physi-cally near the end of his rope. It is difficult to describe the intense feeling of the president about the peace treatv. He thinks and talks nothing else. ' He has said he would gladly lay i down his life for the cause for which he has heen touring the country. Whenever When-ever anyone in the crowd lias suggrsred that Mr. Wilson micht run for a third term he hns given tho impression that ho never would run. His advisers have cautioned him against making a definite statement against a third term until after tho