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Show II TRAINING IS MOST ICESSffl Salt Lake, Feb 19. A little "Inside Information" concerning the campaign at Santiago, Cuba, which the school histories record as a glorious victory for the U. S. A., was given last night by Captain William B. Wallage, instructor-inspector of tho National Guard of Utah and an officer of thp regular army. Captain Wallace's lecture lec-ture was the first of a series of eight to be given in preparation for the organization or-ganization of the citizens' military training camp next summer. The official history of the campaign, combined with the criticisms made by military experts who viewed tho battles bat-tles in perspective a few years later, readily indicated that there is an absolute ab-solute necessity for military training In the United States. "One shudders to think what would have become of that American expeditionary expedi-tionary force If it had been up against even one regiment of the scores which European countries have In tho field today," remarked one man who attended at-tended last night, and who, in his earlier ear-lier life, had experience In a European army. "Surely such lectures as that one should have the desired effect. They should prove conclusively that it Is time for us to wake up to the fact that we must prepare If wo arc to give a good account of ourselves In times of war." Tells of Mistakes. were the actions in tho engagement before Santiago, in tho light of actual military records, that the most unschooled un-schooled layman could quickly grasp tho significance of the mistakes mado, as related by Captain Wallace. This bit of military history, as related In ono hour, proved that military training train-ing and military organization are essential, es-sential, and that they must be arranged arrang-ed for before the battle starts. More than 500 men, and not a few interested women, crowded the main dining room of the Commercial club whe'n the lecture began at 8 o'clock. Captain Wesloy King, chairman of the general committee on arrangements arrange-ments for the military training camp, announced that the next lecture would bo given In two weeks later by Lieutenant Lieu-tenant Max B. Garber, Inspector-instructor of the National Ouard of Idaho. Ida-ho. He will lecture on tho history of military organization. There is every Indication that almoat everyone who heard the lecture last night will be on ImnH ffir t.hn novf rwf itm oarlno r absorbing was tho lecture last evening. even-ing. Lecture Is Illustrated. Captain Wallace illustrated his tnlk, which was Intensely practical and understandable un-derstandable from the layman's viewpoint, view-point, with a series of lantern slide maps, which brought out clearly the points which he desired to emphasize. Furthermore, he asked thoso present to keep in mind the points brought out in tho campaign described, because they would corao up 'in lator lectures. Captain Wallace began by outlining tho condition of the United States army at tho time trouble began with Spain. In the regular army, he said, there wero about 25,000 officers and men. But somo of these wero needed need-ed for patrolling and other duties, so that, ho said, only 15,000 were actually available for expeditionary work in Cuba, or elsewhere. He told of the call for volunteers, but said that these men had to be trained, so that meantime mean-time the war department determined to send an expeditionary iforce to Cuba. Then followed the story of the land ing of the Fifth army corps for tho battle that led up to the taking of Santiago. There were three battles, which wero Illustrated by excellent maps. Thoy were the fight at El Can-ey, Can-ey, tho battle of La3 Guasimaa and the battle of San Juan heights and Kettle hill. Method is Lacking. The results of this campaign showed, show-ed, Captain Wallace said, that there was an almost entire lack of method, organization or plan of attack. In the fight to capture El Caney, he said, the Americans lost in Kincp ana wounaea within seventy-nine of tho total num-bor num-bor of Spaniards that opposed them. Although an American battery started fighting at 6:30 In the morning, It did not get the range of the little fort at El Caney until 3 o'clock In the after- , noon. Captain Wallace spoke of the reports re-ports that cowardice was shown by the Seventy-first New York volunteers at the San Juan hill engagement. When the. Spaniards, from the heights, fired into this regiment, he Bald, the front ranks fled in wild disorder, preventing pre-venting other columns from coming up in the rear for some time. Yet, he declared, the disorder was not due to cowardice. It was because these men lacked the necessary training, so that they would understand what to do under such circumstances. The regulars, regu-lars, he said, had been In training for three years, but tho volunteers were unseasoned and did not know how to handle themsolves, though, in reality, they were just as brave as the regulars. regu-lars. Gives Own Experience. Captain Wallace told of an experience experi-ence of his own on July 2, when his regiment, the Thirty-fifth Michigan was marching toward San Juan hill, along a narrow road, where the men had to walk two abreast. The Spaniards, Span-iards, he said, dropped a shell near the front of the column. Instantly, he said, every man jumped wildly into the underbrush at either side of the road. "And, being closest myself," the captain laughed, "I was the first Into the brush." There was a lack of thorough thor-ough organization, he added, so that the men would know what to do under the circumstances. Movements were made In this campaign, cam-paign, Captain Wallace showed, contrary con-trary to tho orders of General Shafter Not a foot of ground was gained that could not have been gained without fighting. A large force of Americans was held off for several days by an exceedingly small force of Spaniards. The El Caney attack, It was shown, was badly conducted, and tardiness In making the attack, especially with the battery, was the most serious tactical blunder. At San Juan heights and Kettle hill the engagement started by the unfortunate unfort-unate appearance of an army balloon, which disclosed the location of the American forces, then engaged in making a deployment. There were no methods In the attack, It was shown. While commanders recklessly and bravely exposed themselves to shell lire, eucouraging me inea to uuvauuu Into battle, yet there was no scientific direction from the background. There was no positive or direct control over the entire force. The history of the campaign shows, Captain Wallace said, that tho Spaniards Span-iards really never gave fight. The sailing of Cevera's fleet from Santiago harbor, followed by the decisive defeat by the American fleet, ultimately resulted re-sulted In the surrender of the enemy at that point. Yet It was shown that, had General Lanares mado a decisive stand at Las Guasimas, the small force of Spaniards might have inflicted inflict-ed serious injury, if not defeat, upon tho large American forces oo |