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Show SUBMARINE CONTROVERSY IN GERMANY. That the Germans, if Tirpitz had been sustained by the Kaiser, would have started a submarine campaign to sink all ships going to or coming from British ports, regardless of nationality, na-tionality, is made evident by a review ol uie u-Doai controversy by the Springfield Republican, which says: "It Is plain that the TJ-boat controversy contro-versy has been completely misunderstood misunder-stood in this country. While Congress Con-gress was wasting its emotions over armed merchantmen a wholly different differ-ent question was being discussed, somberly som-berly and for tho most part secretly, In Germany. Here the question was treated from the legal or the ethical point of view, there it was primarily a technical question, a question as to whether a certain thing was possible and whether the risk of attempting it was too great. "The real controversy turned upon two facts and a conjecture. The first fact was that England is the cornerstone corner-stone of the Entente, which must crumple up if England falls. The second sec-ond fact was that England Is an Island Is-land and must quickly starve if cut off The conjecture Is more complicated. compli-cated. Can England be starved out by a ruthless nse of mines and submarines? sub-marines? If so can it be done go quickly and efficaciously that what neutrals might think or do about it could not matter? That was the question ques-tion as the navallsts put it, and that is the question which the German government gov-ernment has had to decide. It is fair to consider that perhaps no government govern-ment has ever had to face a more momentous mo-mentous decision. "For consider the situation. As the war drags on, the chance becomes more remote that Germany can win In a struggle of endurance, while not to win would for Germany mean a disastrous dis-astrous defeat. At Verdun, as often before, the German army has won a victory, but has come no nearer to a decision. Few Germans so much as admit the possibility of a defeat, but the fear of not being able to yln jrows steadily, and the longer the war tho greater the disaster that a stale mate would involve. It is not surprising, surpris-ing, then, that any weapon giving the faintest hope of breaking this fatal deadlock should be snatched at eagerly. eag-erly. "But the only means so far as is known, of altering the situation to German's advantage, which anybody has proposed, is the Tirpitz program. It Is extremely simple in theory. The waters about Great Britain are already al-ready full of mines, defensive or offensive, of-fensive, and the fairways grow narrower nar-rower as the war goes on. Fill these with floating mineB, toll submarine commanders to sink everything, and the trick is done. If neutrals do not heed warnings, a few disasters will keep them out of the danger zone. If they protest, no matter, for Germany's destiny is at stake. If they declare war no matter, for with England starv- ing the Entente would collapse. Germany Ger-many would take over Its fleets and bo invincible. Invincible, it would help itself to territory, levy indemnities, and become the great empire of pan-German pan-German ambition. And all tbls, tho German public has been told, Is to be got quickly and easily, by merely putting a- firm hand on England's throat Can wo wondor at the popular popu-lar demand that Germany bo not 'deprived 'de-prived of its submarine weapon.' "In oil this, of course, thoro Is no animosity to neutrals. Probably nobody no-body wishes more heartily than Tir-plts Tir-plts that neutrals would stay at home and not get in the way of his "U-boats. But tho weak spot in the theory Is that If such a campaign Is to bo made effective it must be not merely ruthless ruth-less but blind. This is a technical point which has been too muoh overlooked over-looked in thiB country. If submarines are used legitimately thoy can harans British commerce, but have not the remotest chance of exortlng such a declsivo effect. To have such a chance they must operate undor water wat-er ns much as possible, and waste no time In trying to identify ships. But worse than that, tho calculation that a blockade is possible Is based on supplementing sup-plementing tho available force of U-boats U-boats with the greatest possible number num-ber of mines, either anchored in the shallow seas where ships must pass or set adrift In fairways. To discriminate, discrim-inate, no matter how much it might be desired to spare neutrals, Is a technical tech-nical Impossibility. "This is tho real submarine controversy contro-versy which, under the veil of the redoubled censorship, has been raging In Germany, while our congressmen have Innocently been debating the right of Americans to travel In armed passenger shipB. On the one side has stood the chancellor, supported, fortunately, by the Kaiser and by some powerful shipping and commercial commer-cial Interests, which thave realized that Germany must live and do business busi-ness after the war. On the other side are another strong commercial faction, and nearly tho whole of the powerful junker interest which though Its allegiance is to the army rather than the navy, is strongly for conquest at any price, and opposes the chancellor for his reform tendencies and his moderate views on annexation, as well as for his hesitation to give the U-boat a free hand regardless of neutrals " |