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Show HIDE TfiGTIGS SHATTERED HOI Successful Prosecution of 1918 Campaign Due Largely to America. Incessant Pressure on the Enemy Positions Forced German Army Collapse. By HENRY WALES. (Chicago Tribune Cable Copyright.) PARIS, Feb. 2S. (Delayed.) Tlio successful suc-cessful prosecution of the 'allies' 131? campaign to victory on November 11 was largely due to American Insistence that pressure against the enemy be kept up incessantly, despite inclement weather and heavy losses. By an investigation through military channel3, I learn it ws only a few weeks before Ludendorff,demanded an armistice that the allied high command realized the German army was smashed. As late as October ,10 Marshal Foch was demanding demand-ing that the American expeditionary force should number 100 divisions (nearly 4,000,000 men) in France by April 1, 1919, for an "American offensive," which was expected to administer a body blow to the enemy army. From July IS, when General Mangln passed to the attack between the Marne and the Alsne rivers, eliminating the Chateau Thierry salient, until the armistice, armi-stice, the American general staff stood solidly and insistently fbr sustained hammering ham-mering tactics- against Hihdenburg's hosts. Pershing Submits Tactics. Following the freeing of Paris from the German menace from the east by throwing throw-ing back the enemy along, the Alsne and tho Vesle, General Pershing presented to Marshal Foch plans for reducing tho St. Mihiel salient, which had been worked out in the autumn of 1917. for during -the early part of 191S American engineers were building American strategic railways along both faces of the salient, toward Verdun and Pont-a-Mousson, for possible future operations. It was July 5 last, just after the Thirty-third Thirty-third American division Prairie or Illinoisparticipated Illi-noisparticipated with the Australians in retaking Villers Bretoneaux, east of Amiens, that the allies' intelligence service ser-vice learned that tho number of "hoth belligerents' effectives was practically equal about ISO divisions each due to the German losses during the three initial in-itial offensives on the Somine, the Lys and the Marne and to the arrival of American reinforcements. Contributed to Confidence. This factor contributed largely to the allies' confidence while awaiting Luden-clorff'3 Luden-clorff'3 fourth and final thrust between Chateau Thierry and Rheims and east of Rheims to the Argonne. which was delivered de-livered July 15 and was" immediately shattered. Even before this last disastrous phase ot the "kaiserschlacht," which ended so miserablv, Marshal Foch had perfected plans fo reducing tho Chateau Thierry salient July 18, using the newly formed Tenth French army, under General Man-gin's Man-gin's command, and including two veteran vet-eran American divisions the First and Second and French colonials. Three weeks later, August S, the French and British reattacked, reducing the Montdldier salient and freeing Paris from the German menace on the north, and from then on the French merely wished to throw the enemy 'back, so the long-range Berthas could not shell the capital oTuing the winter. For that reason rea-son Mangin's army moved north of the Aisne late in August, using the Thirty-second Thirty-second American division for attacking the Juvlgny plateau, flanking the Chemln-des-Pames and Laon, in the region of which the original long-range guns were emplaced. Pershing's Plans Indorsed. Then Foch indorsed Pershing's plan for the St. Mihiel operation for September, after which the American high command showed how, with this salient reduced and the menace from the rear removed, the way was open for a thrust into the enemy's en-emy's most vital position up the Mense and through tho Argonne, toward the Montmedy-Sedan railway, which alone linked up tho German army communications. communica-tions. This operation was begun merely for the purpose of advancing within range of this trunk line railway so that heavv artillery could harass the enemy transport throughout the winter and perhaps per-haps leap forward and cut the line in the first offensive of the spring of 1919. The German crash, which Iirst became apparent toward the middle of October, could scarcely be credited, I am told by staff officers who aro in a position to know. But it was not realized even then how far gone the German army was. as plans immediately were laid and operations opera-tions ligured out for Margin's Tenth armv. which it had been intended to rest during the winter, to be rushed to the LAineville sector for another offensive, scheduled to begin at 7 o'clock tho morning morn-ing of November '14. Plan of Ihe Drive. Twenty French divisions and six American Amer-ican divisions were to have taken part, and the plan was to drive northward through Chateau salients, outflanking Met?, from the cast, while the First American army on the Meuse front wheeled on an axis, righting Its way northeasterly. It was this operation by which it was expected to capture two entire German armies and leave an enormous wide-open gap of front through which cavalry could be poured, rolling up the German Lino toward to-ward the northwest. I learn that one of the principal reasons rea-sons tho Ame-icans insisted on pushing the eampai-n through to victory in PUS was tho belief t'at the value of tanks would he largely discounted by the spr-.ng of 19if. as through the winter the Germans Ger-mans wou'd havo had time to construct wloo trenches and tank traps, flood l.arce areas, and a'?n train tank snipers with the new antitank Titles. Methods Are Successful. Certain French exports are said to have declared tho lightly armored tanks wou.d practlcallv be o'. fo.ote for opera ' ions l.y the spri' g ' U'l!1- Ail alited Maf.'s agree that the A-neri- an high coomiand s i -ko-itioss method of nt!..-ia! nt.a.-K proved the oplv -oas-l-o operation ,or -.uvi'aa-.iu1; fee Gortvans' de'onjr.fl :,-h. ,j; (oh. lonin inuc''iue urs in .jep-as .jep-as rventuahy nil t -e Gorman ico'-ino gunners. wore ti.e tlowr.r of IPi-flVp- bnru's army, would he killed or capi u-ed. Otha r ise. if the enemy wort Hoed to rest up : irrc the win.er. he com.l have trained thou-.nr.ds of machine gunners. |