| Show I 1 beneral qs stort stora of the A A eo fe v 2 a iia til 11 countries hyth hythe the north can newspaper News alliance world G cral poper HH vla v Clan l a richt ih including the scandinavian reproduction la in whole in mrs prohibited or r I 1 john J S ics pershing inq CHAPTER continued I 1 I 1 toted stilted that but few of the allied authorities seemed to realize that american Anie ikan participation would depend the amount of shipping available for foe the transportation of our troops and that the time when alien they would be needed was near at al liand hand As there had bad been some reference refe renie to tion I 1 also took occasion to emphasize the point that we e expected us as a matter of course that the lie american army alii would have its own front as an and independent 1 fo tone ree and nut not be used merely as ails it a reserve to be sent here mid and there one insuperable reason I 1 sald said wh why we could not amalgamate with the freie arnet 1 ivas the lie difference lit in language had I 1 added that we would not use our troops in that way at all unless it he be come absolutely necessary I 1 then discussed our problems cull call ing attention to the delays ie afi at french ports and our shortage of rail transportation and touched on lac backward hward state of procure of it of equipment munitions and alt all pianos ahe they nil all appeared appealed sur surprised pried to learn of our difficulties especially Oplie rill roch foe although even us its calef of t th general staff lie apparently could mot interfere in ili matters handled di dilwith i eca by the ministry it was uston shing to find how little comprehension nn ant of then bliem had of the tas that confronted the americans F aoh ooh said none one of these questions lias has been referred to me oll petain retorted that one should d not wait until such things are brought to ills als attention but should look around and find them retain added at once that lie would send ao an official to study our situation and flaig later sent one ot of liis his officers who offered many suggestions gest lons ions out ills his own experience it was the sense of the conference that every assistance should be given os itis in getting our troops across and all seemed fully to realize that no sue offensive could be undertaken without them bliss favors british plan conversations with general contin ed the next day at the brillon crillon Cil Cr llon illon hotel hold in paris with general Gener bliss present tile the same argiA arguments ments were repeated in favor of incorporating american units into british doyls ions and general bliss expressed him ifield elf in favor of the robertson Robert aou plan I 1 was forced to declare myself then and there my bly stand was not quite what Jl had expected and the meet ang adjourned with the position of nil all concerned no longer in doubt general bliss and I 1 met later by tip ftp to talk the matter over be tween ourselves oui selves and alij it if possible come to an all understanding after some als cus slon he suggested that each of us table cable his views to washington and ask tor for a decision it was not my police then or at any other time to put any thing up to washington that I 1 could possibly decide myself this would have hae been the last thing to do in this case especially espe dally as ai tile the secretary had left in my hands the tie de termination as to how our troops should be employed for two men in our m positions to have hae appealed in this way vay would liae have indicated it a clash and washington had enough trouble be sides eldes the lie secretary could not possibly have been sufficiently in touch with the undercurrent of these negotiations negotiation s to make a wise decision so I 1 said veil bliss do you know what would happen if we should do that we would both be relieved itom irom further duty in france and flint Ss Is exactly cacti what we should deserve we then spent some time examining tile the question from fioro all angles until finally lie he came around to my view lew and said 1 I think you ion are aie right and I 1 shall back you ou up in tile the position you have bave taken CHAPTER once general B liss and 1 I 11 had ad reached an understanding as to our attitude toward amalgamation of our troops with the british be gave me his support lu lit later conferences when hen we saw the representatives for further talks at versailles january 29 1018 1918 sit all their arguments were met frankly and squarely after they had presented their case prime minister lloyd george ceorge asked bliss for his views to which he be replied pershing will speak for us and whatever lie he says with regard to the disposition of the american troops will lave alave my approval an agreement was then signed by bar lloyd george maurice and myself as set forth in the following copy of the memorandum submit ted led and cabled to washington in order to meet the situation is as presented by sir william robertson It and hasten the arrival and training of troops it Is proposed that tile the british government use the available set se transportation in question tor for bring ing over tile the personnel of entire alvi alous under the following conditions il 1 that the infantry and duill auxiliary lary troops of these divisions be trained with british divisions by battalions under finder such pan as a may be agreed upon IT 2 that the artillery bo be trill trained ned un ler der american direction in the use of french material na as at present I 1 a that the higher commanders and staff officers be assigned for train ing and experience with corresponding units of the british army 4 when sufficiently trained these batt battalions a lions be reformed into regiments and that when the lie artillery la Is fully trained all the units comp comprising each division be united under their own officers fleis of for service sen ice that the above plan he be carried out without interference with the plans now in operation for bringing over american Ameil caa forces G that question of supply he arranged hy by agreement between tile HIP brit ish and anil american commanders in chief 7 that question of arms and equip ment lie be settled in similar tri manner anner war council meets again the rhe supreme war council lein hegan its third session january 10 ti at hie file open ini ing session ibes mr lloyd george made it 11 R in III of tile rhe tion on oil the i llred fronts ile he then spoke or the hie large number nii ot of casull ties tile allies lind suffered ered during and in ili a ver very pointed mn n ner dc lared dareil lint tile the foelly sly lind ind pro deuced lit hi tangible ihle re stilts lint 13 in t lit lie hf said ahr th allies now found themselves short of mail inan power lit at it 11 critical period of the war iiii shari larl crill cism wn ans evidently lit at sir Ili hals haig and general Robert robertson sot hut but neither was glun given un tilt to reply the military representatives pre pie seated a joint note with alth reference ference le to lo military policy as directed at tile the de cember meeting and the opinion glien given was ft as identical with that of the confer ence at january 21 24 2 1 anti 1 I I 1 I 1 I 1 pershing in tin hat also in august at the meeting in paris except that the campaign under tinder gen eral allenby then in progress in pal estine should continue it will be re called that these two informal confer ances ot if commanders in chief had con eluded that the allies should remain on oil the defensive on all fronts until the americans should arrive arrhe in tone force to warrant the offensive see no end of war until 1919 the joint note was approved as the decision of tile the council with the understanding as suggested by the french that no white troops should be sent from F prance rance to palestine it was decidedly the opinion of NJ and of all others present who expressed themselves that the clr war could not be ended until 1010 when the american army anni it was thought would reach its maximum strength the allied forces at the moment were superior in nil all active fronts except in the balkans but the greek mobilization when completed would add sufficient t strength to give tile the allies tile the advantage there also the american strength streng tn was then negligible but the prospect was that we should have a few divisions ready tor for service by june and by september possibly sev lenteen or the equivalent of thirty four french divisions the danger on the western front lay in the continuous increase of the ger man forces and in their ability to con cen in turn against the french and british and as neither had dent clent reserves of their own it was clear that unless some arrangement arran gemeni could be made between them for bet ter ordination coordination co and support the war 0 might ight easily be lost before the amerl cans should arrive plan allied reserve the study of this problem by the military representatives led to another joint note which proposed a plan for or the organization ot of a general allied reserve it provided that the british french and italian armies should each set apart a certain number of divisions to constitute this reserve which would be called into action only in a great emergency the discussion of this question became acrimonious haig and petain both pointed out that they would be short of divisions very soon in case of severe fighting and presented figures on the subject that were very disturbing but the councils scheme was cut and dried the recommendations set forth in the note were adopted then and there by the council the general reserve was created and its control was placed under an executive war board to ot of generals roch foch rep rel resenting the french chairman nilsa bliss the americans cadorna the italians and a general officer to be nam named d at tills this meeting mr air voyd george designated gen sir henry wilson allson us its the british representative to the hie very verr evident disappointment of general robertson who was present at the ses slon sion tile the selection of wilson wits was regarded by the lie british high command and the war office as open disapproval of their conduct of the winter of 1917 18 most severe it has been said that the winter of 1017 1917 18 was nas the most severe of the war the cold was at times so intense a as s to make the generally unheated houses barns and lofts used as billets nearly uninhabitable tile the gloom of short days and long nights in tile iso and largely de populated french villages can hardly be described then as we ne have seen there wits was also a shortage of heavy winter clothing although frequent cables early t in the full fall had called attention to the probability of a deficiency no ko douht doubt the demands were greater than ihan the quartermaster department could meet but the relatively small number of troops in france going through the winter under tinder actual war conditions condition should have been given first consideration much aluch of tile the clothing that we received for our troops looked to be shoddy and being light and thin of ourse bourse offered insufficient protection the deficiencies were inet in part tv by purchases from the british although our men did not take kindly to the idea of wearing the uniform of another nation and it was with considerable protest and chagrin that they did so ro until our own could be supplied to the credit of our officers and wen tien he be it said that they generally J adverse conditions anti and barring some irritation at french met methods holig ald occasionally sio olo nally at our own they kept at their tasks with commendable determination looking back over the different phases of the war I 1 regard that win ter with its difficulties anxieties and apprehension tor for tile the future as the most trying of them all CHAPTER at the ports la in frince france the amount of discharged in january 1918 was more encouraging being about two fifths as much as during the preceding seven mon months the rate of discharge was accelerated to some extent by the better distribution of our transports by tile the navy more afore construction material was being delivered where it was needed for port works and the future was somewhat clarified in this respect by the arrival of additional logging machinery during the month there was also an increase in troop shipments including some elements of the baans na ans a division with men for tile the service of supply by the end of january approximately 11 combat troops 1000 S engineer troops and others for tile the service sen ice of supply were in france although promising this was only the merest start its as we vie were still tar far behind our schedule it must be added however that tile the IL kilcrease Inci crease ease in the arrivals of men and materials remained haphazard and not at all in the proportions needed it continued apparent that my recommendations were not accepted it in an altogether unhesitating spirit of helpfulness and that the serious need for executive leadership back home had not been met my bly diary diotes notes the following chaumont monday february 18 1018 general foci foch and major general visited headquarters thursday had luncheon with us its and examined the general stan staff organization captain todd director of naval construction came to confer regarding wireless stations at bordeaux left friday spent saturday and sunday visiting first division in Ans ansauville auville sector inspected infantry in front line trenches and the artillery called on general debeney Do bene french first army returned this morning stopping at aviation park colombel Colom bey les belles mal maj arthur page corn com maDdin maddings gm camouflage work exceptionally well done passed through to see general tie de castelnau who speaks highly of our troops foch cold to U S problems Pro blema As general foch then chief of the french general staff had shown some bome surprise sui prise when at the allied meeting nt in january I 1 told of tile the delays and difficulties we were having at the ports and in tile the operation of rall rail waysl invited him hill to make a visit to my headquarters hoping to put him in touch with our activities we had already reached a state of development that confirmed the soundness of our organization and could forecast its ability to meet all requirements I 1 went with him film to the various 8 sections of the general stall staff and while he expressed no opinion about what he be saw his aide and spokesman general a stair mall officer of experience was very complimentary foch never seemed interested when I 1 tallied with will of our problems and I 1 doubt li liet ether lier tie lie ever thought knew or cared indell about organization or questions of transportation and supply ue lie was essentially it student and a teacher of history and strategy treated like mendicants Mendi cants there continued to be cause to find fault with the attitude and Ineth ot if french bureau officials apropos the experience of 0 many of our officers I 1 recall that one of the most efficient on duty at a very it important apor port once sald to me Gell general erni the trouble Is that these subordinate french officials in immediate charge are either so hidebound hide bound or else so conceited that it would be as easy to convince a greek statue as to male one of them under understood ilow how in the th world florid it happens sir that we do so well ft ell I 1 do not see I 1 here we have come miles to help them thein rod and yet et we tire are treated like mendicants mendi cants on oil tile the street corner holding f V tin cut cup for or passing pennies 1 I 1 know sir that co operation cooperation to IB 11 necessary if we vie hope to win the tha war but it requires an excessive effort on oar part pait with more moie failures than bolh otherwise to our credit this was harsh |
