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Show MANY MISTAKES OF IAN HAMILTON New York, Jan. 7. "On the grave of Erasmus at Basle 1b written tho significant word 'Terminus.' It Is not time that the same word Is written over the career and -writings of Gen-, eral Sir Ian Hamilton " This was the comment of Ellis Ash-mead-Bartlett, the noted war correspondent, corre-spondent, in summing up a critical analysis of General Hamilton's report en tho Dardanelles operations. The report was made public in London yesterday. "A foolhardy expedition headed by woofully weak officers the monumental monu-mental fiasco of history," was another anoth-er expression used by xVshmead-Bart-lett. He was an eye-witness to practically prac-tically all the principal operations on the Galllpoli peninsula. "Tho British empire stands aghast at what General Hamilton's report reveals," re-veals," he said. "I am unable to conceive con-ceive the extent of public feeling should the mothers and fathers who sacrificed their sons become fully aware of what happened at Gallipoll." Analyze the Report. Ashmead-Bartlott was asked to analyze anal-yze the Hamilton report for the International In-ternational News Service. In the analysis he asks many pointed questions ques-tions concerning major movements to which General Hamilton either refers re-fers briefly or falls to mention. "The Galllpoli campaign failed because be-cause it ought never to have been undertaken under such conditions and in such a country," said Ashmead-Bartlett. "Troops were sent to attack positions posi-tions which no general acquainted with modern warfare would have attempted at-tempted to attack. Sir Ian Hamilton's attempt to make out that his strategical strate-gical plan almost succeeded is absolute abso-lute nonsense. "Why did the Australian force suffer suf-fer 12,000 casualties and never reach its objective9 A few ghurkaa actually actual-ly reached the summit of Chanak Bahr, which is only one of the lower ridges leading up to Sari Bair and Koja Chemen Tepe, the real objective. objec-tive. "The losses were so terrible in these attacks that even if the troops had reached the highest ridges, which they never did, it would have been utterly impossible for them to have maintained themselves. They could have been driven off by even a mild counter-attack. Fixes Blame on Hamilton. "Sir Ian Hamilton may hope to deceive de-ceive the general public. But he cannot can-not hope to deceive those who were on the spof and know. "He may try to put the blame on General Stpoford, but the real burden of responsibility rests upon his own shoulders and on those of his chief of staff. "Why were inexperienced troops employed for the first landing at Suvla Suv-la bay when two Australian brigades, or even the Twenty-ninth division, which they did not hesitate rb call upon later, could have been utilized for this purpose? "Why were thousands of lives fhrown away in an abort! vo attack on the front of the vineyard of Achi-Baba Achi-Baba in what was supposed to bo a feint attack? "Why were 2500 men of the First Australian division sent to their doom to win tho useless positon of Lone Pine? "Why were thousands more lives thrown away in useless attacks from Quni's, Pope's and Courtney's posts, which had nothing whatever to do with the main operation? "Why, if his objective was to get astride the peninsula, did General Hamilton throw the main weight of his attack against the side of Koja Chemen Tepe lay in an impossible country when apparently his real objective ob-jective was to seize Anafarta hill?" |