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Show WHY HAVE THE GERMANS SO FAR FAILED? "Something has happened to the German war machine," says the Salt Lake Tribune, and then that paper asks the question, "Will history relate that It was wrecked when Belgium hurled a monkey wrench into It?" The Tribune proceeds to present the following as an explanation of the failure of the German army: "When the Germans swept Into Belgium Bel-gium promptly on schedule time and began operating the war machine with due precision, the public in England. France and the United States were convinced that the Germans would at the very least be able to prevent the French from taking the aggressive The battle of the Marne demonstrated that the French not only could take the aggressive, but actually could defeat de-feat the enemy The present battle seems to show that the German ag- gresslve has been deiaved, if not permanently per-manently chocked. "Various reasons have been as sigmd for the brcakd own of the German Ger-man war machinA. Perhaps breakdown break-down is too strong a word, but it ex-preesea ex-preesea the KenenU view oi Germany s failure to carry out its plan. The first reason given for the failure is Belgium's opposition, but this must have been taken into consideration by the German general staff The en trance of Kngland into the war, while not wholly unexpected, was a surprise to Germany, and yet no doubt the German general staff had reckoned exactly the number of men England would be able to place in the field early in the war. "Another element which has heen given consideration as a cause of Germany's weakness in the western theater of war is the 3udden invasion inva-sion of east Prussia by the Russians, wnicii rerimred the German general staff to send more men into the eastern east-ern theater of war than had been planned. But it must be remembered that Germany had in its regular army r.nrt In its reserves at least o.OOO.oiio , men What was it. therefore, that checked the tremendous impetus with which Germany began the war? "It is likely that all the circumstances circum-stances taken together have combined to hamper the operations of the war machine. The Belgian opposition was strenuous. England was able to afford af-ford I"rance a very considerable army of efficient men. The Russians got into action much earlier than the 8P rts had any reason to believe they could Austria failed to do her part, despite the undoubted bravery of her soldiers Then there was the element of excessively heavy lotses for the Germuiis early In the war The tactics of General Joffre were such that the Germans were compelled com-pelled to suffer (he maximum of loss in a series of eigantlc opc-rntions that ended Indecisively The retreat of General Joffre was a masterpiece, and w hen, finally he made his stand his i losses had been comparatively light and the accessions to his ranks had been tremendous. It cannot be de j nied, moreover, that the German gen eral staft, in spite of Us remarkable i brilliancy, made some vital mistakes It operated the armies in the field from Berlin and as each point was gained, according to plans, the experts ex-perts at the German war office deem eri that all was going well, but they could not see the disorganization hea v losses. They wrongh concluded conclud-ed that the armies wer.e practiealb as efficient at the line of the Marne rp er as they had been in Belgium or ' on the borders of France, but such ? was not the case 'When the war broke out Franco had a regular military establishment ! of 800,000 men. whereas the German 1 regular military establishment wasj onlj about 75". oho men. This is very ! significant, because Prance, England and Belgium were able to put regular regu-lar army men In the field to the number of 1,200.000, or more. Germany, Ger-many, on the other hand was compelled com-pelled to use at least 200,000 of the 750 000 In the eastern operations, and, therefore, could employ against Belgium Bel-gium and France only about 560,000 regular soldiers. The first reserve of Germany is efficient, but. naturally,: it does not compare In efficiency with the regular establishment. The heavy losses of the Germans have practically wrecked the regular army and reliance must now be placed largely upon the first and second reserves re-serves and the landwehr, whereas the English and French are still carrying carry-ing on their operations largely with their regular soldiers "It will be seen, therefore, that the Get man army which won the battle along the line of Oharlerol, Namur, Luxemburg and Lorraine and Alsace was the real war machine of the Kaiser's empire, and it was this machine ma-chine that ran like a steam roller cer Belgium and France until it was wrecked. Virtually, it has disappeared and Germany is now carrying on the war with its reserve organizations.'' No writer can form an accurate judgment of the war events up to the I. resent The information from the battlefields has been fragmentary, except General French's reports which have to do with only a part of the war zone, but, from the facts as we have gleaned them, we believe It will be shown that the Germans have committed two great military blunders that have kept them from achieving success. First, General Von Kluck, seeking to gain an iron cross and become recognized as the most brilliant military genius of the war, being inflated with uninterrupted success through Belgium down to the gates of Paris, made a turning movement move-ment as though to bottle up the entire en-tire French army of the center. His troops had made forced marches, had suffered heavy losses and his Hues of communication were long and exposed. ex-posed. But he sought to do the extraordinary ex-traordinary and his vanity not only involved his own command, but the entire German army operating in France. When Von Kluck's progress was stopped and tho army of the City ot Pans fell on his right flank, It soon developed that the entire German Ger-man right was in danger of a crushing crush-ing defeat, and, to sae himself, Von Kluck had to retreat in great haste His weary forces, thrown back, and hounded by an enemy that had taken new heart, lost their morale. That was the beginning of the end of the Kaiser's march on Paris. When the German right- gave way, the entire battle front had to yield. Now the second cause of Germany's setback, in our opinion, will be round to have been the solid formation employed em-ployed by German troops in frontal attacks While it may be true that a charge must be made In force to obtain results, yet the British skirmish skir-mish lines, one foHorfing the other, closing in as the enemy i6 approached should be much more effective because be-cause accompanied by far less losses. The Boer war impressed this lesson on the British, and the Germans have yet to learn its Importance. The German losses, in their repeated frontal attacks in solid bodies, must have been frightful. Along the River AiBne, it will bo noted, that none of these charges have proved successful. Soldiers, in mass formation, hurled iteainat entrenched positions held by rapid-fire guns, are suit to almost certain death. |