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Show By-Paul1allon j HulciiHud by W.'Ntorn Newapuper Union. AKMV-NAVY UNIFICATION SHOULD START AT ONCE WASHINGTON. Mr. Truman mttcie the proper move to get his nrmy-nuvy unification bill tlirounh congress. The navy hiid performed im all-out lobbying Job uc"inst the program. It was In charge of Navy Assistant Secretary II. Struve llfn-sel, llfn-sel, who worked through the Navy League promoting speeches and articles by admirals, and arousing naval ulTuirs committeemen in both houses. If Mr. Truman succeeds in stopping navy agitation, he will get his bill through because there is no other opposition, except that which may be continued by the nnval committeemen who fear they may lose their seniority standing in their committee jobs. But the bill is not on the program for this session. ses-sion. The calendar of both houses is already crowded for the next several months, and the leaders are planning a summer recess to let the legislators go home and mend their broken fences in preparation for their re-election campaigns. The navy never had much of a case. No one can oppose unification as a theory. Appalling duplications of army and navy services filled the committee record of hearings. Army and navy competed with each other in bidding for such things as clothing, for example. In that line, one service might have a surplus of some items while the other had a deficiency. In negotiating their separate contracts, con-tracts, they were actively competing compet-ing against each other. Then again on small islands like Guam, there would be a naval hospital constructed construct-ed and maintained a mile away from an army hospital. It was shown also that in armament the navy and army encountered needless need-less conflict. Furthermore, the building of separate airports around the world caused duplication waste in many instances. NAVAL DELAYING ACTION In the face of such overwhelming evidence, the navy centered its campaign largely upon delaying action ac-tion by congress. Its basic fear and claim was that the navy was to be put under the army by unification which simply is not true. The Thomas subcommittee has reported report-ed now a bill which proposes to set up the unification this way: A single sin-gle secretary of common defense in the cabinet, with three secretaries under him, one each for army, air and navy; then an over-all chief of staff (with a recommendation that the President rotate this office between be-tween the three services, giving it to army for a year, then to air and then to navy), three assistant secretaries sec-retaries representing each branch of the service, and finally legalization legaliza-tion of the joint chiefs of staff set up during the war to provide cooperation co-operation in strategy between the services. This setup preserves the navy as just as much an independent unit as the army or the air forces. It does not put the navy under the army. But it is true the armv. numerically, is stronger, and may wield a greater influence in the combined department than the admirals ad-mirals or air arm, despite the legal equality of each branch. Delay in enacting the program until next year will greatly impede efficiency in national defense. Even if the legislation could be enacted today, at least a year or more would be required to work out and effect the vast details of reorganization. reorganiza-tion. While the Soviet seems to be leisurely withdrawing its military army from Iran, it is leaving behind be-hind a political army which has an excellent chance of absorbing the country, as Britain and the U. S. have no armies on the ground, military mili-tary or political. Next possible Russian move may be to cut the nearest slice of Turkey already defined in the official Moscow Mos-cow journals. This is a thin slice running about 200 miles westward in length along the Black sea with a depth of 75 to 100 miles inland. The Turks could not stop such a move without naval assistance from the British or U. S. Their frontier armies could easily be by-passed by Russian amphibious landings in their rear. A late grapevine report to trustworthy trust-worthy authorities here indicates Russia is in no condition to try this, or any other major venture. Her casualty list from the war has not yet been published and no one knows how many she lost. Russia's manpower shortage has been made acute by critical short tages of farm tractors, locomotives and trucks to an extent' where she cannot hope to supply her people with food and necessities. Economists noted Stalin's goal; for the fourth Five Year plan, tc end in 1950, were lower than his 194! goals in pig iron, steel, oil, locomo tives, freight cars, paper, leathei and some other phases. In short his figures suggest he will fall short of prewar production after foui more years if figures can be trust ed. |