Show No Spies h in United States in 1914 I Geman War ar Chief Denies Treachery KARL H. H VON WIEGAND U Universal Service Staff Correspondent BERLIN April 23 When When the war broke out the tho German general staff did not have a single spy or secret I military agent In in either the United States or in England This was the statement made t to me today today- today by by I I Colonel V. W. Nicola Nicolai chief of the intelligence intelligence in- in division of the German I army and who from 1913 until until the i revolution had charge of the kaisers kaiser's i military espionage system I I The assertion of the chief of the I 1 German military espionage is all the themore themore themore more remarkable able In view of the belief very genera generally ly held that the kaiser had covered the world with a network of spies such as never existed before It was the first time that I had seen the former chief of the German intelligence department in the general generalI staff since the end of 1916 1916 when I among other things his I department had charge of foreign war correspondents correspondents correspondents corre corre- In Germany Colonel Nicolai Nico- Nico Ilai lal lai saw the amazement and skepticism skepticism reflected on my face Of course he said there are many I people who will not believe that but that does not alter the fact that we weI j I had no military agents in England and andI much less in America when the war came I say that regretfully because I had it b been en otherwise the German general general general gen gen- eral staff might have been Jeen much betI better better bet bet- I ter tel informed What the naval staff did didin didin didin in that respect I do not know They worked Independently An attempt by the Gedman general staff starr to organize an espionage system in England after the outbreak of the war for for military m information purposes was a a. complete failure The insular and isolated position of England to together together together to- to gether with the J with which the English proceeded against all suspects and the cutting off of all channels of communication contributed largely to our lack of success DIFFICULT TO ORGANIZE I Under the best of circumstances it itis itis It ItIs is extremely difficult to organize an n I espionage system in an enemy country after war once has broken out The j intelligence division of the German I general staff did not attempt an anything thing in the line of military espionage m in the United States until after America en entered entered en- en the war It was a futile attempt The task assigned was chiefly that of giving us information as to the movement of troops In nearly every I case the troops had arrived in France rance before the reports of our agents I reached us and therefore were ut utI utterly utterly ut- ut i terly worthless I wish the stories of i ithe the alle alleged ed marvelous secret seret espionage s system stem of the German general staff I I which the tho world believes had only been I true alas they were not Colonel NicolaI gave me a briet brief I I sk sketch of the history of the German i military m espionage system in the general general gen gen- i eral staff I I From rom the end of the war with France In 1871 until 1904 1004 the work of the intelligence division of the German I general staff was confined almost wholly to defensive counter espionage in Germany to uncover French and Russian secret military m agents who were very active among us I In the general staff began to organize and develop an espionage system tern tem for military m information in countries countries countries coun coun- 1 tries with whom Germany might be Involved in war vai It was therefore confined confined con con- I fined tined to Russia and to France And there was no thought of war with England and no attempt was I made to organize a military intelligence intelligence intelli intelli- gence system from there and outside of the customary information sent by bythe bythe I II the With the growth I II I Of the war feeling In France and In I I Russia our efforts to obtain I I tion Uon in those countries as to military m I plans a against us were intensified I I j WATCHES RUSSIA AND FRANCE I I took tool charge o of the intelligence d dj d- d I dl-I j vision of the in The work was still confined to Russia and I II I France and we had not a single secret military agent in En England land and of I 0 course did not dream of war with America The chief o of the German military intelligence paid palf a singular tribute to France rance He III said that prior to the tho war the intelligence division had succeeded suc sue in making connections with a ai i considerable number of French citizens in France for information but that at atthe atthe the outbreak of war not a single one of these agents who h hid Md d been in the German employ titled failed to return to his patriotic duty to his country He lie declared that it had taken years to find tr traitors in France and by the time that the first one had been in inI induced in- in I to enter the German service al already already at- at ready thirty Germa s in Germany had been tried and co convicted for assisting the French military espionage in Ger Ger- many Colonel Nicolai recounted how much easier it was for England surrounded by waler water to protect herself against enemy espionage in time of war than it was Germany with its many borders and its numerous numerous' outlets into neutral countries Colonel Nicolai said that the Intelligence Intelligence intelligence intelli Intelli- gence division of the general staff had very small appropriations at its disposal disposal dis dis- dis for military intelligence work and that it was all spent in Russia and France You Yo may not believe lieve It but it is a fact that up to 1313 1913 the annual appropriation appropriation for the intelligence division never tr exceeded marks that marks that is I he said I would like to ask I anyone how Y you u could cover the world with a network of espionage with that sum I I |