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Show . . 4 7Y."ii'li'"l"l"l"l"l''l""l"l''H"l'H"l"l'illlHI FORWARD MARCH By H. S. Sims, Jr. !.,,'.. I .M.i..i,.j-.iill,,llrti1.ililll.lll TUNISIAN TRIUMPH INDICATES THAT GER5IAN DEFENSE LLXE MAY BE EASIER THAN EXPECTED The campaign in Tunisia presents pre-sents solid ground for the optimistic opti-mistic hopes of the United Nations. Na-tions. The successful conclusion of the Allied offensive is important import-ant but more significant is the masterful manner in which Axis armies were overpowered. bardment, the expeditionary force could be transferred across the narrow channel waters, protected by British and American warships. war-ships. The shorter distance involved in an invasion from England as compared com-pared with a similar attack across the Mediterranean, is an advantage advan-tage not to be tossed lightly aside. Not only aircraft but surface ships would be more effective and reinforcements and supplies could be brought up without delay and in relative safety. While German defenses in Western Wes-tern Europe are far stronger than Axis fortifications in Southern Europe, Tunisia seems to tell that a coordinated attack, through, the air and on the ground, can succeed suc-ceed without undue casualties. An attack in Western Europe would present an immediate threat to Germany itself such as cannot be secured by an invasion of any point in Southern Europe. The war will be won only when Germany is invaded. If such an offensive is launched in France or Belgium, it will indicate a belief on the part of our leaders that Germany can be beaten in 1943. 'Allied Tactics Overwhelming . . . More than a month ago, we suggested that the Axis would use Tunisia as a proving ground for defensive tactics. Certainly, our enemies had plenty plen-ty of time to prepare the Bizerte-Tunis Bizerte-Tunis area. These key points fell six months after the Allied landing land-ing in North Africa and more than six months after General Montgomery's Mont-gomery's victory at El Alamein. The scope of our victory gives promise of greater success in Europe. Eu-rope. The decisive push was preceded pre-ceded by a gigantic air assault, which for nine straight hours dropped four plane-loads of bombs a minute upon a narrow section of the German front. The greatest concentration of air power thus far seen in this war was supplemented by the tremendous tre-mendous fire of Allied artillery. Under the pounding, the Axis broke, their positions became hopeless and they surrendered by the thousands. Axis Forces Gave Up Quickly ... The same Axis soldiers who drove the British into the sea at Dunkerque in 1940 and drove into Russia in 1941, without overwhelming over-whelming superiority in the air and on the ground, were as helpless help-less as the French and Polish armies ar-mies when overwhelmed by the German attack. On the defensive, the Nazis did not display the stubborn fighting qualities of the British, French or Russians. Attacked by superior forces and overwhelmed by superior super-ior weapbns, the Germans and Italians displayed no willingness to "take it," yielding -quickly to the inevitable. Speculation as to the Allied offensive of-fensive against the Continent of Europe rose to new heights fol- The point of attack must be close enough to Allied bases to insure in-sure adequate and overwhelming air power. Nowhere is this available avail-able to the same extent as it is from the British Isles. From England, Eng-land, it would be possible to blast a limited area of the Continent with such a cascade of bombs as to destroy all preconceived plans for defense. A narrow section of the French or Belgium coast, selected by the Allied High Command, would be within a few minutes range of British airfields. Complete aerial superiority could be maintained and the special area of operations pulverized by high explosives. English Base . Invaluable . . . With the area of attack under continuous and heavy aerial bom- lowing the conclusion of the TunH sian campaign. The secret of the Allied High Command remained undisclosed but various guesses were made. Some of them are correct because be-cause they included every possible source of attack from Norway to the Black Sea. The predictions were alike in only one respect that the assault upon the enemy's continental forces was near at hand and that our losses will be heavy. May Attack Western Europe . . . Previous to the Axis debacle in Tunisia, we had been inclined to the belief that the offensive would be launched against the "soft underbelly' un-derbelly' of Europe. This seemed to be a logical course for the major ma-jor attack despite . the necessity of reducing certain island strong points before the main invasion could bggin. The probability that the Axis Mediterranean will be invaded continues, but the revelation of Tunisia adds strength to the suggestion sug-gestion that Northern France and Belgium will be the scene of the decisive invasion designed to knock Germany out of the war. The conclusion springs from the demonstration of airpower, concentrated con-centrated in a narrow place to blast defensive positions into ruins and shatter the morale of troops under a rain of bombs. If this strategy succeeded in Tunisia, which may turn out to be a proving prov-ing ground for Allied tactics, it will probably succeed in Europe. Tunisia Demonstrates The Way . . . Without any first-hand information infor-mation we believe that the crumbling crumb-ling of Axis defenses in Tunisia, under bombardment from the air and from ground artillery, indicates indi-cates that, given the same conditions, condi-tions, the German fortifications in Western Europe can be breached breach-ed without excessive losses. |