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Show 4 p-rr-r:,lliniMiMiniMiiiNiiiiilliiNiMiliiiiimtiiiii,l FORWARD MARCH By II. S. Sims, Jr. ,", ,..,1. I llll-.llNlllllll'l..lllllll..ll.lllllll HITLER CAN HARDLY WAIT X XTIL ALLIES ARE KE DY TO BEGIN COORDINATED ATTACKS The Russian government, In a summary of two years of war, asserts that Germany and her allies al-lies have lost in killed and prisoners, pris-oners, 6,400,000 officers and men and 56,500 guns, 42,400 tanks and 43,000 aircraft. Such tremendous casualties explain ex-plain the tardiness of the Nazis to , launch an offensive against the Red Army, which is reported to be larger and better equipped than when the war started, despite the ; admitted loss of 35,000 guns, 30,- 000 tanks and 23,000 planes. There has been a tendency to discount Moscow's claims as to ' German losses. This doubt exists imnnf the neoule of the United ing" the German successes of the summer. In addition to the Stalingrad Stal-ingrad triumph the Russians relieved re-lieved Leningrad and gained control con-trol of Kursk, Rhev, Vyazma, Gzhatsk and Velekige Luki. Authorities Au-thorities agree that, under Russian pounding, "Hitler's war machine started shaking and trembling." On no other front did Germany score successes to offset defeats in Russia. The Nazis sufferd "severe military reverses" in Egypt, Libya, Lib-ya, Tripolitania and Tunisia. The Luftwaffe wobbled badly In battle, bat-tle, there was inadequate protection protec-tion of vital centers from aerial bombardments and, lastly, in recent re-cent months, the U-boat campaign has been ineffective. Moscow calls attention to the "great military power" of the Red Army which is "capable of breaking" break-ing" the German Fascist troops "in open fight" and says that Germany's Ger-many's "military, political and international situations" are "undergoing "un-dergoing a great crisis." The Russians assert that postponement post-ponement of a second front in Europe Eu-rope would cause "serious setbacks" set-backs" because "the present situation sit-uation depends on the manner in which the Allies will be able to exploit their present advantages." Moscow reiterates the need of a second front to sp.cnrp viptnrv drawn decision, is passing fast. His enemies, confident and gaining gain-ing overwhelming strength, have him cornered, .where he cannot escape es-cape destruction. The United Nations Na-tions have only to stick together. They can afford the luxury of timing a leisurely, but certain, kill. States even if our high cqmmand v knows the truth. The military record of two t years' fighting in Russia goes far ' to lend weight to Russian asser- tions that the Axis armies have , been seriously crippled. As Mos-S, Mos-S, cow points out "the second year of the war brought to the Ger-i Ger-i mans new and enormous losses I and gave them no territorial l! gain." The Soviet offensive in the win- ter of 1942-43 "brought to noth-ii' . . i There are supposed to be 190 German and 28 Satellite divisions on the Russian front, according to Prime Minister Churchill, and so long as this large army remains re-mains on Russian soil a German offensive is to be expected. Hitler naturally holds off until he can appraise Allied intentions in the Mediterranean and on the western coast of Europe, anxious not to commit his reserves in a two-front battle, but it should be remembered that his previous drives in Russia were not launched until late in June. If a large-scale Allied invasion is attempted the Axis will seek desperately to smash it and the less fighting in Russia at the time, the better. Should the Allied attack at-tack succeed the Axis couse would become hopeless but should it fail there would still be the opportunity oppor-tunity to seek a great victory in Russia. For these reasons it is argued that the Nazis may maintain the present status in Russia in order to deliver maximum blows against an invasion in its most perilous period as Allied forces seek to maintain and enlarge their precarious pre-carious bridgeheads. If no huge operation is going on in Russia the Nazis would have a far better prospect of mauling the Anglo-American Anglo-American offensvie. The only other courses open to the Nazis are: (1) An immediate offensive against Russia, designed to knock Russia out before the Allied attack, at-tack, or at least to render the Red army incapable of preventing the transfer of the bulk of the Axis forces to meet the Allied thrust, or (2) Acceptance of the defensive everywhere, particularly in Russia, Rus-sia, in the hope of wearing down the United Nations and thus gaining gain-ing a negotiated peace, which is the maximum that the Germans can now hope for. Time, however, is working against the Nazis. The longer a decisive campaign is delayed, the stronger the Allied coalition will become and the more elaborate will be the preparations for the destruction of Nazi military power. pow-er. Every day the aerial bombing of German industrial and military facilities is weakening the Teutonic Teuton-ic power to wage war. Every day the productive plants of the United Unit-ed Nations increase the odds against the Axis. . In brief, Hitler cannot wait for his enemies to strike without resigning re-signing himself to eventual and complete defeat. His last slim chance, not to win but to gain a |
