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Show by the sub committee. Among other t liings he said that Germany did not desire war and that Germany "s defeus i ve strength from t he very start was unfavorable. Tt was the lack of co-op-era t ion between the "army and 4 interests inter-ests at home" which influenced the defeat de-feat of Germany. "1 know with absolute certainty that neither the people, the kaiser nor the government desired war. tor the government gov-ernment knew liermany 's I lomendously difficult position in a war against thl entente. ' " fiindeiiburg declared. GERMAN POSITION WEAK, j H IN DEN BURG TESTIFIES. tirniiiiiy's defensive, itrengtn, said the Field marshal, v as as unfavorable as possible from-the start. It miaht be left to history to decide why Germany s ' pease policy had failed, ho j.i'nl. ''It' the military authorities prepared j for the possibility of an unavoidable war,'' cofitlnueii von btuidenburjr, "that was only their duty towards the nation. If there had bseU solid, united cooperation between army anil homeland home-land we could have attained ietory. While with the enemy, notwithstanding notwith-standing his superiority, all parties wove united oven more firmly iu the determination to be victorious, with ns, although we were numerically inferior, in-ferior, interests at home made their in flueiue felt, and this stale of affairs led to the breaking of the will to ietory. ie-tory. ' ' CONSIDERED SUBMARINE WARFARE IMPERATIVE. In all oroat decisions l.udendorf f aud himself were of one mind; they had worked in full accord from AiiKiist -9, ItMti. to the end, he asserted. "We considered unrestricted submarine sub-marine war imperative immediately wc entered t'u" supreme command." said the field marshal. "When HU7 eame we could no louder permit our gallant soldiers to be bombarded with American ammunilion and their wives and chil dren starved by the blockade. Tb 1'-boat 1'-boat war was the only means to oppose t hose conditions ' Von Hiadonbiirg and l.udendorff found the corridors leading to the committee com-mittee room crowded to the doors with admirers and others, who, by divers means, had secured admission.' Deputy Oothein, president of the sub-c sub-c oumittec. held a reception and thanked the field marshal, who replied that he was glad to come because il was his duly especially to appear with " my true comrade." Questions Submitted. The sub-c ouimittee had prepared six questions which had been submitted to vou HinaeabjUM on Saturday to enable him to study them and prepare his an SWOTS, The questions weiw: Virt t'rnlll what timt' did I h.i iirillv Ob Oi LP! In! Report of Attache Predicting Pre-dicting American Part in World War Read to Assembly in Berlin. BERLIN, Nov. 19. Dr. Heinrich F. -Vlbert. Ucrmaii under secretary of state, afcd formerly eommereial attache in Ihe ii'ernian embassy at Washington, predicted pre-dicted in l!Ub with unerring accuracy thedeefsive effect America 's entry into the war would have. A report which he made st thai lime to the Uerman government', read today to-day before the sub -committee of the national assembly investigating war responsibility, gave clear warning of the feeling in the t:nited States, of America's efficieucy, of her financial powers, and of her intense leanings toward the entente, and declared that, il case of America's participation, "neutral nations would side with America; the psychological effect would be felt at once; it would be a national misfortune and Germany would be defeated. de-feated. " ' Dr. Albert asserted then that America Amer-ica could raise several army corps and that she w ould energetically support the allies with huge loans; that the Lnfay-elto Lnfay-elto flying squadron, "that dangerous branch of warfare," without doubt would be vastly strengthened, and that America's transportation would be efficient effi-cient and capable of increase. Held Marshal von Hindenburg, who pas the star witness today, had before him the task of answering six questions ques-tions which were prepared beforehand taxation of G'jrmuny s pronptM made In (W8 meant war with A merh'a, tn tho opinion of nil Intollisvnt Germans D Amen a. said the- report. Convinced 1. S. Would Knter. National ttftUng had grown enormouuiv and America, already on the side of -i UUution. feared the l"-bout danger leas than it wanted to he on tho side ot the entente. IWyr llanie! Waji firmly convinced con-vinced thai war with America would result re-sult from I -boat w arfare, after w hlch America's supplies of money, material and foot) v " be enormous. Secretary Albert rjporu'd more tron(fly even in his roinmunkalbm tf Novender t;, 191(i, whn the 1-boat warfre had not yet been agreed upon and thrre had been no question of recalling the boats. "If Germany '-an beat Kngland.'' lie said, "then war with America will make no difference. But thus far our boats havp been inahle to sink the large, armel British merchantmen. The hlo-kad of Kncla pd would have tO last a long UlM and be supported loyal; . and if Japan can bv induced by Kngland to kep ita fleet at home America baa the poaalblbty of sending Us sldpa to Kurupeau waters. wa-ters. "Aniertca gy raise at leaM nevera! army iorrs. and strengthening of Ihc entente en-tente forces otdd result. It w owld In' most UnDOrt&M In economic que-tlonn an! would energeticall SUpptflPl Its allle with no telling what huM luaiu under the Influence of the ent hustaam In America. Witness the Amerh-ans who came to Fran-'e and created the I.afayMte fixing squadron. That dangerous hrnnrh of aar-fare aar-fare would be surely vastly strengthened Resourto Pointed Out. "America's transportation without doubt would be efficient and capable of Increase, and it Amerb'a fels safe from Japan ihe wtD throw all her amniuniUon to rYan-e. "Not to forget t -ic wonderful American automobile industT. fISe giant Ford fae- 1 torUs and other mac. lines which would help In winning the war. "Neutrals would side villi America. The psychological effect would b felr at .tome. It would b a national misfortune, and. at the did. German) wuukt be evre to be defeated." In hi tatlinoiv. Cn raj l.udendorff aid that the high command flut r Trained from begtnnla&T h I'-boaT cam -paign beiause tbe rnancior at that time feared an attack hv Mn'tand and Denmark, Den-mark, owing to the pressure of Great Britain, and there were then no troop to mast now ertumiea. Yon Benitorfl I 'n- mp;ithetic. The high cotiunand w aa akeplial re gardlng President Wilson' peae move, but expressed approval of this, and alao approved Germany'i peace move and an j deavored not to thwart poll Ural peat e i step lie had always regacded rouot I von nernntorfrj" a.-tUltlen a- unaMnpa- ' UsOtlc. He believed that n llernstorffi had not furnlshM the ehancellor with J correct lnfornuitlon. This impression was strengthen when Yon Bernatorff told thai committee yesterday that America could I only hava been held aloof from lha war by entrusting (redent Wilson With the role of intermediary for paace. whereas, ! f.udendorff pointed out. this waa not men- I tloned In Von Iterristorfr" reports Moreover, von Iter nstorffs statement , that hi visit to tidendorff headquar ters was aceldental waa untrue, the wit-ness wit-ness said, as be had askeil to be received re-ceived Former i baneelior t 1ethmann-Hol. weg dec lared that, with reference to the sixth question, there waa no contradiction In his declaration and t.ndendnrfr book. Inasmuch aa h Joint - ulth llerr Zim-mermann. Zim-mermann. "n r-- -eh lug Vnn Mernstorff report. aked Admiral von Holtsendorff former head of the nn-raj general ntaff 1" defer uarestli' tl submarine warfare, but Von HOltawftwOrff hsr replied thai Ihls was Impoasible The chancellor therefore ronsldered the matter settled. I leadership COBaider" sharpened submarine submar-ine vfur unavoidable, and for what reasons rea-sons beeoiul, Uid the army leadership kuow, of reasons against the submaritn and the opening of submariue warfare from the declarations of under secretaries of state, Haniel and Albert? Why did the army leadership consider those declarations declara-tions against submarine war as no longer long-er sonudf Third. Why did the army leadership accept, as in the telegram of von Hiu deuburg, December 33, 101 b to L'han-eeHor L'han-eeHor von Bethinonn llollweg, the? state meut thnt Uio Wilson ptdUM "waa called forth by Kulau'l," antl nol agree to the MM4 proposal made by the imper taJ leaders: Fourth, Was the army leadVrship fa iniiiar with the various details of Prcsi (Jent Wilson 's action, pspecially on January Jan-uary 9, 1917. as the decision to begin U-bV.at war was taken? Were the reports front Bernstorff dur ing the periocK iJeicmbcr -1 to .Ian uarv B, familiar f nfta, Did the army leadership as sume that England eould be compelled to peaee, at the lalest in sToty, 1817, M contained in t ho memorandum of the admiralty staff I Sixth. General I,udendtirff assumes In his book that on January' -9. in a conversation con-versation from headquarters wltu the government, that Uo'ay In the eubmarln war had not been demanded, while Chancellor Chan-cellor von Bethmann-Hollweg. In hie statement before the subcommittee, do fared tnat be had made such a demand. How Is this contradiction to be explained ex-plained ? Chairman tiotheln tried to have Von Til nd en bur ir answer the iuoetlona separate:..-, but he declared that he must mix them up. The questions were read. The lecdnd was bv far the most Interesting, for It embodied long cable reports of Secretaries Hanlel and Albert from America Amer-ica under date of IMS des- rlblng as exports what the effert of snbniHrine war wfiuld be. These reports were unusually clear in their warning. ManieJ report was rend HraL Tn it he said America, despite its business sense and Its KncUnh atid to some ox-tent ox-tent Freieh tits, was at heart sentimental, senti-mental, nnd that numberless Americans with whom he had talked were m greed that If Germany began 1 - boat warfare they WO Old go to war. whereas If Ger-manv Ger-manv ceased It they would compel n-gUuid n-gUuid to remove the bhn-kade. Anv re- |
