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Show Communists Await Depression in U.S. . Reds See Nation's Economy Gravitating Toward Disaster By BAUKHAGE Neil's Analyst and Commentator. , WASHINGTON. There are a good many ways to judge the moods of official Washington. Sometimes you can assay them the moment you read the latest statement of the bureau of labor statistics. Sometimes you can interpret them in terms of the number of press and radio conferences that are NOT cancelled or the number of presidential or cabinet fishing fish-ing trips that are scheduled. Sometimes you can read the story in the Congressional Record or the Gallup poll. But in recent times one of the best barometers of Washington emotions emo-tions (some of my deep-dishers tell me) is the facial andor oral expressions expres-sions of the professional Communists who inhabit the carefree District of Columbia. To help you understand the above" somewhat un-understandable statement, state-ment, let me refresh re-fresh your mem- iT o r y concerning r the Kremlin's f. .f 1 most cherished s'"v?. desire. That . X- .fe iSsJ dearest wish, as you know, is a ttl-S i'1 great, big all-out v J replica of the de- 1,,. .' pression of 1929 j j "' for the United 4-. .4tlS States. I Let's step for a - f J hCS . moment into the f..v"( j sanctum sancto- I if i n nnWm.ri-ivtol rum of the So- Baukhage viet s No. 1. boy, Josef Vissarionovich Djugashvill, alias Marshal Stalin. The following is an excerpt from the official transcript of a conversation conver-sation between Harold Stassen of Minnesota and Josef Stalin of Georgia, Geor-gia, U.S.S.R.. not Georgia. U.S.A.: Stassen: Onr problem now Is to see to It that we do not have a depression, de-pression, an economic crisis. Stalin: Do yon expect a crisis? cri-sis? Stassen: I do not . . . with wise policies . . . we can avoid a crisis . . . Stalin: Do American industries indus-tries have a lot of orders? or-ders? Is that trne? And that American factories can't keep pace with them and that all factories are running 100 per cent? Is that true? Stassen: Yes, substantially, but they are largely domestic orders . . . Stalin: But that is the most Important , . . magazine maga-zine analysts and the American press carry open reports to the effect ef-fect that an economic crisis will break out. Stassen: The problem is one of . . stabilizing without with-out having an economic eco-nomic crisis. . . Stalin: But what about business busi-ness men? Will they be prepared to be regulated and restrained? re-strained? Stassen: No, some will have objections. Stalin: Yes, they do. That is a verbatim record with omissions which do not affect the context. They reveal Stalin's keen interest in cur domestic economy and any prospective depression In that economy. The conversation took place In trie Kremlin on April 9 of this year. A friend of mine, a financial expert ex-pert met a Communist acquaintance acquaint-ance who was bubbling over with joy. The reason for his gayety? The fact that he foresaw a real depression depres-sion for the United States. Later the financial man again met the Communist, Com-munist, informed him he was sorry to hurt his feelings, but that there was going to be only a mild recession reces-sion which would serve to check the boom. No bust would follow. That was the opinion of most of the experts government, industry and labor at that time. The whole country, despite the fact that business busi-ness was booming, seemed to be aware of the dangers of inflation. Furthermore, people were in the mood to check extravagances (for example. the Newburyport and other price-cutting experiments). It appeared there would be a slight recession, that it would relieve the labor tension and encourage more efficiency on the part of workers work-ers and management. Also, it would adjust inventories, bring down real estate prices so that people could buy homes, reduce the cost of living, liv-ing, and in general, take the wind out of the sails of a boom that might be followed by a bust. That was in April. Well alont about the middle of July, the Communist ran into the financial expert again. Ada in the Communist was smiling. 'Woll. he leered happily, "where's your mild recession that was going to take the wind out of the sails of boo m -and-but?" He snifTrd the brryzc blowing ofT the Potomac a couple of times and added (as if he bad caught the stent of attar of roses): "Smells a lot like 1020 to me." The Communist went on. obviously obvi-ously enj' .yir.g hi:v..elf: "John Lewis gnt the b:2;:ct w;i;e settlement settle-ment in h:s his'.nry. Didn't ycu sny wa;e increases wore ir.:Vi'.:on:iry? What are the other labor leaders pom to do? Didn't I hear s rr.e-thing rr.e-thing about an increase m the price of steel as well as coal? And v. hat about the other side more lo' ?e change In people's pockets? Congress Con-gress talked about letting the boys have cah fur their terminal leave bonds? That wouldn't do much to pull down prices and releasing credit controls on installment buying. buy-ing. And the railroads saying they can't pay their coal bills without a freight rate increase. Congress tried twice to cut taxes too. right where it would do high pnee the most good. Where," he akerl again, "where'3 this recession, and all the serious thought about checking check-ing a boom?" With that, the Communist walked ofT. chuckling in his bnrd. My financial fi-nancial expert admitted he couldn't answer him. "It's this way." he said to me afterward, "people feel about In Ma tion the way they felt about sin. Everybody is against It but they want to gt the;rs." |