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Show if r CEronacBiPSifl IFeirsIMmcxn9 n T Qi North American T Newspaper Alllanc. y Stopy 22 tffliie LEo LFo 1 f T or Ui part prohibited.) 1 pose of American troops. It was not In any sense a prerogative of the supreme su-preme war council. There can be little doubt that Lord Reading received the distinct impression impres-sion from President Wilson that Infantry In-fantry and machine-gun units would be sent to Franco at the rate of 120,000 men per month for four months, beginning with April. That the President agreed to this "In principle" prin-ciple" is practically certain. It need not be further emphasized that such a concession, even though prompted by the most generous Impulse, could only add to the difficulties of our task of building up an army of our own. It Is probable that Lord Reading, skilled advocate that he was, did more while ambassador at Washington to Influence the administration to grant allied requests than any other Individual. Indi-vidual. CHAPTER XXXVII I left London April 25, 1918, and crossed to France in a British destroyer. de-stroyer. Colonel Mott was at Boulogne with a request for me from General Foch to come . to Sarcus. I learned then that the Twenty-second division, at Seicheprey, had repulsed a severe trench raid on the night of April 20-21, and had suffered considerable loss. Arriving at General Foeh's headquarters head-quarters I found Generals Bliss, Har-bord Har-bord and Weygand already there, and after dinner we entered Into a general gen-eral discussion about American troop shipments. The conversation ran as follows : Foch On March 28 you came to offer the services of American troops. men would go In. Naturally the British Brit-ish wanted unlimited Infantry and machine-gun units, but I would consider con-sider nothing further than a limited extension of the six-division plan. During the conference a cable from Lord Reading to the prime minister was brought forth, which stated that the President had agreed to the amalgamation amal-gamation of Americans with the British. Brit-ish. I had nothing ofticial at hand later than the President's conditional approval of joint note No. 18 of the supreme war council as suggested by Secretary Baker, so I promptly said that It could not be possible that any such concession had been made and that the classes of our troops to be shipped over and their disposition must be left to me. Agrea on Troop Shipments. As a result of these discussions we reached an agreement which provided for the shipment in May by British and American tonnage of the infantry, machine gun, engineer and signal troops, together with the various unit headquarters, of six divisions for training with the British army. It was provided that any shipping in excess ex-cess of the amount required for this number of troops should be utilized to transport the artillery of these divisions; di-visions; also that such personnel as might be required to build up corps organizations should then follow, It being understood that the artillery regiments would train with the French and join their proper divisions when this was completed. To meet any emergency that might require an excess of infantry after the completion of this program, it was nprppd rhnr nil tho Amppirnn nnd We were always made welcome at British headquarters. It so happened that on the day of our arrival Lord Derby, who had Just been relieved as minister of war by Lord Mllner, was there en route to Paris as British ambassador. During dinner the conversation con-versation ran along freely, as though we were members of the official family. fam-ily. At length Lord Derby and Sir Douglas drifted to the subject of British Brit-ish politicians. It would betray no confidence to say that there was considerable criticism of some who held prominent places. The coalition government came In for Its share because of Its attitude toward to-ward the military high command. I took advantage of the opportunity opportu-nity while on the British front to visit the Nordaques area to Inspect the advance elements of the Seventy-seventh division, one of the divisions selected se-lected for training with the British. We took luncheon with Brig. Gen. ISvan M. Johnson, then temporarily in command, and his staff officers. He praised the soldierly qualities of the men, but said they were very much behind In their training. Makes Agreement With Haig. At Sir Douglas' headquarters he and I reached an understanding as to the training and administration of our troops that were to be temporarily with the British. In the first place, they were to be allocated by regiments regi-ments to British skeleton divisions under such a schedule as might be agreed upon. The training staffs of British divisions were to be at the disposal of these regiments, especially for Instruction In the use of the rifle and machine gun and the handling CHAPTER XXXV Continued It was a source of real regret to me not to command the First division In person, and this, coupled with the fact that Its entry Into the battle was of considerable moment, led me to speak a word of confidence and encouragement. When the officers, about WK) In all, were assembled In the grounds of the chateau oc-upled as division headquarters they formed a rare group. These splendid-looking men, hardened hard-ened by I he strenuous work of the fall and by two months In winter trenches, fairly radiated the spirit of courage and gave promise that America's Amer-ica's effort would prove her sons the equals of their forefathers. The First division saw Its first major offensive some six weeks later, brilliant counterattack at Cantlgny, lu the Amiens sector. Wanted the A. E. F. United. That afternoon I motored to Sarcus to see General Foch and sound him out regarding the prospects of uniting unit-ing our divisions In a sector of our own. I told him that the secretary of war when In France had expressed an earnest desire to hasten the formation of an American army and that this was also the wish of the President. It was my opinion, I said, that early action would be of great Importance In stimulating the morale of our troops and of our people. Now that the First division was to go Into line the people at home would expect noon to hear that an American army was engaged on Its own front. I suggested sug-gested the possibility that the corps might be assembled near the First division di-vision as a beginning. I have a vivid recollection of the occasion. oc-casion. As to the American divisions, In what order do you think they should be employed? Pershing The order would be the Twenty-sixth, Forty-second, Second. (The First had already been sent to an active front near Amiens.) The regiments of the Thirty-second will be ready by May 1. Foch I do not think they can be used before May 5, but the more we put into the line the better it will be. Your Seventy-seventh division has arrived, ar-rived, I see. What about the Third and Fifth? Pershing The infantry of the Third has arrived, and that of the Fifth will soon follow. Pershing Stands Firm. Foch What we need now is Infantry, In-fantry, especially the British, on account ac-count of the present crisis. That Is why the supreme war council at Versailles Ver-sailles recommended that all tonnage be devoted to that purpose for the time being. I hope that America may send over as much infantry as possible possi-ble during the next three months. The other arms to complete your divisions can come afterward. What do you think of that plan? Pershing I cannot commit myself to such a proposition. If nothing but infantry and machine gunners are brought over, to the total of 360,000, it will be October or November before be-fore the artillery and auxiliary troops could arrive, and we could not foresee fore-see the formation of an American army until next spring. Foch I think your calculation is rather pessimistic, for we could begin be-gin bringing your other troops in August, but without considering that point we can furnish you with artillery artil-lery and its personnel and you can have your divisions reconstituted beginning be-ginning with October. ' What would you propose in this connection? Pershing I think we should limit the transportation of infantry to May, arid that the artillery and auxiliary troops should come In June. They should not arrive more than a month later than the infantry. Under what conditions would you employ the American Infantry units? (TO BE CONTINUED.) British shipping available for the transportation of troops was to be used under such arrangement as would Insure immediate aid to the allies, al-lies, and thereafter as far as possible provide other units necessary to complete com-plete the organization of our divisions and corps. It was further agreed that the combatant com-batant troops mentioned in connection with May shipments should be followed fol-lowed by such services of supply and other contingents as we ourselves might consider necessary, the shipment ship-ment of a large number of these troops should be utilized at my discretion, except that the six divisions which the British were to transport would be trained with them. Washington Makes Concession. Reaching Chaumont, I found that a cablegram dated April 26 had been received, transmitting a memorandum dated April 19, that had been sent by direction of the President to the British Brit-ish ambassador at Washington in conformity con-formity with his approval of note No. 18. In this memorandum the shipment of 120.000 infantry and machine-gun units per month for four months was conceded, with the understanding that their assignment for training and use should be left to my discretion. It went on to say that the United States, until the situation changed, had no intention of departing from as full compliance with the recommendation recom-mendation of the permanent military representatives as the nature of the case would permit. This was the first official information informa-tion I had received that the administration adminis-tration had agreed to send any specific numbers of infantry and machine-gun units to France. This concession went further than It was necessary to go and much further fur-ther than I had expected. Realizing the complications that might arise from commitments so far in the future and the delay in forming an American army that would follow, I did not agree in later discussions at the supreme su-preme war council with all that the allies now felt justified in demanding. I was opposed to the action of the supreme war council in assuming the power under any circumstances to dis- of gas. After that, and with the approval of their American division commander, com-mander, the regiments were to be attached to a British division in line, so each of the three battalions of the regiment would have the opportunity to serve with one of the three brigades bri-gades in each British division. These battalions were to be commanded by their own officers as a part of the British brigade, while the staff of the American regiment was to be attached at-tached to that of the brigade. In the next stage the American regiments, with their three battalions united under the regimental commander, com-mander, were to act as a brigade in a British division. The final stage would find the four American regiments regi-ments of each division united as such under its own officers, the artillery being British until the arrival of its own artillery brigade. In carrying out. this scheme the tendency ten-dency at first was for British officers actually to assume command of our units in training. Our officers in most cases permitted this to be done until it was checked by my orders that "American units must be commanded in training by the officers and noncommissioned noncom-missioned officers who are to command com-mand them In battle," and that American Amer-ican troops would in all cases be commanded com-manded in battle only by Americans. Talks Shipping in London. Following a suggestion by Lord Milner, I went to London April 22, 191S, to consider further the shipment ship-ment of American troopers. At our first conference there were present Lord Milner and Gen. Sir Henry Wilson, Wil-son, who had succeeded General Robertson Rob-ertson as the chief of the general staff; Ilarbord and myself. The main point of difference that had developed in pevious conferences as to just how far the Americans should be commit ted to serve In active operations was again considered. I stated that the main thing was to get our units trained, and that while I was opposed to amalgamation, yet if during the period of instruction the units with which they were serving should be attacked or, if another great emergency should arise, of course, our General Foch agreed la principle to the suggestion, but was uncertain when the other divisions could be spared, which I, of course, fully appreciated, ap-preciated, lie pointed out that the enemy was very aggressive and referred re-ferred to the severe attack against the British on the Lys between Lens nd Ypres, which began on the 9th and was still In progress. But looking look-ing beyond, I Insisted that the Twenty-sixth and Forty-second divisions might be withdrawn at any time from quiet sectors, to be followed by the Becoud and the Thirty-second and also the Third a few days later. I pointed out that this force of six divisions, including the First, would equal twelve French divisions, and gave it as my opinion that it would be better to use this American group for active operations than to detain the units In quiet sectors and send French divisions to the battle front. My understanding after this discus Blon was very definite that the plan would soon be carried out, leaving the exact time and place to be determined. It was Immaterial to me just where It should occur, the point being to get It done. Hard Fighting on the Lys. The German offensive on the Lys was another formidable effort to break the British line. The attack Was made to the north and south of Artnentieres on a front of 24 miles by 27 German divisions. The exhausted British, though they fought with most commendable courage and skill, were forced again to yield with heavy losses to themselves and the Portuguese, consisting of two divisions, who were with them. Several French divisions were hurried hur-ried to the Lys front, but it was a week after the attack began before they were put into the line. They then relieved British divisions at the famous Kemmel hill, only to be surprised sur-prised and defeated themselves April 25, much to their chagrin. The battle was practically ended by the last of the month, with a gain by the Germans Ger-mans of ten or eleven miles and the capture of important territory from the British, but with failure to take Ilazebrouck. ' ENGLANDfesEs"7 I LOCATION AMERICAN DIVISIONS , Jjl Vnroe MAY 14,1918 .T fi 'xl r Battle line . International bdy. 37;- I Bruxelies Numerals indicate Divisions t WTtTtJi i iP circled numerals those not in line. z' VLille1. Q so iqo MILES 4unnizt J 0 o 50 100 150 kilometers ' Arrasy Q-r 1 7 . Lf A Amiens r.Quentin fe Havre SedanvX ) orliejms sssgt.) GERMANY . tfo Chalonss. , &.Brest Parish Bar-leiDuo 2p -' q Neufchateau ? XrhrSLo EP',naV Jcblmr CHAPTER XXXVI It was always stimulating to one's morale to visit the headquarters of the Cunndians, where one soon caught the fine spirit of that superb body. I made such a visit in the spring of 1SU8 and talked with their corps commander, I.ieut. Gen. Sir Arthur Currie; his chief of staff, Major General Gen-eral Weber; his chief of engineers, Major General Lindsny, and others and had tea with them. The alertness and confidence of these neighbors of ours and the excellent ex-cellent record they had made and were si ill making gave us as much gratification as though they had been our own. I remember this visit with much pleasure and recall the prediction pre-diction of the Canadians that Americans Amer-icans would soou play an important part in the war. General Currie deplored the fact that the Rritish had so easily given up Pnschendaele ridge, which the year before he had been told must be taken at all costs and for which the Canadians Cana-dians made the tremendous sacrifice of 16,000 casualties. Calls at British G. H. Q. At the invitation of Sir Douglas Ilaig, nritish commander In chief, I wont to the British general headquarters headquar-ters April 20 to discuss the training of our troops with the British aud study operations in progress. |