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Show With decision nearing, a brief MX history The off-road mobile proposal pictured above is one of many options looked at by the Air Force for MX deployment. The plan'would scatter a fleet of 200 , off-road mobile iransporier-launchers iransporier-launchers over large uninhabited areas of the southwest. The (.round Effect Machine, similar to hovercraft, would ride on a cushion of air. The possible deployment vehicles would be scattered over 90,000 square miles and could travel at speeds up to 80 MPH. However, jammed roads could be a problem, as in the road mobile (minuteman) . system. Also, transporter locations would be in danger of being tracked and attacked. Covered Trench Under this plan, an unmanned transporter-launcher transporter-launcher would travel randomly in a trench . covered with a "concealing "con-cealing fabric." The metallized fabric cover would conceal the transporter-launchers , from radar observation. Although missile location might be discovered by aircraft or "local sensors carried by enemy agents on the ground, there is no practical way to use decoys," the report states. Additionally, the public would be barred from 180,000 square miles. Hybrid trench This plan would,., use shallow buried tunnels with MX missiles on unmanned transporters, which would move randomly to selectively hardened (protected against, nuclear blast) locations in the tunnel. This plan wouia provide excellent security, and would, be automated. However, it would involve in-volve a large public exclusion area, and missiles could be detected by implanted sensors, as in the covered trench plan. Dash to Shelter This plan would use missiles on transporters at the center of a radial road or rail network. Upon warning, the missiles would "dash" to ' 4,600 hardened horizontal shelters. However, the transporter might be observed while moving, and the high speed of the heavy transporter would be the chief technical problem. Cost is also considerably higher than other MX-MPS systems. Mobile Front End Under this plan, millions of silos would be built with a missile booster in each one. Each missile would be completely concealed, but the front ends would Ik; randomly moved from silo to silo. Front ends and decoys would be shifted periodically and randomly. This plan is probably inconsistent with the interim SALT II agreement, and the cost is much higher than comparable MX-MPS plans. Pool System This plan, a variant of the hide-in-shelters concept, would move an automated mobile launch platform among numerous pools of water by an amphibian transporter. tran-sporter. Dye in the water and a retractable pool cover would hide the missile. helicopters, taking off straight up from the ground, and able to land almost anywhere. However, they are extremely ex-tremely costly, and the system could not go into effect before the 1990s. The plan also violates interim SALT II agreement. Dirigible The low-speed, high endurance blimps would carry and launch ICBMs while flying over oceans. However, they are easy to track and attack, and bad weather would limit its capabilities. Hard Rock Silo The Hard Rock Silo was considered as a technique lor rebasing Minuteman missiles in the late 1960s. Under this plan, silos' would be built in granite outcroppings in western U.S. This would create the highest possible hardness level for a surface-flush silo launcher. laun-cher. However, "the hardness level is no longer judged to be adequate to cope with the exisiting Soviet threat, and it is not technically feasible to design them to adequate levels of hardness," hard-ness," the report states. Hard Tunnel Under this plan, missiles would be stored in very deep, superhard tunnels at depths down to 3,000 feet or more, which would be able to withstand direct hits. The plan has good security, would mean minimal public contact and environmental en-vironmental impact, and would have long endurance. en-durance. However, hardness verification would be impossible, and there would be a problem of slow reaction alter attack; South Side Basing Under this plan, silos would be dug near the base of south-facing mesas or mountain cliffs, shielding missiles from Soviet ICBM attacks from the north. Each silo, horizontal or vertical, ver-tical, would contain a single MX type missile. The plan would be inexpensive, and have long endurance, but the missile might be vulnerable to responsive threats from the Soviet Union, including missiles launched from the south. ' This plan requires special terrain, which is hard to find. Many sites would, additionally, be in national parks. Sandy Silo Under this plan, 100 MX-type missiles would each be buried in a 2000-foot 2000-foot deep hole and covered with sand. On command, pressurized water would "fluidize" the sand, and the encapsulate en-capsulate missile would float to the surface for launching. The plan is inexpensive, has excellent ex-cellent security, minimal public contact, and long endurance. However, the report says, "the principal prin-cipal disqualifier for the Sandy Silo is technical uncertainty as to the ability of the system to perform its mission after an attack. . . including ability of the released water to fluidize compacted com-pacted sand reliabily, and ability of the capsule to rise to the surface. Commercial Rail Under this plan, special trains would randomly move the ICBMs over existing commercial railroads. However, the trains, might be trailed, the public would probably object, and the system has poor security. Dedicated Rail. A new automated railway lor nuclear-hardened nuclear-hardened trains carrying missiles would be built, using over 90,000 square miles. Each missile would be parked most of the time, but would move to new random locations at intervals selected to be shorter than the time needed by the Soviets to locate the missiles and retarget their missiles at them. Negative features include the system's high cost, the large public exclusion area, and the possibility of trains being detected by remote sensors. Off Road Mobile This plan would scatter a fleet of 200 off-road mobile transporter-launchers transporter-launchers over large uninhabited areas of southwest U.S. The plan would use over 400,000 square miles, which exceeds the total land area controlled by the Department of Defense and the Bureau of Land Management and more , than the combined area of military bases in southwestern U.S. The difficulties; with ' this system include the severe defacing of the " terrain, and the need to exclude the public from a great deal of land. -Ground Effect , Machine (GEM) -GEM vehicles, similar to hovercraft, ride on a cushion of air. Here, as in the off-road mobile plan, a fleet of 600 GEM would I be scattered from 20 bases into a 90,000 square mile area at a speed of 80 mph. There are questions concerning environmental impact, and the GEM would create a lot of dust. Negative features also include the fact that the system requires warning, and the transporter locations may also be tracked and attacked. j Road mobile (new missile) The plan would base new ICBMs on military ' bases, waiting for attack warning. On command, 1 transporter convoys would move out .: over I interstate highways and secondary roads. Sea Sitter A sea sitter is a large amphibian aircraft which w ould carry ICBMs. The plane would fly over the ocean, landing randomly lor extended periods of time. According to the report, the plan would have minimal environmental en-vironmental impact and would be highly isolated from the public. However, like ships, the sea sitter could be traced. Other negative features include its high cost, weather problems orf high seas, low endurance and poor accuracy. W ide Body Jet This is the "Big Bird" concept; recently described in press reports as the plan Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger may recommend. Under this plan, conventional wide body jet airplanes would disperce the ICBMs, either in dash-on-warning, or in continuous air alert modes. For the dash-on-warning mode, 100 aircraft each carrying two 150,000 pound missiles with 10 warheads and 50 bases would be needed. For the continuous airborne alert mode, 129 aircraft and four coastal bases would be needed. This is an expensive plan, and, according to the report, "a principal difficulty with an air-mobile system using wide-body jets is the limited post-attack post-attack endurance of a fleet of heavy aircraft that can disperse only to selected fields that are themselves likely to be bombarded. Short Takeoff and Landing (STOL) Missiles could be launched from STOL-type STOL-type aircraft, which have access to many landing sites in the central part of the U.S., and can operate on ground alert like bombers. However, this system is very expensiveespecially ex-pensiveespecially for airborne alert requires warning, and has limited endurance. It is also susceptible to attacks. Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) These are the planes that can act like By DIANA QU1NN Hecord Correspondent WASHINGTON, D. C. Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger is believed to be on the verge of recommending a plan of deployment lor the new MX intercontinental in-tercontinental missile, one of the biggest strategic warfare decisions since the missile race began with the launching of Russia's sputnik in 1957. Although many rumors are circulating about which type of deployment the administration will recommend the most recent of which is putting the missiles on converted jet transports for aerial launching that decision is not expected ex-pected before Aug. 1. The latest plan would involve placing 100 MX missiles aboard a fleet of Air Force C5A jet transports. tran-sports. The planes would le kept on alert on runways run-ways at a string of bases in central United States. When alerted of an attack, at-tack, the planes would be launched within minutes. ; This short-term solution would eventually lead to deployment of a larger airborne force in a new airplane called "Big Bird." The vexing problem of how to deploy the MX in a survivable basing mode has plagued the White House, Congress, the Department of Defense and citizens in whose areas the new missile might eventually be based, for the last, decade. Plans for MX deployment, such as "Big Bird," are not new, and have been studied and restudied for over a decade. The search for survivable sur-vivable ICBM (intercontinental (in-tercontinental ballistic missile) basing, beyond the existing Minuteman silos, began in the mid-(iOs, mid-(iOs, when the eventual vulnerability of fixed targets, such as the Minuteman silos, was realized. After extensive evaluations and presentations of all the options to Congress, the Defense Authorization Act of 1981 approved the Defense Department's recommendation of a 4,600 shelter MX multiple protective shelter system. sys-tem. A report of ICBM basing options prepared by the Department of Defense eight months ago under Congressional mandate, describes no less than 30 different plans for deployment of the MX missile. The following describes each alternative, along with major and positive features of each plan: Launch under attack (LUA) Under this plan, as soon as our warning systems detected income Soviet missiles, we could fire some of our Minuteman missiles from existing silos. Major positive features include the plan's low cost and high isolation from the public. The plan also introduces "an element of uncertainty into an enemy's planning process, - possibly deterring attack." However, major negative features include the system's lack of prolonged, post-attack endurance, so that U.S. retaliation could be deliberate and careful. Another major negative feature would be the extremely short decision time needed to launch the missile and the "catastrophic false alarm problem." Orbital-based This plan would involve launching weapons into orbit from new boosters in Minuteman silos, which would, on command, com-mand, deorbit to attack or be recovered. The major positive feature of this plan is the low cost. However, major negative features include the missile's vulnerability to attack in orbit, and inaccuracy in hitting hard targets. Shallow underwater missile (SUM) The plan, which would involve attaching two or more MX missiles to submarines patrolling the U.S. coast, would have little environmental impact, and would be isolated from the public. However, it would not be until the early 1990s when the plan would reach fruition. Hydra This plan would scatter missiles in the ocean on strategic warning from ships or submarines. Waterproof missiles would float, unattended, until commanded to launch or be recovered. The goal of the concept would be to make it difficult for an enemy to locate a water-based missile. Only an inconspicuous in-conspicuous part of the missile front end would be visible above the surface of the water. An alternative might be to store the Hydra aboard ships or submarines until a command would be given. Negative features include the possible capture of unmanned missiles. In addition, remote surveillance of Hydra locations might be possible by sonar or radar. According to the report, "the Hydra concept also presents safety problems of an unprecedented kind. The idea of missiles with nuclear warheads floating unattended in ocean waters introduces an unacceptable hazard to navigation for the world's shipping." Orca The Orca plan is similar to Hydra, but, instead, anchors encapsulated en-capsulated missiles to the coastal seabed. On command, the capsule would float to the surface, and the missile would be launched. Although the plan would be inexpensive, inex-pensive, would have minimal environmental impact and minimal public contact, the plan violates seabed treaty. Additionally, the locations of ORCA missiles could be revealed by sonar. The report also states that this system "is intrinsically in-trinsically unreliable," because it would be impossible to check its , status periodically, since ' the ORCA would emit no signals. Ship, inland This plan would involve barges carrying missiles along existing inland and coastal waterways. Although the report says the plan would have low environmental impact, U.S. waterways would be vulnerable to attack, threatening commercial traffic. Ship, ocean Under this plan, special vessels would carry the .missiles randomly on the I ocean. The plan would have minimal environmental en-vironmental impact and public contact, but the ships could also be easily traced, and their accuracy ac-curacy would be insufficient in-sufficient for hard targets. |