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Show I I I' l I I I I I 'll I I I I I I I I I 'I I I; H i FORWARD MARCH By H. S. Sims, Jr. U. S. Submarines Score . . The great damage done by th American submarines highlight! the fact that the enemy has not except in occasional instances, attempted at-tempted to use Japanese submarines submar-ines to destroy our ships enrout to the Far East. We do noe mear that Jub subs have not torpedoed American ships but that the enemy's ene-my's naval strategy apparently did not envision a a U-boat cam- SUBMARINES, SURFACE SHIPS AND AIRCRAFT WORK TO ISOLATE JAPS' HOME ISLANDS Our warfare against Japan may Hf!f:m to be comprised of isolated attacks upon islands and territory hold by the enemy but this is due entirely to the inability of aircraft submarines and warships to make vivid copy out of a steady blockade block-ade of Japan or for us to visualize progressive development of an offensive of-fensive which includes stepped-up bombing and the gradual dismemberment dismem-berment of what the Japs expected ex-pected to become an overseas empire. em-pire. The entire Japanese hope in Greater East Asia depended upon the control of surrounding sea lanes, leading to the Asiatic mainland, main-land, the scattered island bases and the captured possessions. The home islands had, and have, no link with these domains except by surface ships to transport men and materials back and forth. There was not adequate development develop-ment in aerial transportation to eliminate the necessity for surface ships. paign in the same sense that the Germans used them in the Atlantic. Atlan-tic. The Japs seem to reserve submarines sub-marines for fleet operations to a large extent. In addition to the work of our submarines there has been an increasingly in-creasingly effective use of aircraft against Japanese shipping. "In the early days of the war this was not productive of heavy enemy losses but with the acquisition of closer bases our planes have roamed the South and China seas and it has been bad medicine for Jap ships. It is not always possible to secure accurate information on the losses inflicted by aerial operations but the enemy has suffered pprirvus losses. Surface Ships Moving In . . . Backing up the blockade effort has been the surface ships of the fleet, now almost in a position to tighten it considerably. While , nothing like an actual surface ship has been possible the .acquisition of operating bases in recaptured islands and in the likely future, on the China coast and elsewhere will give the fleet the anchor positions necessary to a binding blockade. In addition the time will come when our surface ships will operate oper-ate between Japan and the Asia- Now the United States has given giv-en the utmost attention to efforts designed to reduce Japanese shipping ship-ping and to blockade vital Japanese Japa-nese supply routes. From the beginning be-ginning of the war our submarines have boldly invaded enemy waters to sink and damage 1,119 ships up to May 2nd. The silent service has, no doubt, inflicted greater damage upon the enemy but the Navy claims are conservative. tic coast. The activities of our ships and aircraft have been strengthened by the laying of mines in Japanese waters. Superfortresses and submarines sub-marines have been known to participate par-ticipate in this undertaking, strewing strew-ing destruction in the Inland sea and in and around major Japa-ese Japa-ese ports. The sea blockade of Japan, whether made effective by warships war-ships or aircraft, cuts the jugular vein of the Japanese empire. Our enemy, like Great Britain, depends upon the sea for life. Japan is susceptible to blockade to a degree de-gree not approximated by Germany, Germa-ny, which, as we have been told after two wars, suffered serious shortages of materials because of the bolckade that prevented the delivery of supplies. |