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Show - -, , " ""ii FORWARD MARCH By H. S. Sims, Jr. a- v MONTHS IS MINIMUM Si OF PREPARATION Ke our full KS CAN BE USED While there will be great mill-, mill-, ,v activity during the balance of P45 the chances are against any Lsive results, unless the Japs fter a preview of American bomb-t bomb-t decide to surrender, whicvh is considered unlikely by most comment com-ment observers. P The transfer of fighting men from Europe, the building of facil-ties facil-ties the transportation and stor-L stor-L of vast supplies and mounting of an actual invasion represent titanic ti-tanic forces and immense detail. It vill take time nd lots of it. Prob-ab!y Prob-ab!y as much as ten months. jo Follow Pattern In Europe . . . The great success that we scored in Europe was due, in large degree to the thoroughness with which1 the invasion was prepared. Wisely our military leaders declined to launch a premature assault. When the Allied armies began to move j France there was ample power in reserve, ample materiel to make good all losses and a reasonable margin of safety. Tis must be repeated in the Pacific. There is a great difference differ-ence in the distance at which we must attack the foe. Across the English Channel we moved millions mil-lions of men and millions of tons of supplies a distance of about 80 miles. In assaulting Japan we must move them five times as far. Moreover, our preliminary bases will be nearly three times as far nrvny in th.it country. Here ngain opinion is somewhat divided without with-out anybody knowing at this time what the top command really has decided. Okinawa Campaign Successful . . . Meanwhile, the actual course of the war is favorable. The capture of Oinawa has been completed, the Island Is being rebuilt Into a huge American base and the losses, despite de-spite what you may have read, were not excessive in view of the number of enemy troops engaged and destroyed. Some commentators commenta-tors have compared our losses upon up-on Okinawa with those at Saipan and Iwo Jima without taking into consideration the relative enemy forces disposed of in battle. Naturally Nat-urally our losses in any battle, upon up-on any scene, will depend more upon the strength of the enemy than upon any other factor. Total casualties of 36,588, Including In-cluding 6,990 killed, while grievous, griev-ous, are not indicative of any military mil-itary mishap. The enemy was skilfully skil-fully dug in, there were more than than 100,000 Japs killed, and because be-cause Okinawa had been a training train-ing ground of Jap soldiers for any years, the entire island was plotted for artillery fire which was, according to testimony, very accurate. Our losses were in proportion pro-portion to the job accomplished and there is nothing to be gained by misunderstanding the cardinal fact of war, that gains ust be paid for. Figures for losses do not include those suffered by the Navy which has heen given a hot time by the Jap suicide planes. We presume, upon the basis of earlies figures, that naval deaths will exceed those of the Army and Marine corps. Incomplete reports upon ships involved include 31 sunk, including 11 destroyers and 54 others damaged. This means that nearly a hundred ships of all type have been put out of action for some weeks or months but our naval superiority is so great that the losses will not interfere with our progressive attacks. Considerable Fighting Ahead . . . The presumption is that subsequent subse-quent attacks upon Jap strong-hols, strong-hols, including the home islands, will take a toll of warships and other vessels. This is inevitable unless we can successfully cripple the Jap air force by bombing attacks. at-tacks. It also depends upon how long we give the air force to complete com-plete the work of destroying Japanese Jap-anese industrial plants, which turn out aircraft. In time, the problem will be mastered. It will not come in a day. Like the aerial sasault upon Germany, the destruction of Japanese economy will require time and if we are patient, reduce our losses, both in men and materiel mater-iel of all types. There is no reason for Americans Ameri-cans to become concerned over predictions that invasion of Japan will mean one million casualties. The nature of. our publicists to be pessiistic is apparent. They were sure of enorous losses in Europe. They didn't materialize. The chances chan-ces are that they will not occur in connection with the war against the Japs but of this we can not be sure. They may. Anyway, we must press on with our warfare and apply enormous pressure to the enemy, leaving it to them to shout, "Hold, enough!" from our industrial sources of supply. sup-ply. This distance-- means more ships and more supplies. It means time. There is much discussion on the air and in the public prints as to the strategy to be followed against Japan We read and hear of two theories: (a) to blockade and bomb the enemy into submission, with the possibility of eliminating an actual invasion and (2) to mount an invasion as quickly as possible, on the theory that by defeating the enemy on the home we will immediately end the struggle. strug-gle. There are points in favor of both plans but, without complete information, it is hardly probable that any layman can decide the matter. We must depend upon the judgment of our expert leaders. They are not altogether unanimous unani-mous in regards to the strategy to be adopted but, after discussing discuss-ing the probabilities, they will determine de-termine the course of our offensive offen-sive movements. When they make known their decision it should be that of every American. There is also discussion about the campaign inside China, whether wheth-er we should supply the Chinese armies, possibly through a port to be seized on the Chinese east coast and then let them fight the Japs out of their country or whether we should attempt to build up an |