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Show I More Proof of Exiled j i Ruler's Aim to Deluge j the World With Blood . I (Special Gable Pispalch to Universal Service. (Copyright, tm'J, by 1 'niven-al Service.) (Gopyrlirht in Great Ihitain and Holland. All rig' tils of republication reserved. ITTKULAM, Holland. Doe. L In the R subjoined fourth chapter of the "Book of Uevelaiions," compiled for the German r.-publioyn government gov-ernment by So.'iali'U Deputy Kaut-sk.', Kaut-sk.', assisied by I 'rol fssor Sell necking ami Count vuii Moutgelas. important additional ad-ditional extracts are from some of the ;on documents of the Berlin foreign office brought to Unlit by the in estimators. Amplifying and llluinimuing the Mimniary presented in the two first chapters, th.se excerpts give f artf'.er proof c-f the em-'jihiiti..: em-'jihiiti..: promisi'S of "unconditional support" sup-port" w ith wliicii Gi.-rnia ny "e.-d" on Anuria in br olans fi.r the partition of S.'rina. Tin-y tend to s iov that "Wilhehn-sti "Wilhehn-sti ass" bopi-d and hcU--v i-d Lhai a k-u-era) Gm-epj.m con lie. gear ion con Id be averted ii". es a emmina l ion to the r-ecret ird i-S.-rbp' u d iplomacy. the world (.on Id be confronted with tlie aceotuplislied fact of Austrian occupation of most of Serbia. Ser-bia. In This resnect "icnna and VP-rlin wore pursuing the blent ie;u riolie.e followed at the time of Austria's annexation of Bos nia and Herzegovina, when Germany de- iiantly annouiecod to the world that any power opposing that high-handed Austrian . coup would have to fight not only Austria i but Germany as well. j Throughout 'the long series of the Kant- ' sky documents runs a threat Indicating f that Berlin and Vienna beiiewd that they could repeal that performance, and that, having once embarked un this great gamble, gam-ble, they went ahead regardless of tiie j consequences until, when they saw a world conflagration was inevitable, the half-lu half-lu a rted. a soil la ting eff rts to avert it can.e too bite to extinguish the fast-spreading' fast-spreading' flames. On July HI. after the Austrian ultimatum ultima-tum had b-en delivered to Serbia. Germany Ger-many told France and Russia, through her ambassadors, that if any outside power should seek k intervene G.-rma iy won hi be "found on th.e side of her ally."' Thought Threat Sufficient. j The documents ,'rave ground for tiie he- j li.'f thai IV'diu hopt-d this and other threa's would ki-p tlvse two powers out of Thf.onfiiel. and tiie kaiser's note.s 1 to Bethmann - Hoiiweg. pjldished y ester- ! da, showed; he had hoped L-lugiaud would 1 stay out. 1 evert lie1 ess. the do-" urn ems showed ('ConiIHe;i on "aca i. ihdumn 1 ' Hims AIM TO DELUGE IWOHLG WITH BLOOD i 1 . ; (Continued From Pago One.) - tie ha-i hoped England would stay out. Nevertheless, the documents show that the deliberate duplicity of AViihemstrasse, enf-cially with regard to the Knglish tnediation efforts, steered the two empires, em-pires, and subsequently the world, Straight into the abyss ot" the great war. i Today's chapter showed further light 6n the Machiavellian attitude taken by fn. Gottlieb von Jagow, then German foreign minister, toward Sir (now Viscount) KdAard (Jrey's attempts at ; fr,ed iation. It shows that Jagow trans mitted the English proposal to the German Ger-man ambassador at Vienna without, however, how-ever, instructing him to submit this proposal pro-posal to the Austrian foreign minister, Count von Berehtold. Jayow thus was iii a position to tell London without lying that he had "actually t-ansmittcd it to Vienna." Meanwhile he had been advising ad-vising Vienna by all means to ignore each and every mediatory proposition. further Revelations. i-The fresh revelations, in chronological order, follow : ; "About the middle of June, 1014, when io all appearances perfect peace prevailed pre-vailed throughout Europe, there took place in Vienna a conference between Count von Berehtold and Archduke Ferdinand, Fer-dinand, heir to the Austrian throne. The kaiser had had a visit witii Francis Ferdinand and had seized the occasion for Ions heart-to-heai t talk with the archduhe. Tht; German amhassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirsehky, reported to Berlin Ber-lin on June 17 that t he archduke had expressed ex-pressed himself highly gratified at his conversations with W'iliielm II, in which "they had discussed in detail every conceivable con-ceivable question" and established perfect per-fect agreement upon all points. ( (Eleven days later the archduke was assassinated at Sarajevo.) Meanwhile Count Tisza, the Hungarian premier, according to T.schirsehky's report re-port to the German government, was persistently refusing to make any territorial terri-torial concessions to Rumania in Hungary. Hun-gary. On the margin of a report to this effect ef-fect from Tschirsehky the kaiser wrote: Rebuke for Tisza. "Me (TTsza) must not- endanger the foreign policy of the triple alliance, which, in the case of the Rumanian question, is influenced by his domestic policy." (Count Tisza, who has been assassinated assas-sinated since, was a thorn in the side both of the Berlin and Vienna governments govern-ments -in the early stages of their aggressive ag-gressive plans against Serbia. He -opposed these plans obstinately until finally, final-ly, on July 1-1, he was won over to their policy, and to Tsehirschky's report on this the kaiser annotated the remark: "There now a man for all that.") Then followed the completion, of the memorandum on the Balkan policy which Berehtold, about mid-June, had instructed instruct-ed the officials at Balplatz (seat of the Austrian foreign office) to draw up lor presentation to Berlin. On July 18, Constantinople Con-stantinople was informed regarding the presentation of this memorandum. This is some of the secret diplomacy that preceded the assassination of the Austrian prince. June 28. Emperor William Wil-liam was expected to attend the archduke's arch-duke's funeral, but, as shown in a previous pre-vious chapter, he was warned to stay away because twelve assassins were reported re-ported ready to murder him, if he came to Vienna. On July 1, still expecting the Un iser's attendance at the funeral, Count Berehtold Bereh-told submitted to Emperor Francis Joseph Jo-seph his memorandum on the Balkan policy and urged the Austrian ruler to seize the opportunity of the kaiser's visit for enlisting the la iter's active support. The chief of the Austro-Hungarian general gen-eral staff, Baron Conrad von Hoetzen-durff, Hoetzen-durff, was instructed to draw up for the kaiser's information an estimate of the prospective military consequences to Austria Aus-tria oi Rumania's secession from the triple alliance in the event of an Austrian Aus-trian War with Russia. (Rumania, it should be explained, was regarded by Berlin and Vienna as a sort of "silent partner" of the triple alliance, on the strength uf certain pre-war agreements.) agree-ments.) Under date of July 12 there is a document docu-ment which proves conclusively that all the aggressive plans against Serbia were hatched and executed oeinnd the back of Italy, a member of the tripiu alliance. Indeed, as previous documents have shown every tning was done to prevent the slightest inkling of the Austro-Ger-nwn machinations irom filtering through to Rome. This deliberate secrecy was later cited by Italy as a proof of her lormer allies' bad faith. Accomplished Fact. The document of July 32 is a note from Cuunt Beremold to the Austrian ambassador at Rome telling lnm that the rejected action against tSeruia. was being termed for about the end of July and that Italy was to be conironted with the tait accompli (accomplished fact). "This was obviously done for tho dual purpose of preventing Italy from registering regis-tering protest and keeping her from directing di-recting h'-r own political orientation in accordance with wuat was happening.) On Juiy 17 Yon.-Jaow (tnen German foreign minister) sent a note to Tschirsehky at Vienna, asking him to obtain ob-tain from Berchtola a deiinition of tae iatter's plan for the partition of Serbia. ""It is necessary," Von Jugow said in 1 that note, "for tne German government to be in possession of the Austrian views regarding the luture of Seroia, since the question would materially miluetice the attitude of Italy and public opinion in England." Whue disclaiming any desire to Impede or limit Austrian action, Von Jagow. repeated re-peated : "It would be valuable to us to have some idea of the eventual direction in which the road is to lead." The following day (Juiy IS) tho Bavarian Ba-varian legation in Berlin sent the report to Munich, previously published in part. This document, the full text of which is now at hand, said further that "German;' "Ger-man;' will seek to restrict the conflict to Austria and Serbia. It is assumed England En-gland and France will enneavor to pacity Russia, who in any case is regarded as being prone to bluff." Germany, the Bavarian report added, would not mobilize and the Austrians would be urged not to mobilize their troops in Galieia, since this automatically automatical-ly would involve a counter-moid lizat ion by Russia and thereafter by Germany j aiid Fiance, and would thus lead to a ! European war. j On July 21 Count Szoegyeny (Austrian ambassador in Berlin) telegraphed to the Vienna government urging it to communicate com-municate to Berlin at the earliest possl- 1 bin moment the Austrian note (to Ser- hta). on the ground that from the very lirst moment all competent German quarters, from the kaiser down, had pledged their uncondil ional support of the proposed action against Serbia. Chancellor yon Bethmann - Hollweg's anxiety with regard to the disposition ot the German fleet has already been shown by the previous quotations from documents,, docu-ments,, as has the contemptuous indignation indig-nation of the kaiser at those warnings from his "civilian chancellor." An additional document sheds further light on thi-s subject. The chancellor telegraphed from his country cat to Von Jagow: "His Majesty's order to the fleet, not to disperse until July 25. makes me apprehend ap-prehend the possibility that if the ultimatum ulti-matum (of Austria to Serbia) Is rejected, i attention might he excited by the fleet; movements ordered f rom (Malvoe?) off : which place the kaiser was cruising at the time, and at the same time it would, In the event of a crisis, be fatal if the fleet were at a wrong place."' Chancellor's Telegram. On July 2". the chancellor sent his telegram tele-gram to Gount von W'edcl (with the kaiser on his (rinse) in which, in add it ion to what lias been previously quoted, he said : "Only the intervention of other powers will draw us into the conflict, and it is not to lie assumed that any such (power) can make up its mind immediately to intervene. "Poincare's (president of France) voyage voy-age itself Is sufficient to delay decisions, since he leaves Kronstadt tonight, is due to visit Stockholm on the 2th, Copenhagen Copen-hagen the 27th, Chrlstiania the 29th, and to arrive at Dunkirk on the 31st. "According to the admiralty's information, informa-tion, the British fleet disperses and proceeds pro-ceeds to home ports on the 27th. "Any premature recall of our fleet might excite general uneasiness, especially on the part of Kngland, who may regard if with suspicion." (It was lo this message that the kaiser defiantly answered, "My fleet has received re-ceived marching orders to Kiel and that's where it's going!') At 3 o'clock that afternoon (July 23) on the night. of which the Austrian ultimatum ulti-matum was presented to Serbia, Count Mensdorff (Austrian ambassador in London) Lon-don) informed Sir Kd ward Grey of the character of the proposed Austrian action ac-tion towards Serbia. A Policy of War. The Italian and Rumanian governments were similarly advised. To the Austrian ambassador at Rome, Count Berehtold, in notifying him of the action against Serbia, addressed a detailed de-tailed expose of his, Berchtold's policy, which he concluded thus: "For the moment, I feel I have been selected by providence to join the ranks of those ministers who desired to pursue a policy of peace but wern compelled to pursue a policy of war. They rank from Cardinal Fleury to Iambadorff, but hope that I will at any rate have better luck than the last named." On July 24, the German ambassadors at Paris and St. Petersburg (Petrograd) intimated in-timated (to the French and Russian foreign for-eign offices, respectively) that if any outside out-side power should seek to intervene between be-tween Austria and Serbia, Germany would be found on the side of her allv. |