Show QUESTION OF DISSOLUTION On the question of dissolution the court holds An an answer to the fact of the dissolution dis-solution of the association i is shown on the part of the government that these I very defendant or most of them immediately im-mediately entered into a substantially similar agreement which was to remain re-main in force for a certain time and in regard to which it does not appear that they are not still acting I the mere dissolution of the association worked an abatement of the suit as to all the defendants a is the claim made on their part i is plain that they have thus discovered an effectual means to prevent the judgment of this court I given upon the question really involved in the case The defendants having succeeded in the court below it would only be necessary thereafter to dissolve their association and instantly form another an-other of a similar kind and the fact of I the dissolution would prevent an appeal i ap-peal to this court or procure its dismissal i dis-missal if taken This result does not and ought not to follow We think therefore the first ground argued by the defendants for the dismissal of the appeal is untenable Coming to the merits of the suit Justice Jus-tice Peckham states that there are two important questions which demand examination ex-amination They are first whether the trust act applies to and cover common carriers by railroad and if s second does the agreement set forth in the bill violate any provision of that act AS TO COMMON CARRIERS held As to the first question the court A contract that is In restraint of trade or commerce is by the strict language lan-guage of the act prohibited though such contract is entered into between common carriers by raidroad and only far the purpose of thereby affecting traffic rates for the transportation of persons and property I such an agreement agree-ment restrains trade or commer itjs prohibited by the statute unless it can be said that an agreement no matter what its terms relating only to transportation trans-portation can not restrain trade or commerce We see no escape from the conclusion that i anv agreement of such a nature doesrestrainltthe I agreement is condemned by this act I I cannot be denied that those who are engaged in the transportation of persons per-sons or property from one state to another an-other are engaged in interstate commerce com-merce and i would seem to follow that if such enter into persons agreements between themselves in regard to the compensation to be secured from the owner of the ai tides transported such agreement would at least relate to the business of commerce and might more or less restrain i The point urged on the defendants part is that the statute was not really intended to reach that kind of an agreement relating only to traffic rates entered into by competing common carriers car-riers bv railroad that i was intended to reach only those who were engaged I in the manufacture or sale of articles of commerce and who by means of trusts combinations and conspiracies I were engaged in affecting the supply or the price or the place of manufacture I manufac-ture of such articles The terms of the I act do not bear out such construction ac constructon We have held that the trust act did not apply to a company engaged in one state in the refining of sugar under the circumstances detailed in the case of United States vs E C Knight company com-pany because the refining of sugar under those circumstances bore no distinct dis-tinct relation to commerce between the states or vyith foreign nations To exclude ex-clude asreements as to rates by competing com-peting railroads for the transportation of articles of commerce between the states would leave little for the act to take effect upon JUSTICE PECKHAMS CONCLUSION The court at this point dwells at some I length on the contention of the railways rail-ways that the interstate commerce act authorizes such an association as the transMissouri Justice Peckham concludes I i r Jf L 4 The commerce act does not authorize author-ize an agreement like the one in question ques-tion I may not in terms prohibit but i is far from conferring either directly or by implication any authority author-ity to make i I the afrreement legal it floes not owe its Validity to any provision of the commerce act commece and if illegal is i it not made so by that act The fifth section prohibits what Is termed pooling but there is no express provision in the act prohibiting I the maintenance of traffic rates among competing roads by making such an agreement as this nor is there any provision vision which permits i As the commerce act does not authorize this agreement arguments against a repeal by implication of the provisions of the act which it is alleged grants such authority becomes ineffectiva There is no repeal in the case and both statutes may stand as neither is inconsistent in-consistent with the other On the point that the Sherman act did not embrace railways the court says saysWe see nothing either in contemporaneous contempo-raneous history in the legal situation at the time of the passage of the statute stat-ute In its legislative history or in any general difference in the nature or kind of trading or manufacturing companies from railroad companies which would lead us to the conclusion that i cannot can-not be supposed the legislature in prohibiting pro-hibiting the making of contracts in restraint re-straint of trade intended to include railroads within the purview of that act Neither is the statute in our judgment so uncertain in its meaning or its language so vague that it ought not to be held applicable to railroads We think after careful examination exami-nation that the statute covers and was intended to cover common carriers by railroad |