OCR Text |
Show : ' THE FL 5TLLX. : I ' X With a Refutation of the Errors Which it Condemns. : - : : f (Translated from the Italian of L. Falcon i.) First Error: Pantheism. There exists ex-ists no Divine Being, no Eternal Providence, Provi-dence, omniscient and supreme, distinct dis-tinct from the universe; God and nature na-ture are identical, and consequently God is subject to change; all things are God, and their substance, is His substance; sub-stance; God is identical with the world, and, as a necessary consequence, spirit with matter, necessity with liberty, truth with falsehood, ' good with evil, what is just with that which is unjust. un-just. Refutation. The first proposition, which confounds God with the universe, is a palpable absurdity, for since no single part of the universe Is necessary, or self-existent, the universe in its entirety en-tirety cannot be necessary or seif-existent; seif-existent; therefore all things are not God. ' Such a God would possess contradictory contra-dictory and mutually destructive attributes, at-tributes, viz., thought and extension. Thought is simple and individual, whereas extension admits of division. Moreover, in the hypothesis, that God and the world are identical, all the existences ex-istences in the world would be mere modifications of the Deity. Now these different modifications, aside from the fact that they import contradictory attributes at-tributes in the same subject, would likewise add to the number of God's perfections, inasmuch as they would impart to Him new qualities, new cognitions, cog-nitions, and new forms of being. They are therefore repugnant to the Divine Nature, which is in its very idea, infinitely in-finitely perfect, and can admit neither increase nor diminution. Pantheism is consequently an impudent and brazen absurdity which laugha reason: to scorn. Moreover, as all things in the universe uni-verse are not. necessary, but contingent, contin-gent, that is. indifferent to their exist-once exist-once or their non-existence, the quec-tion quec-tion naturally arises: Who determined their existence? They did not themselves them-selves determine it, before commencing to exist, because action presupposes existence; ex-istence; nor after they came into being, because they were then already in existence. ex-istence. This existence could not, therefore, there-fore, be determined except by a causa other than and entirely distinct from themselves. If, accordingly, as is manifestly mani-festly the case, there exists contingent being, that is, being indifferent as to its existence or non-existence, we must, in order to avoid, the absurdity of admitting ad-mitting a thing which exists and has not in itself the reason of its existence, exist-ence, or, in other words, an effect without with-out a cause, seek some other cause, which determined its existence, rather than its non-exisitenca Now, unless we wish to admit an infinite in-finite series of beings producing one another, which is absurd, we must admit ad-mit a first cause, itself without a cause a being who exists by necessity of its nature, and who possesses he plentitude of existence, which we call God, living by his own life and substantially sub-stantially distinct from all created things. The God of Pantheism is not a personal per-sonal God. as is evident from the proposition prop-osition above quoted and condemned by the Sovereign Pontiff, and cannot be considered a God at all, since he is continually undergoing the transformations transforma-tions in nature and humanity. Such a God, moreover, does not and cannot adequately account for either nature or humanity when reason, in the assertion asser-tion of its legitimate right, inquires into their origin and demands an explanation ex-planation of their constant action and uninterrupted development in space and throughout tima 1 Second Error: Naturalism "Ond, . j does not exert any directing influence : 1 over men or over the world." . J Refutation This proposition is absurd ab-surd because it denies the provide.'., of God who watches over us, provid-.s for and governs his creatures, mure especially those on whim he has bestowed be-stowed the light of reason. God mteht. had he so chosen, have refrained from the exercise of His creative power, but, to abandon that which He has on. .. created, would be repugnant alike t , His goodness and to His wisdom, ju.--. as it would argue a want of conim.ui sense in the sculptor to take no pains for the preservation of a statue, whi.ii he had fashioned from the rude marble mar-ble and clothed in all the beauties ..f art. God does not. therefore, and cannot can-not neglect His creatures and least f all man who is the noblest work of lf:s Omnipotent hand; on the contrary. Ha governs them by His providential a -ton, and thus secures- the end which He had ire view in their creation. The internal volition of God is identical iden-tical with its external manifesuatior.s. and therefore, the act by which He still preserves the world is not distinct from that by which He willed its creation. Were He for one moment to withdrav.-His withdrav.-His protection, it would be replungcl into the abyss of its original nothingness. nothing-ness. His providential action operates directly upon every one of its part;i at the same time, that it unites them in one harmonious whole: and though the influence of His guiding hand never ci-asea to make itself felt He permits ech particular body to act as a secondary sec-ondary cause ini accordance with the law and proporties of its nature, that is matter according to the rules of necessity, animals according to their J instinct, and man according to the die. i tates of reason and free will, f But if God governs and directs 'everything 'every-thing by His Providence, why ia it that moral evil or sin exists, in the world? The explanation of the prevalence of ; moral evil lies in the fact that God desired the existence of creatures endowed en-dowed with the attributes of reason ' and free will, to be governed by the principles of law and not by blind ne- ( cessity. He desired that these crea- tures should, by conforming to His law, j merit the reward attached to its ob- ' s-ervanee, and He threatened those who violated it with the extremest penalty of His wrath. i It is insisted that, as moral evil is j inconsistent with the infinite goodness . f of God, He should have prevented it, and that He could have done so, while I still respecting the inviolability of , man's- free will. f All things are possible to God, and ! He certainly might have prevented sin, s had He so denired, but such was not j' ' His divine will, nor was there any ob- i ligation on His part to render man's ! I fall impossible, and why? Because the j sole end, which He proposed to him- I self in the creation, was the manifee- i tation of His own glory. And He so- i cures this end both by. the reward which he bestows upon those who ob- , serve His law and by the punishment I inflicted on those who rebel agaimit j His supreme authority. By the graces i which He freely showers upon all men. He gives- them strength to triumph over temptation; and if they refuse to obey His call and thus bring upon themselves the penalty of their disobedience, dis-obedience, He is not responsible for their sin. nor can He be taxed with cruelty or unkindness, simply because He does not, by an act of His omni- j potence, prevent its commission. I (To be Continued.) j |