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Show Manufacturing in 19f41 11 Per Cent Increase in Production Estimated i By jl. V. PRENTLS JR. President National Association of Manufacturers Any estimates as to the volume of total business production In 1941 are closely related to such pro pi ems as priorities and industrial indus-trial capacities. II for example, some Industries Indus-tries are prevented from getting all or part of the materials they . defense production for thi.t year will be 43 M per cent j Tester than th annual rate reacied by October, 1940. Figures for different Industries vary wiilely. For example. It is anticipa ed that Iron anr steel, machine tools, aircraft an i some others vill materially increase their troduction for defense goods aid war exports in 1941. On the other hand, thjre art Industries now producing substantial sub-stantial amounts for defense needs w hose importance in defense de-fense production will decrease In 1941. A nong these are lumber and tex lies. It is elieved the steel Industry Indus-try and other industries essential in the defense effort hafe sufficient suf-ficient rapacity to produce our own defense needs, necessary exports ex-ports to England and production for norr ial uses. It Is believed the capacity in the oil industry is suf f icier t for any needs that might arise. There are other Industries, such as the machine tooll Indus try anr the aviation industry, where t le capacity Is perhaps not sufficient if existing machinery . and proluctive facilities are used desire, whether by priorities or otherwise, this nattrally will tend to reduce their output andl their relative! rela-tive! 1 m p o r-tanee r-tanee in total production. But if materials and labor are de-liberately de-liberately di-Verted di-Verted to some Industries, then these may take up slack occa- v.. Jis sioned by eur- FrenHs tailtnent of other industries. II all Industries alike should nnq tnemseives handicapped because be-cause of transportation, and la-bor la-bor difficulties, and of material shortages, then the total volume of production, including both defense de-fense and nondefense, might decline. de-cline. The estimates which follow are based upon the assumption that defense production will increase on the basis of known and anticipated an-ticipated needs and of Industrial capacity. They are not computed comput-ed pn any basis which forecasts a Shut-down of production in nondefense Industries by government govern-ment order. These estimates are based, moreover, on the assumption that the) war abroad will continue, or that if it should cease, the United Unit-ed States will absorb the production produc-tion which would otherwise have gony to England. They are also baaed on the United States not beifig directly involved in the wat. It is estimated that average production for 1940 on the basis of the federal reserve board fig-urB, fig-urB, Is 121; careful estimates as to (probable average production In 941 indicate a figure of 134 nearly 11 per cent above the 1940 average. Some government economists estimate an increase of 10 per cent over 1940. we obtain a better picture as to the share of defense industries in (this total by taking the figures fig-ures for October, 1940, this being the! last available month for which figures are available. In October, 8.1 per cent of total production pro-duction for the entire country was related to the production of out own defense goods and the supplying of war materials to England. St la esUmated that 1941 will I 13.4 per cent of total production produc-tion going for defense materials and war exports. Because of the higher total of all production in 1941, this means that war and at the present rate and in the present way. On the other hand, een in these industries, taken as a whole, the capacity would presumably be sufficient If the machinery was used 24 hours a day ami if it were possible to provide three shifts of labor a day. 1 This Increase depends ti a considerable con-siderable extent upon the present pres-ent availability of labor, plus the ability of both Industry and government to train additional workers. It should be pointed out thai there might be a possibility possi-bility ; expanding the hours of labor row employed beyond 40 a week This can only be done if the govprnment that Is, ail tax payers--Is willing to pay Increased In-creased prices because of the overtlrre rates that would be involved. in-volved. A demand might be marie that industr es not now producing defense de-fense materials divert a considerable consider-able part of their skilled labor supply to Industries producing defense goods. This would have a consilerable bearing oh shifts of Industry between different segments. It al: io might be poss ble for hotels, office buildings, wtc to divert various kinds of skilled labor f-r production In defense Industr e. .Such diversions would not grratly change the jpropor-tlon jpropor-tlon Indicated previously,! al-' al-' though It might possibly result in expanding defense production to 30, or possibly 60, per cent above 940. I i Such a result would bi assisted assist-ed by s eed in the effective placing plac-ing of orders both by Kngland and by our own military authorities. authori-ties. Uf ing a schedule of delivery dates t hat would avoid overlapping, overlap-ping, II ley would facilitate speed of proi uction. Defe lse production would be further Increased If there should be simplification of specifications and Inspection technique on the part ol our government. |
