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Show , 4 I I 1 I I I I :'MI'.M. 1 H lllll.,M. HI FORWARD MARCH By H. S. Sims, Jr. lll..tllLllMll1lll,llllll,.lllil.lll NllllllllHn-lll ANGLO-AMERICAN THREAT EXPLAINS GERMAN WITHDRAWAL WITH-DRAWAL IN RUSSIA TO THE DNIEPER RIVER LINE The German retreat to the Dnieper Dnie-per river line gives official notice that the Nazis have revised their war strategy and that, from now on, the Teutons will concentrate their strength in a bitter, defensive defen-sive stand against increasing Allied armies. The 950-miles front, from Leningrad Len-ingrad to the Crimea, is only two-thirds two-thirds the length of the line established es-tablished last Summer, from Leningrad Len-ingrad to the Caucasus. This shortening short-ening of the line will release an estimated 500,000 to 750,000 soldiers sol-diers for service in other areas. It requires no great imagination to understand why the Germans have adopted the new strategy. The Anglo-Americans are gradual- ly preparing to throw 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 men into action in Italy and Northern France ,or some other oth-er places in western Europe. Relieving Pressure On Russia . . . The German retreat is the conclusive con-clusive answer to Premier Joseph Stalin's demand for a "second front" and absolutely refutes the idea that the Russians are not being be-ing helped by British and American Ameri-can operations. A retrospective view of the war reveals that Germany was unable to smash Russia in the great campaigns cam-paigns of two Summers, 1942 and 1943. In the Winters that follower fol-lower the Red Army scored decidedly. de-cidedly. Obviously, in view of the record, and the likely prospect of another Russian campaign this Winter, the Nazis had to re-arrange their armies with the knowledge know-ledge that other mighty blows would come elsewhere. Nazis Improve Their War Position . . . While we believe this threat explains ex-plains the German retreat in Russia Rus-sia there is nothing to be gained by discounting the power and drive of the Red Army which undoubtedly un-doubtedly precipitated the withdrawal with-drawal this Summer. The secrecy surrounding Russian operations makes impossible any accurate conclusions and, consequently, we island outposts. A shortage of cargo ships and successive naval defeats have robbed Japan of sea supremacy around vital islands and our increasing aerial superiority super-iority guarantees this advantage. There is also the suspicion that Japanese strategists, like those of Germany, have adopted a policy of defense in an effort to prolong the war and gain a draw. The abandonment of Kiska has been followed by similar moves which indicate that, because of strategy or necessity, the Japanese are engaged en-gaged in a holding-war. Progress In Pacific Encouraging . . . Our war in the Pacific is making greater progress than most Americans Ameri-cans realize. From the Battle of Midway, where Jap offensive plans were destroyed, to the Battle of Guadalcanal, last November where our offensive began, the ambitious Japanese dream of conquest flickered. flick-ered. It has not burned brightly any time in the ensuing eleven months. The stage is set for an aggressive aggres-sive offensive which will be spearheaded spear-headed by the Navy. Smart use of ships, in conjunction with land and air forces, will feature any successful suc-cessful operations, whether they are launched by Lord Mountbatten from India, or General MacArthur from newly-won island bases. Incidentally, with 3,000 miles between them, there is ample room for complementary offensives, without conflict of command or friction of any kind. do not know whether the Soviet's attack upset Nazis strategy by compelling a premature execution of long-range war plans. The German gains are not restricted re-stricted to the advantage of a shorter front. Just as important is the shortening of transport routes. Supplies to the German armies ar-mies in the east, moving from Germany, travel distances that are from 300 to 600 miles less than formerly required. Conversely, Russian supplies to the Red Army must travel this added distance. German Army Remains Powerful . . . The prediction of our military leaders that much heavy fighting must precede Germany's defeat is based upon the estimate that the Nazis have between 8,000,000 and 9,000,000 soldiers available for defense. To crush such military strength will require our utmost exertion, even when we count upon up-on the continued aggressive activity activ-ity of the Red Army. While the air attack upon Germany Ger-many is increasing and the fighting fight-ing in Italy continues the steady mobilization of a huge Anglo-American Anglo-American army goes on in Britain. Brit-ain. Its invasion of Europe will not be delayed but the immense task of organization and transportation transporta-tion require time. Meanwhile the aerial bombardment of Germany will be stepped up, to soften Nazi resistance, and supplies sent to Russia to increase the hitting power pow-er of the Red Army. Not to be overlooked is the newly-created Italian front, where Great Britain, with some French soldiers of the United States and and Italian assistance, are fighting fight-ing Germans. The campaign In Italy proper gives promise of considerable con-siderable pressure upon the Nazis who will have to reinforce their army or give up the land of n Duce. Moreover, our advance up the mainland opens new avenues of attack in the Balkans, which require re-quire increased Nazi attention. Japs Also Revise War Strategy ... Our campaign in the Southwest Pacific is making plain the inability inabil-ity of Japan to supply or reinforce |