Salt Lake Tribune | 1917-03-13 | Page 6 | Bagdad and After

BAGDAD AND AFTER. The capture of BagJud ami Jthe occupation occu-pation of more and more territory in Mesopotamia have a significance beyond mere strategy and military advantage. Military and economic affairs are so welded together in the present war that when one speaks of military advantage he necessarily implies economic advantage advan-tage also. The advantage, therefore, is twofold, tending toward the one goal the defeat of the central power's. The British are entering a rich area just at the planting time. If they, in conjunction with tho Kussiau armies, can occupy all of Mesopotamia and push on into the peninsula of Asia Minor they can shut off from Germany and Austria a source of supplies. Moreover, the pressing hack of the Turks toward Constantinople so that the Russians and English can align their military front ' from Aleppo to the Black sea may mean that the supplies of Russia especially wheat can be transported overland from the Black sea to the Mediterranean. Mediterra-nean. To what extent this can be done is problematical owing to the dearth of railroads. At all events the central powers pow-ers will be deprived of a region which now furnishes foodstuffs and necessary-minerals. necessary-minerals. The occupation of all of Asia Minor would bring about the capitulation of Constantinople and the opening of the Dardanelles. Then there could be no doubt about the economic victory, for ships could sail between the Black sea and Meriterranean with foodstuffs for Italy, France and Great Britain, and with munitions for Bussia. Such a result re-sult of the combined Russian and British drives, even if their armies press on from one victory to another, can hardly be hoped for until late in the summer at the earliest. Whether Germany will send aid to stem the Russo-British wave depends upon up-on how essential the possession of Asia Minor is to her. If she cannot get along 'without Turkish supplies she may be expected to send not only munitions, but an army. At present the Russian and British gains are not important enough to warrant the sending of a German army into Mesopotamia and Armenia. It would perhaps be a safer plan to establish estab-lish a Turko-German front considerably to the westward of a line drawn from Bagdad, now held by the British, and Trebizond, now held by the Russians. A line nearer Constantinople would be comparatively easy to supply and a larger army could be maintained by the shorter than by the longer lines of communication. com-munication. If this deduction be correct the difficulties of the Russians and British Brit-ish will increase as they move forward. If, however, they can seize all of Mesopotamia, Meso-potamia, move into the peninsula of Asia Minor, and thus automatically acquire ac-quire all of Syria as far as Egypt, they will have the Mediterranean as an additional addi-tional source of supply, thereby diminishing dimin-ishing their difficulties. It will be a most intercsting.campaign to watch because of the many contingencies. contin-gencies. There is a chance for strategy of the most masterly kind, and one would be foolish to make predictions of victory.