OCR Text |
Show GENERAL. Iinporlunl Supreme Courl De-cislou. De-cislou. Washington, 21. Justice Davis' supreme court opinion in full has lust appeared in the California case of William .F. and Lucy B. White, plaintifls in error, against Nicholas Lulling. The latter became possessed pos-sessed of the property in dispute by foreclosure of a mortgage given by the Whites, who Bought to recover on the ground that, no title passed to Luning, by reason of misdescription in the ahentl s aeeo. -toe cuuruBuye, as it does not find that the descriptive descrip-tive errors misled any person or caused any sacrifice of the properly, the presumption is that no one was injured by them and that the property prop-erty brought a full price. Obviously, therefore, there are no merits in the defense, and it rests alone on the idea that the sherifl's deeds are to be construed differently from ordinary deeds. Of course, in many respects the rules ol construction are different, but this difference does not extend to a description of property conveyed. In this regard the rules are the same, whether the deeds be made by a party in his own right or by an officer ol the courts. The policy of . the law does not require the courts to scrutinize the proceedings of a judicial sale with a view to deteat them; on the contrary, con-trary, every reasonable intendment will be made in their favor so as tc secure, if it can be done consistently . with legal rules, the object they were 1 intended to accomplish. Is this deed void lor uncertainty of description, or . ran he oronertv intended to be oon- veyed be reasonably located by means ol that description? The court below located it by adopting, except in one instance, the calls for courses and distances, dis-tances, and rejected certain calls for tnown objects as false and repugnant. It is true that as a general rule monuments, natural or artificial, referred re-ferred to in a deed, control in its construction con-struction rather than courses aud distances, dis-tances, but this rule is not indexible. It yields whenever taking all particulars particu-lars ol the deed together it would be absurd to apply it. For instance, il the rejection of a call for a monument, would . reconcile other parts of the description and leavo enough to identity the land and render certain what the sheriff in tended to convey, it would certainly be absurd to retain the false call and thus defeat the conveyance. Careen-leaf, Careen-leaf, in his treatise on evidence, first volume, section 301, speaking on this subject, in effect says that where the description in a deed is true in part, but not true in every particular, so much of it as is false is reiecttd and the instrument will take effect il sufficient description remains to ascertain as-certain its application. Applying this rule to the subject matter of this deed we do not think there is any difficulty in reaching the conclusion that it is sufficiently certain to pass the title to the land. Alter making this application by discussing various details, the court affirmed the decision deci-sion oi the court below in favor ol Luning. |