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Show The Utah Enterprise Review , January 19, 1977 Page 19b Pragmatic Dogmatics Legislative Replacements by Kent Shearer Let us assume that your State Representative or State Senator dies, resigns or is removed from office. From a sense of public obligation (neither the pay nor the publicity is worth it), you determine that you will attempt to fill the vacancy. With what provisions of law and political dynamics should you concern yourself? The Utah Constitution delegates replacement procedure to such statute as the Legislature may enact. Responsive to that Utah Code Annotated delegation provides: (1) the Governor shall appoint the successor; (2) who shall be of the same political party as his predecessor; (3) who shall have the endorsement of the legislative district central committee of that party; (4) who shall be a resident of the district; and (5) who shall serve until the next general election. Read literally, it would appear that the statute contemplates one of two procedures. Either the appropriate central committee sends an unlimited list of approved aspirants to the Governor from which he selects, or the Governor appoints subject to central committee approval. In fact neither method is followed, as is illustrated by the steps recently taken to name a Salt Lake Senatorial District 7 replacement for GOP Senator Douglas G. Bischoff, who had resigned. 20-1-- 5, , In harmony with prior practice. Governor Matheson requested that the Senate 7 Central Committee certify to him three names from which he would appoint. The Republican County Chairman then Set dates and times for indication of candidacy and an election meeting. Some eight candidates responded and, prior to the central committee ballot, more or less sought the support of the members who were empowered to accord them approval. The vote was held (in something of a departure from precedent, a form of preferential ballot was utilized), three names passed on to the Capitol, and the Gubernatorial appointment support. Third, the system gives the Governor considerable bargaining power, if he opts to use it. Although I am aware of no instance in which it has transpired, he could condition his appointment on a pledge by a candidate to support significant portions of the Gubnatorial legislative program. When, as was the case with Senatorial 7, the Governor is of a different political persuasion than the appointee, his selection may be warped by the influences of his party members and platform. All in all, legislative replacement methodology has worked well in the past. As a matter of principle, however, it may well be that either the statute should be altered to conform to the practice now in vogue, or that practice should be changed to fulfill more exactly the statutory mandate. Better yet, both the statute and the practice should be revised more adequately to assure that the replacement legislator is as truly representative of his constituents as was the person he or she replaces. ensued, effective until the 1978 general election. In addition to its surface departure from literal legislative interpretation, the replacement process contains several aspects of interest. First, the central committee (at least in Salt Lake County) is comprised of the chairman and of each affected voting district, not as in the case of usual legislative nominations - state or county convention delegates. Those who make the initial choice, thus, are not necessarily persons knowingly appointed legislative selection responsibility by their respective mass meetings. vice-chairm- an it is conceivable that the Three name modus operendi could break, not just bend, the statute. A failure to be one of the three does not imply absence Second, wn terns, m I of approval: among those passed over in Senatorial 7 were two State Representatives elected November past, and it is difficult to conceive that either was disapproved. Conversely, it is mathematically possible that one of the three "approved could wend his way onto the list although actively disapproved by an actual central committee majority provided he had ample minority shave RMER0ASE iu vcue oim TO kom H3M6.AU ip M-H6I- 4TIM65A m U6 PKK. UXkR .SUITS HP AFACSIMItP HtXJR flasffiam eemMetir. SGM.HIUI-FIAS- BUT & CFAU.UATWUS. w met m&i MPOMDW AUP,U83?(:W H&) S&e"5' Au. VISIT, bhiawupau 6FQX0T vOuesafA IU THE GUSH- - TVRSflrSP IU POBUC (OlNZHfie ime-vieios.s- er ee&eu OILY WITH iupusiriae- ISK. THEY APP T0 CMP W 184 IWCH TAP6IRS7r icok mw 6COPA60X uuajo) THE PORTRAIT: WR Pkesv6e. H ERA and Its Alternatives by Parker M. Nielson c 0 u N T E R P 0 I N T The proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which has already been ratified by a large number of states and may be proposed again to the Utah legislature, declares that equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any state on account of and gives the Congress power to enforce the sex amendment. That is a goal I wish the sponsors of the amendment success in achieving. Nevertheless, there is doubt, at least in my mind, as to whether ERA is the proper approach, or even the most desirable, to achieve its laudatory objectives. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution already declares that no State shall . . . deprive any person of . . . the equal protection of the laws and it has never been held by any court that I am aware of that a woman is not a person. It is difficult to perceive how the language of ERA is any stronger than that already in effect or why it is necessary in face of the clear mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ladies repond that ERA is necessary because the Supreme Court has refused to recognize their rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and that, therefore, an unequivocal declaration of rights is necessary. Respectfully that just will not wash. Why the High Court would pay more heed to the declaration that equal rights shall not be denied ... on account of sex than that states shall not deprive any person of . . . the equal protection of the laws is obscure, even if the premise that the Supreme Court is hostile to womens rights is accepted, and I have to deny that it is so. Moreover, it is not at all clear that the Supreme Court is not susceptible to logic or that it is out of tune with the mood of the times in any event. Too many cases may be cited in in areas such as voting rights, child support recent years in which full and equal rights have and labor relations been enforced on behalf of women. Further, I favor a constitution which broadly declares rights, as in the Fourteenth Amendment rather than a laundry list which ERA tends to be. The point, however, is more practical than legal. It is undeniable that women are deprived of equal rights and equal protection of the laws in many areas. It must also be agreed, among reasonable minded and fair persons, that something ought to be done to rectify that situation. The doubt I have is whether ERA is the best way to go about achieving that objective. The issue of womens rights must be decided in the courts, with or without an ERA. Meaning and effect must be given to the Constitutional language, whether it be that of the ERA or the Fourteenth Amendment, and it is difficult to see one as a better vehicle for that task than the other. Why not simply get on with the task and save the enormous expenditure of time and resources that has been applied to ERA? Considering that the effort to adopt ERA has been in progress now for almost five years, in virtually every state of the union, it is probably that the needed litigation could have already been concluded, at less expense than has been incurred in the effort to ratify ERA. The task is not significantly different than that confronting Dr. King when he started his bus boycotts. He was also confronted with adverse decisions on the equal rights of the black minority. Through his efforts attention was focused on the inequity of those decisions and changes resulted. The ladies, I submit would be better advised to follow' the same course. |
