Show condral qs pl E 11 A F V oj of the me I 1 A E r 1 F Ws W b ath north world iju Clen general cral i th 8 al in mithu revved dudlin aidis la Cm in or 1 t john tl t l J 1 pers 0 hing I 1 8 io CHAPTER continued in malting mailing our dispositions for or bat tle tie our older divisions the first see ID ond ull and forty second had received rec elvei p positions on the southern face appo s site lie the open spaces to enable then them t to 0 flunk flank the wooded areas quickly thus aiding the advance of less elpe units assigned to these areas tile whole line pivoting piloting its as planned on the eighty second on the right advanced resolutely to tile the attack the entire operation was cur car ried through with basli and precision by afternoon the troops had pushed beyond their scheduled objectives and by evening had reached the second days objective on most of the southern front the division of the fourth corps corp 8 dickman and th those 0 as on in the left of the first corps liggett overwhelmed the hostile garrisons and quickly overran their positions carrying the fight ing into the llie open the german resist dice alice on tills this part of the front was disorganized by the rapidity of our advance arid and was soon overcome although the enemy was expecting an attack tie he did not think it would take place so SD soon and it therefore came as a surprise when the first division on the marching flank of the southern attack had bad broken through the hostile for word ward positions the squadron of caa alry airy attached to the fourth corps was passed through the breach at 14 p m it pushed forward to reconnoiter recon the roads toward Vigne vigneulles ulles but en countering machine guns gung in position was forced to retire western attack slower on the western race face of the salient ballent progress pr oges was not so satisfactory the twenty sixth division in its attempt to make a deep advance toward VIgne vigneulles ulles met considerable resist ance and except for a battalion of the division reserve had bud not cot reached the days objective the french at the lipof the salient had bad attempted to follow up tile the hanks flanks of our successful penetrations but made only small advances upon the request of gen C E J Blond lat corn com mantling the french second colonial corps a regiment of the eightieth dl di vision in reserve was vent lent to his assistance on the afternoon of the twelfth learning that lot the roads lending leading out of cf the salient between the two atta attacks its c were filled with retreating enemy troops with will their trains and artillery I 1 gave orders to the commanders of the fourth and fifth corps to push forward without delay using the telephone myself I 1 directed tile the commander of the fifth corps to send at least one regiment of tile the twenty alith division toward vig neulles with all possible speed that evening a strong force from the fifty first brigade pushed boldly forward and reached at a m the ath it immediately immediate y made dispositions that effectively closed the roads loads leading out of ta the salient west of that point in the fourth corps the second brigade of the first division advanced in force about down dawn of tile the mill its leading elements reaching Vigne vigneulles ulles by 6 a in the salient was closed and our troops were musters masters of the field could have passed hindenburg line the troops continued to advance on the lath when tile line was approximately along the final objectives set for this offensive in view lew of tile favorable situation created just west of the lie moselle river by our successes further farther to the left a limited attack was made on that part of the front by elements of the eighty sec ond and ninetieth divisions with good results during the night our troops all along the line were engaged in ili organ izing their new positions im foi defense preparatory to the withdrawal of dl di visions and corps troops for in the meuse aleuse argonne battle september 14 15 and 10 16 loul loca lopera opera dilons continued continue consisting of strong and occupation of better ground tor for defensive durpos nn auses ses beginning the lie lath several counter attacks were repulsed the line as finally established wits vms fresnel fresnes en cn doncourt saulny jaulny Vand leres reports received the leth and indicated that the enemy was retreat ing in considerable disorder without doubt an immediate continuation of the advance would have carried us well veil beyond tho the hindenburg line and possibly into metz and the tempha tion to press on wits was very ery gi gibat eat hut but we would probably have become deeply involved and delayed the greater meuse argonne operation to which we were wholly committed during the lighting front september 12 to 10 the german one hundred and twenty fifth eighth landwe lir eighty eighth mid and twenty eighth divisions re enforced the line hue anil and several other divisions arrived in reserve po september 18 13 in front of the first timy any here were ten german divisions and two brigades in line and seven seve divis divisions lons in reserve french french Over overjoyed loyed by release w s birly arly prisoners were taken end ana some aw enemy guns had boa fallen into our bands our casualties num bared about As the enemy retreated he set fire bre to many large supply dumps and several villages til lages the few remaining french inhabitants who found themselves within our lines were were overjoyed to be released from the domination of the enemy but many were left destitute by the burning of their homes at the very moment of deliverance on the general came by my headquarters and we went together to st where the people including children carrying french lags flags gave us a welcome w which aich may well be imagined when one realizes that they had been held its as prisoners entirely out of touch ath their own countrymen for four years though always within sight of the french lines on my visit to several corps and division headquarters the following day 1 I found nil all jubilant over tile the victory and overflowing with incidents of the fighting reciting many cases of individual heroism among the troops CHAPTER I 1 in accordance accordi ince with the understanding of september 2 we were now moving rapidly toward our second great offen offensive questions concerning the concentration and supply of the elements of the first army in tile the bottle battle areas were being worked out by the a taff staff of that army who were given every possible assistance by the staff a at t 0 11 Q the general plan of action of the allied armies as agreed upon nt at the of commanders in chief july 24 was to state it simply and briefly that the offensive should con dinue each army driving forward ai a rapidly as possible the allied and american operations during the sum mer had resulted in tile the reduction of the chateau Clia thierry Tb Th lerry allens akiens and st sal salientes lents and the grent great offensive was now under way immediately west of the meuse adeuse river the battle line had remained practically unchanged since 1017 1917 it wits was on this front the american army was to play its great part the disposition of the belgian british french and american armies on the wide front between the north sea and verdun was such that they would naturally converge nerge co its as they advanced so long as the enemy could hold his ground on the east of this battle line frontal attacks farther west might drive him back on ills his successive post eions yet a decision would be long delayed de yanks face strong position ills main line of communication urn and supply run ran through carlnon Carl Cari guan nin sedan 1 und and Mez leres if tint that should tie he interrupted before lie cald withdraw ills armlee from france ranee and the in the hie mirrow ave aue which lay between the he Ar dennes denns forest ind and the hie dutch frontier were so at limited that he would ne unable nile ade auntely iun flun tely to supply his forces or in evau evacuate ate thein before tits his ruin would be accomplished As our objective was tile the sedan carl ann railroad it was evident the sector assigned to the american army was opposite the most sensitive part of the german front then being attacked the danner danger confronting the enemy made it imperative that he should hold on in front of the american army to tile the limit of ills ilia resources germans strongly fortified the area between the meuse river and the argonne forest was ideal for defensive fighting on the east tile the heights of the meuse commanded that river valley and on oil the west ahe rugged high hills or of tile the argonne for eat dominack d the valley of the lie alre aire river in tile the venter enter the watershed between the ure kire and the meuse commanded command pd both valleys with the heights of loinel cunel Ll inel ko ito mange and of the bols de Harrl conn standing out as natural strong point from these heights observation poll completely covered the entire german front the terrain over which the a attack wag as t to 0 be made inn deformed formed a defile bl blocked by t three successive barriers tile the heights tit of montfaucon Mont faucon then those of cartel a and ad ilo om manKe ange and farther back tile the ridges of the bola bois de Bar barricourt ricourt and of the he hols bois tie de bourgoyne the meuse river waa was the alre aire river fordable only to ID places in addition to the heavy forest of the argonne there were numerous woods with heavy undergrowth which were serious obstacles these natural defenses were strengthened by every artificial means imaginable A dense network of wire entangle ments covered every position it was small wonder the enemy had rested tour four year on this front without being molested hindenburg position Is objective in accordance with the principal m mission which remal remained ned the same throughout this great offensive the main attack of the first army was to be launched west of the meuse river its right to be covered by the river and by the operations of the french seventeenth corps on the east of the river that corps being a part of our army our left was to be supported by a simultaneous attack by the french fourth army our attack to include the argonne forest was to be driven with all possible strength in the gen eral ral direction of af Ale tile the first operation of our army was wai to have for its objective the alinden burg position on the me front sur mouse meuse sous montfaucon grand e with a following development in the direction of buzancy Mey leres in order to force the enemy beyond the meuse and outflank his positions on the rethel une line from the east in conjunction with our advance which would outflank the position south of the alane the french fourth army by attacking successively the positions between the theA lsne and the suippes rivers would be able to ciupy the line after that it would operate in the direction of tile the plateau east of the rethel kethel sig ny habbaye road alm aim at tacal tactical ca I 1 surprise our purpose was to effect a tactical surprise if possible overcome the first and second positions in the area of montfaucon Mont faucon and cote dame marle of his third position before the enemy could bring up strong re it was an ambitious ambition plin and oie oi 01 e ant would require a rapid advance of ten miles through a densely fortified zone froin an estimate of the reserves and their location it wits was realized that vae must capture enire and belze cote pame dame marle hearle by the end of the second day it wits was thought reasonable to count on the visor vigor and aggressive spirit of our troops to make up in ID a measure for their inexperience but at the same time the fact was not overlooked that me ra 4 iq ST MIHIEL OFFENSIVE os aa I 4 CIA I 1 11 V 4 0 1 0 2811 1 IN I 1 I 1 11 M alo e ell of C st I 1 I 1 I 1 eiJA tj P 4 1 ln aren 1 3 t A I 1 IN 71 y 4 5 i P va 47 katat 4 oe ZIP J dar Y 11 41 1 iv tn 4 s N ape I 1 up x ix W 1 I 1 k S 0 W V 4 1410 sp ftp faz TV a r r ko lack of technical skill might consider ably reduce the chances of complete success against well organized tie de fenders general had already given len it ns as tits his opinion that we e should not be able to get further than mont faucon before winter ft inter CHAPTER the mouse aleuse argonne offensive open opened ed the morning of september 20 26 to call all it a battle may be a misnomer yet it was ft as a battle the greatest most pro longed in ili american history through 47 days we were engaged in a per sistena struggle str uKle with ath the lie enemy to smash through his defenses ohp attack started on a front of nf 2 24 miles allies which gradually extended until the enemy wits vas being actively assal as balled led from tile argonne forest to the mo hin selle river R 00 miles in all more than hian were em aloyed and the HIP attack was dri driven v e n 1 82 13 2 miles mile to tile the north and 14 miles to the northeast before the armistice ter ml allied hostilities the outstanding fact that I 1 desire to emphasize Is that once started tile the battle was maintained continuous sly aggressively find relentlessly to I 1 the ie end all difficult difficulties les were ere overridden in n one tremendous sustained effort I 1 to 0 terminate the war then and there 1 in n i vIctor victorious lous manner after three hours dolent artiller artl llen ller the attack attach belati at rim a ci at the same time to divert the attention elsewhere local raids and demonstrations were made on the meuse moselle front the french fourth army gouraud Gour nud to our left on the west of the argonne forest began its attack half an hour later the battle opened favorably our attack at that particular place lad and at that time evidently came as a a sur bur prise to the enemy and our troops were enabled quickly to overrun his forward positions the vast network of undestroyed destroyed nn barbed wire the deep ravines dense woods and heavy fog made it difficult to coordinate the movements of the as assaulting bulling infantry especially of some divisions in battle for th the first time yet the advance throughout vias wa extremely vigorous third corps reaches second line the third corps bullard nearest the Af medise ellse carried the eremya second position before dark the thirty third division bell wheeling to the right as it advanced occupied the west hank bank of the meuse to protect the flank of the army the bols bois tie de forges with its difficult terrain and strong machine gun defenses was carried in splendid fashion the right of the eightieth division had bad by noon cleared the bols bois jure in the face of heavy machine gun fire and established its line north of dannevoux on its lift left after an till nil day tight fight the division forced it its a way through the strong positions on hill and reached the northern slopes of that hill the fourth division Ill illanes nes on the left of the eightieth took Sept arges and firmly established itself in th the e woods to the north it was abre abreast a at of and its left was more than a mile beyond montfaucon Mont faucon but through some misinterpretation of the ordera by the third corps the opportunity to capture montfaucon Mont faucon that day lay was lost three counterattacks counter attacks against the division during the afternoon were broken up fifth corps falls fall short in the center the fifth corps cameron with the exception of the nine ty first division johnston on its left fell short of its objectives the seventy ninth division kuhn on the right of the corps took malan court but in the open ground beyond encountered considerable opposition and the advanced elements were not in id position before montfaucon Mont faucon until late afternoon the attack of the division launched against this strong point early in the evening was met by the ore |