| Show Gel teral in all coun count tle I balb by th nort north A american me rl N story off the ae A E M F scandinavian world right light reproduction r dd t ion in whole prohibited AN osgy y gess gen john ahn I 1 service CHAPTER XIV in response to my request to wash eton for an experienced man to take of rail transportation IV W atterbury general manager of 0 the pennsylvania railroad arrived lu iti prance franco and reported to me september 1 1917 at Atter burys suggestion a cable was sent requesting certain men to fill important positions in the tion the alst I 1 included ne I 1 u ded J A mcrae mckae genral general manager 0 of f the long island railroad for general manager with P tl 11 bun bunting t ing as business manager 11 II C 0 booz bonz a as s engineer for construction and nd J G rogers bogers as deputy the rail way problem was far from easy and ina ciany by the obstacles obstacle s to be overcome botti in our own and in the french services successful manage nent would h have been very doubtful as aa practicable and aviation was organized and maintained as a distinct force to ordinate coordinate co our training with that at home brig gen william th okenly kenly was sent sen tover over the latter part of august and was appointed chief of aviation in the A B E P F colonel mitchell Ml who ft ho had succeeded major dodd the first firk chief of aviation was given jurisdiction over aviation in the zone of advance major boiling was placed in charge of aviation in the zone ot of tile the Inter interior lor and soon succeeded in securing a better operation cooperation co through fin an aircraft board the next essential step was the training of airplane pilots and accordingly arrangements were made tor for our men to enter flying schools to in england gland franceane france and italy after they had passed their preliminary tests testa at home va canales weri wem held for us in the schools A 4 building in france used as school for officers of the A E F under cinder a leader without Atter burys patience ability and force of character visits to our training areas by the french official and otherwise had bad be come rather frequent one of tile the visitors al georges clemenceau who always remained a power even een when not in any official position Clemene clemenceau cau was not then prime minister called pt jut the headquarters of the first clyl slon elon accompanied by general de castelnau the commander of the group of armies with which it was serving clemenceau urges urge action in the course of the conversation with general albert the division commander tl al clemenceau with considerable emphasis urged that our troops be put into the line without delay it was explained to him by general de Cast lenau that as soon as they were sufficiently advanced the troops of the division were to be placed by brigades with the french in a quiet sector near Lu huneville neville il clemenceau went on to say that america had now been in the war several months and the french people were vere wondering when they expected to take an active part no he said that the french army was exhausted by tile lie war and that its morale was poor lie ile insisted then as he did with even greater vehemence later on in an ofal caal capacity that it anns not so much it A question of troops being ready its as it was of giving relief to the allies although the division was only partially trained it could have been used in an all emergency but there here was nothing threatening in the situation at that time and no suggestion had been made that it should go into the line for serious work the failure of our aviation bureau to keep abreast of airplane development in the contending armies cost us serious delay with a lack of data in the beginning little progress had been made at home on our aviation program at the end of five months fruitless efforts to describe mechanical construction and give definite information concerning production and otherwise reach decisions by cable prompted washington to send a special mission to france of f which maj R 0 boiling was the head through ills his ability and expert knowledge he rendered exceptional service in operating cooperating co with those in contrat of allied aviation and in furnishing the necessary technical information upon which to base action at home the investigation made by ills his mission confirmed the view that our manufacturers could not begin to furnish planes before the summer of 1018 pershing orders planes after inquiry as aa to french capacity to turn ou out it planes I 1 made a contract with tile the air ministry late in august toni committing us to an expenditure of for planes and engines to be delivered as rapidly as possible at intervals before the first of june 1018 on condition that we should provide certain tools and raw materials to make a contract to pay such an amount appeared somewhat bold but under the circumstances wine come one asid to take the initiative in providing alanes lanes needed at it once tor for tue be envelopment development of our air force AS all aviation was in no 10 sense dpn e fl a logical branch of the signal corps UK 1110 two were separ separated atod to ID the A B M F ii as huott but we were unable to take full advantage of this opportunity for training because of the delay in sending over flyers however we proceeded with the establishment of our own tra training ning centers the first of which located at was planned for a capacity of JOO pilots by spring use of gas new problem the use of poisonous gases in warfare had been discussed at the hague conference in 1899 1890 with the result that several nations pledged themselves against tile the employment of projectiles jec tiles the only object of which was to give forth suffocating or poisonous gases tills this action had created a feeling of se cuilty regarding such a possibility sib lity lifty germany had subscribed to the agreement and when her armies disregarded this pled pledge e and became the first to use gas shells the impression was that they had now thrown every consideration of humanity to the winds this action liy by the enemy forced the allies to adopt this weapon themselves as a matter of self protection from aiom that time on the employment of gas became common to all combatants the use of gas in warfare presented nn an entirely new problem to ta us S all and d the organization of a service to handle it demanded immediate attention the first plan of the war department provided that the engineers should devise and handle the mechanical features and the medical department the chemical but this soon proved to be impractical and it became evident that it as 9 W we e had maintained at the beginning a separate service would be necessary Blean meanwhile while application was made for a complete chemical laboratory to be shipped to france for use mainly to in investigation as supplementary to similar work in the states gas service established considerable information concerning gases and tile the organization of gas troops had been gathered gathe redby by my start staff and on august 18 col amos A fries was designated as chief of the gas service ile he made some further investigation of the subject in the british and french armies and as a result nn an order issued depte september rober 3 established a department known tit at that time ns as the gas service experiments were at once begun to discover new gases and devise improvements prove ments in gas masks to save tonnage and avoid the dangers of explosion in transit it was decided after consultation with the allied services to request the shipment fro from in the states of the basic elements and manufacture the chemical products in france after thorough tests of different types of gas masks we adopted the box bos respirator used by the british and a preliminary purchase of was made to meet immediate demands for training with the development of trench weapons and special tactical methods of defense never had the offen offensive been rora costly in human life than in this war the ingenuity of the allies was put to tile the test to devise new engines of war that would make the attack possible without excessive losses while the took tank which was simply no an armored caterpillar traction motor car was favored by many officers as an aid in 0 o advancing infantry this opinion was by no means our lay layeski esti gat gallons ions however led to the conclusions that we should accept allied experience per peri lence ence and also adopt the tank as a weapon CHAPTER XV I 1 received ninny reminders september 13 that another birthday lind find come including a surprise pit party arty by toy my staff that evening As this was exactly three months after I 1 had readied inels 1 I the time seemed to be passing very rapidly with littie apparent progress against the day when oil en allier american can army should be ou on the front line the importance of shipping for america was vas beginning to be consid ered in allied circles I 1 received a letter from general robertson bertson Ho british chief of staff who spoke of their increasing losses and of ills his anxiety regarding the voyage of our troops across the atlantic As to tonnage for us he said it wits was entirely between great britain and ourselves ourse hes as as none of the other allies could furnish any to speak of on top of this in confer conference ence a few days later with lord derby the british minister of war I 1 was told that ills his government could not be co counted tinted on to furnish us with ships ibias as aa transports the substance pt general robert sons letter was cabled to washington suggesting the importance of taking advantage of the opportunity offered to obtain additional shipping A few days litter later we were told that needful arrangements for transatlantic transports were being made by the shipping board gloomy time for allies there was little in tile the general altu situation to give comfort to the allies losses by the british through continuing operations lons were still growing there no longer remained any doubt as to dussias Rus sias fate and it was consequently certain that german troops on that front would be released for service in the west under the circumstances the tired allied people were easily influenced by rumors the popes proposal issued in august started some talk of pence peace but as it failed to condemn germanys germanas Germ anys violation of treaties and her inhuman submarine warfare the note did not make a favorable impression on the allies in fact it was was criticized in terms that tha I 1 were not at all moderate the various replies from the different governments did however arouse some hope which was altogether unwarranted by the real attitude of the belligerent powers on either side the discussion was unfortunate because the french people not realizing that peace was improbable lost some of their courage and the depression front from this and other factors caused uneasiness among both civil and military leaders from our sources of information which included the intelligence bureaus of the allied armies we got the impression that austria bulgaria and turkey would make peace on any reasonable terms if they could do so visits visit artillery school the military post of le valdahon Val dahon near the swiss border used by as BI an a school tor for our field artillery was ans one of several which had been kindly set it part apart for americans in different parts t 63 i american troop iraln irain passing through a french town of france the others were at cost cuidan and meacon meucon near st nazalee Naz alre atre and at bouge and la corneau Corno au near bordeaux and also at Blont morillon saumur and angers with a school for or heavy artillery at mailly auth southeast cast of rheams the school at valdahon Val dahon dalion was then under the direction ot brigadier general march alarca no nn energetic and alert commander at the time of ray my visit the fifth sixth and seventh regiments comprising the field artillery brigade of the first division were there for training As to the signal corps and its pr progress 09 colonel russell before leaving washington had ordered a large consignment sign ment of material for both telegraph and telephone services but so far none had been received except what was sent with us on the baltic finding it necessary to establish our mr own service in paris where the city system was almost useless we were fortunately able at once onca to obtain enough material for the purpose ta bi england alii france the signal corps had find of course to anticipate the communications necea sary in III battle therefore definite decisions wen required some soine time little in ad vatice vance as to of operations tons of material most of which except wire wits obtained in france and any amount of labor was used usa in the actual installation the main telephone and am lines tit in proximity to the battle area were when uld andl underground ng round to pre one of the crying needs winn we once I 1 begun began to use ase our own lines was for exper experienced fenced operators instead of trying to train men of ilie corps requested that a number of experienced e n girls who could french ile be sent oer and eventually we had about girls on this duty No civil telephone service that ever ca came me under my observation excelled the perfection of our system after it was well established the alie telephone hone girls in the lie A E P F took great gr ait pains ilia and pride in their work a and nd did dd it 1 with satisfaction to all the hospital problem the medical departments plans con s tautly received my careful attention through frequent conferences with tile the chief surgeon colonel bradley and ills his assistant colonel ireland our lern lem ot of handling tile sick and wounded was more difficult than that of any of the allies as we had no civil ito of our own available full provision therefore had bad to he be made for hospital ac coranic flatirons flat ions in france as only convalescents manifestly unfit for further service could be sent home linroe the early estimates submitted in august based upon a small force of men called for beds in permanent or temporary hog hoa and plans tor for expansion were in hand to keep keel pace with the expected requirements of our armies onea they should become engaged while this beginning ripp appeared eared quite liberal yet it was calculated to meet further demands of the immediate future all the he facilities through france were available for the french yet they had so many sick and wounded that their hospital resources were pretty well vell exhausted As there bo ollya few suitable buildings that cou could id be assigned to us we had to plan considerable new construction this required additional labor and material both of abich were scarce and although althou gli there was some delay we man managed liged by persistent effort to keep pace with requirements danger of coal shortage the destruction by the german array army of tile the mines of northern france had forced the importation from england of a large proportion of the coal needed tor for various purposes in both france and italy lack of cross chan nel tonnage had produced a serious situation and the danger of coal shortage during the approaching winter gave us much concern italy was even worse off due to the greater distance front from the source of supply the outcome of our efforts with the very effective assistance of admiral hayo alayo was that some co colliers lifers one of which was already at brest were ordered into service for immediate us usa and these were supplemented later by vessels from the shipping board an organized cross channel service ya vs completed under the control of our quartermaster department and later transferred to the transportation department part ment although the coal question became more or less critical nt at various times in |
